Claim · 2025-07-10 · publication · Stated in source · Supported

Appendix 1.3.1 of the Safety and Security chapter of the General-Purpose AI Code of Practice lists, among the model capabilities treated as non-exhaustive potential sources of systemic risk for systemic risk identification, chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) capabilities and other such weapon acquisition or proliferation capabilities.

One recorded claim. The claim panel gives its qualification, the source passages with their place in each source, and how it was checked.

What it connects

General-Purpose AI Code of Practice (final version, 10 July 2025) → states provision → Appendix 1.3.1: CBRN capabilities among the model capabilities treated as potential systemic risk sources

Where it appears

Claim and evidence

General-Purpose AI Code of Practice (final version, 10 July 2025)states provision ↓Appendix 1.3.1: CBRN capabilities among the model capabilities treated as potential systemic risk sources

Machine-checked, not reviewed by an editorStated in sourceSupported

Supporting evidence: primary · 1 source

Provision: Risk domain · provision ID eu-cop-appendix131-cbrn-capability-source
Subject version: Final version (10 July 2025) · Published 2025-07-10 · Effective date not established
Date: 2025-07-10 · publication

Scope and limitsWhat the Code's text says, in a voluntary instrument. It is not evidence that any signatory identified such a capability in any model, and the list is stated to be non-exhaustive.

The evidence 01

primary sourceSupports the claim

General-Purpose AI Code of Practice: Safety and Security chapter (final version, 10 July 2025)

European Commission · 2025-07-10

Archived copy, captured 2025-07-10: General-Purpose AI Code of Practice: Safety and Security chapter (final version, 10 July 2025)

Cite the original source

Cite the original document, not Selekoa. Check these details against it.

Source excerpt

“Model capabilities include: (1) offensive cyber capabilities; (2) Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) capabilities, and other such weapon acquisition or proliferation capabilities”

Location in source Appendix 1.3.1 (Model capabilities), PDF p. 35 of the file served on 2026-10-28

How it was read Retrieved directly from the publisher

Machine-checked · 2026-10-30

Source details and check notes

Authors: Chairs and vice-chairs of the Code’s working groups (independent experts)
Version: PDF served by the Commission on 2026-10-04 (a re-rendered file of 43 pages); it has the same 15,392 words as the Internet Archive capture of 2025-07-10 (10:58 UTC, 40 pages), with a different reading order on the cover page. Every quote matched in both expressions. Publisher as printed on the inspected expression: European Commission (AI Office).
Canonical address: Open the canonical source ↗
Accessed: 2026-10-04
Language: English (en)
Archive copy: Open archived copy, captured 2025-07-10: General-Purpose AI Code of Practice: Safety and Security chapter (final version, 10 July 2025). Captured on the recorded publication date. An archive copy shows only what the archive retrieved on 2025-07-10. It does not prove what the page said earlier, and it can differ from the copy checked on 2026-10-04.
Attribution: General-Purpose AI Code of Practice, Safety and Security chapter (10 July 2025), published by the European Commission.
Reuse: European Union; quoted briefly under the editorial policy. Selekoa practice: metadata, attributed paraphrases and short attributed quotations under the editorial policy (at most 50 words each; at most 400 quoted words per document across the dataset, and about 10% of a document under about 2,000 words). Documents are linked externally, not redistributed. Publisher terms that forbid quotation override this practice.
Check notes: Candidate pack passage, AI and biosecurity (research/ai-bio). The quotation (23 words) matched the text retrieved for the candidate pack on 2026-10-28 and again at admission on 2026-10-30, in a fresh retrieval whose SHA-256 equals the pack’s. Matching ignored differences of whitespace, case, quotation marks, dashes and Unicode compatibility forms, so the source’s typography can differ. Appendix 1.3 introduces these as non-exhaustive potential systemic risk sources for the purpose of systemic risk identification pursuant to Commitment 2. No human editorial review.

Status and meaning

Editorial status. Not reviewed by an editor. An exploratory record that no editor has accepted. This status does not say whether a person has read any linked passage. Each evidence record above shows how it was checked.

Relation. An exact framework edition, or another document with an exact expression, states one provision: a capability threshold or risk level and its trigger, a required safeguard or action, a decision authority (who decides, recommends, can overrule or is informed), a stated exception, or another statement of its content, such as a licence term or a prospectus statement. The passage records what the document says, not implementation, compliance or effectiveness. Provisions with the same key align across editions of one family.

Date. Dated by the publication of the final Code.

Record ID ab-gov-eu-cop-cbrn-capability-source