Contemporary AI foundation models increase biological weapons risk
RAND working paper WR-A3853-1, arXiv v1 (12 June 2025). The arXiv abstract page for 2506.13798 records the v1 submission as 12 June 2025 and the report number WR-A3853-1 (`arxiv-2506-13798-abs`); the PDF's cover reads "June 2025" (`brent-mckelvey-2025`). A later RAND perspective (PEA3853-1) with a similar title was seen in search results and was not retrieved.
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- RAND Corporation (from the version record)
- Authors credited
- No authorship claim recorded yet. The source records list arXiv (Cornell University) and RAND Corporation (working paper WR-A3853-1), posted to arXiv.
- Dates
- Published 2025-06-12
The arXiv abstract page for 2506.13798 records the v1 submission as 12 June 2025 and the report number WR-A3853-1 (`arxiv-2506-13798-abs`); the PDF's cover reads "June 2025" (`brent-mckelvey-2025`). A later RAND perspective (PEA3853-1) with a similar title was seen in search results and was not retrieved.
- Exact source
- arXiv abstract page for 2506.13798 (submission history and report number) arXiv (Cornell University) · publication date unknown · Retrieved for the candidate pack on 2026-10-28 (SHA-256 64847d8461f1f0361daccfb569e8d6cc053bfd8a4125c5339eeda6ec8bb06c17). Abstract page as served on 2026-10-28; used only for the v1 submission date and the RAND report number Retrieved again at admission on 2026-10-30 (SHA-256 63834668f90e3a0e80b98abc1ee48e42834a3ecc9060acc685a1a048bafb24e2). Its wording can change; earlier wording is not authenticated.
- Contemporary AI foundation models increase biological weapons risk RAND Corporation (working paper WR-A3853-1), posted to arXiv · publication date unknown · Retrieved for the candidate pack on 2026-10-28 (SHA-256 1cc64de0a880543bda08d64374ee47539c029c55b187ab3f4e66603e3f8ad7e5). arXiv v1 of 12 June 2025; the PDF is the RAND working paper WR-A3853-1 of June 2025, marked "not been formally reviewed or edited" Retrieved again at admission on 2026-10-30 (SHA-256 1cc64de0a880543bda08d64374ee47539c029c55b187ab3f4e66603e3f8ad7e5, the same bytes).
Appears in
- Arguments about AI and biological risk →4 records on this document
Versions
brent-mckelvey-foundation-models: 1 recorded version, oldest first, published by RAND Corporation. A version is shown as replacing another only where a record says so. Date order alone never implies it.
- 2025-06-12 · publishedRAND working paper WR-A3853-1, arXiv v1 (12 June 2025) (this version)
This version
Earliest version recorded here; no replacement is recorded.
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Articulates · 3
Propositions whose criterion a passage of this document meets. The record says what the text states, in its register; it is not evidence that the proposition is true.
- Currently available AI systems increase an actor's biological-misuse capabilityThe RAND working paper "Contemporary AI foundation models increase biological weapons risk" (WR-A3853-1, arXiv v1 of 12 June 2025) states that contemporary AI models can meaningfully contribute to biological weapons development, against published safety assessments that assert minimal risk.2025-06-12 · publication · Stated in source · Supported Inspect claim & evidence ↗Currently available AI systems increase an actor's biological-misuse capability: propositions page →
- Published evaluations do not establish real-world biological riskThe RAND working paper of 12 June 2025 states that flawed safety assessments resting on tacit knowledge and inadequate benchmarks may create a false sense of security, leading to weak safeguards and regulatory gaps.2025-06-12 · publication · Stated in source · Supported Inspect claim & evidence ↗Published evaluations do not establish real-world biological risk: propositions page →
- Assessment must cover actors who already hold relevant skillsThe RAND working paper of 12 June 2025 states that safety assessments rely on benchmarks that overlook the full range of potential threat actors and fail to account for how AI could enhance the capabilities of skilled individuals as well as enabling non-experts.2025-06-12 · publication · Stated in source · Supported Inspect claim & evidence ↗Assessment must cover actors who already hold relevant skills: propositions page →
Contests · 1
Propositions a passage of this document disputes, or a premise they depend on.
- The binding barrier is physical execution rather than informationThe RAND working paper of 12 June 2025 states that safety assessments mistakenly assume that biological weapons development requires tacit knowledge, that is, expertise gained through experience that cannot be conveyed in words.2025-06-12 · publication · Stated in source · Supported Inspect claim & evidence ↗The binding barrier is physical execution rather than information: propositions page →
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