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Sandbrink's preprint on AI and biological misuse (arXiv v1, 24 June 2023) states that large language models such as GPT-4 are already able to provide dual-use information that could have enabled historical biological weapons efforts to succeed. Copy claim link
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Machine-checked, not reviewed by an editor Stated in source Supported
Supporting evidence: primary · 2 sources
Subject version arXiv v1 (24 June 2023) · Published 2023-06-24 · Effective date not established · Revised 2023-12-23 Date 2023-06-24 · publication Role Articulation Register (kind of text) Nonfiction Scope of the passage Stated as a claim about information provision, with historical programmes as the comparison. Scope and limits The record documents what version 1 of this preprint states; it is not evidence that the proposition is true, implies no influence between texts, and does not carry over to the later versions, which were not retrieved.
The evidence 02 primary source Supports the claim
Artificial intelligence and biological misuse: Differentiating risks of language models and biological design tools ↗ arXiv (preprint, Jonas B. Sandbrink, Nuffield Department of Medicine, University of Oxford) · Publication date unknown
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Source excerpt “LLMs, such as GPT-4, are already able to provide dual-use information that could have enabled historical biological weapons efforts to succeed.” Location in source Abstract, PDF p. 1
How it was read Retrieved directly from the publisher
Machine-checked · 2026-10-30
Source details and check notes Authors arXiv (preprint, Jonas B. Sandbrink, Nuffield Department of Medicine, University of Oxford) Version Retrieved for the candidate pack on 2026-10-28 (SHA-256 1ab85d8647f2d23079d35eb8162b70b3f970094106808ef4291fb89615db0afa). arXiv v1 of 24 June 2023 (the article was revised to v8 on 23 December 2023; this record cites v1 only) Retrieved again at admission on 2026-10-30 (SHA-256 1ab85d8647f2d23079d35eb8162b70b3f970094106808ef4291fb89615db0afa, the same bytes). Canonical address Open the canonical source ↗ Accessed 2026-10-28 Language English (en) Attribution arXiv (preprint, Jonas B. Sandbrink, Nuffield Department of Medicine, University of Oxford), “Artificial intelligence and biological misuse: Differentiating risks of language models and biological design tools”. Reuse No open redistribution licence asserted. Bibliographic metadata, editorial paraphrases and short attributed quotations (at most 50 words each). Recheck terms before wider redistribution. Check notes Candidate pack passage, AI and biosecurity (research/ai-bio). The quotation (21 words) matched the text retrieved for the candidate pack on 2026-10-28 and again at admission on 2026-10-30, in a fresh retrieval whose SHA-256 equals the pack’s. Matching ignored differences of whitespace, case, quotation marks, dashes and Unicode compatibility forms, so the source’s typography can differ. The text is the primary source for its own statement. A cross-family machine check (2026-10-30, item 99) re-read the record’s sources and found full support. No human editorial review. primary source Supports the claim
arXiv abstract page for 2306.13952v1 (submission history) ↗ arXiv (Cornell University) · Publication date unknown
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Source excerpt “[v1] Sat, 24 Jun 2023 … [v8] Sat, 23 Dec 2023” Location in source Submission history block, v1 and v8 entries
How it was read Retrieved directly from the publisher
Machine-checked · 2026-10-30
Source details and check notes Authors arXiv (Cornell University) Version Retrieved for the candidate pack on 2026-10-28 (SHA-256 f05b805a071dd4ad81ec84279296ed530c8a4b679f8d05ffa4760d24a79d8440). Abstract page as served on 2026-10-28; used only for the v1 submission date and the version history Retrieved again at admission on 2026-10-30 (SHA-256 f05b805a071dd4ad81ec84279296ed530c8a4b679f8d05ffa4760d24a79d8440, the same bytes). Its wording can change; earlier wording is not authenticated. Canonical address Open the canonical source ↗ Accessed 2026-10-28 Language English (en) Attribution arXiv (Cornell University), “arXiv abstract page for 2306.13952v1 (submission history)”. Reuse No open redistribution licence asserted. Bibliographic metadata, editorial paraphrases and short attributed quotations (at most 50 words each). Recheck terms before wider redistribution. Check notes Candidate pack passage, AI and biosecurity (research/ai-bio). The quotation (10 words) matched the text retrieved for the candidate pack on 2026-10-28 and again at admission on 2026-10-30, in a fresh retrieval whose SHA-256 equals the pack’s. Matching ignored differences of whitespace, case, quotation marks, dashes and Unicode compatibility forms, so the source’s typography can differ. Added after the audit of 2026-10-28: both dates in time.note rested on no cited passage. Cited for the submission dates only; the retrieved PDF of v1 carries no arXiv stamp. A cross-family machine check (2026-10-30, item 99) re-read the record’s sources and found full support. No human editorial review. Status and meaning Editorial status. Not reviewed by an editor . An exploratory record that no editor has accepted. This status does not say whether a person has read any linked passage. Each evidence record above shows how it was checked.
Relation. A passage of the document meets the proposition’s criterion. The record documents what the text states, in its register (fiction and satire are labelled); it is not evidence that the proposition is true and implies no influence on or from another text.
Date. Date of the arXiv v1 submission; the article was revised to v8 on 23 December 2023, and only v1 is cited.
Record ID ab-arg-d1-sandbrink-articulates