{"entities":[{"id":"us-white-house","name":"The White House"},{"id":"us-nsm-ai-2024","name":"Memorandum on Advancing the United States' Leadership in Artificial Intelligence; Harnessing Artificial Intelligence to Fulfill National Security Objectives; and Fostering the Safety, Security, and Trustworthiness of Artificial Intelligence","subtype":"Presidential memorandum","description":"As posted on the White House briefing-room page of 24 October 2024 (archived copy). Publication date from the archived White House page's own date line ('October 24, 2024'); the cached text carries no signature line or Federal Register citation, so no signature date is recorded. Whether the memorandum was later revoked or superseded was not established in this pass (open question).","sourceIds":["source-ab-gov-nsm-ai-2024"]},{"id":"us-nspm-11-2026","name":"National Security Presidential Memorandum/NSPM-11"}],"claims":[{"id":"ab-gov-us-nsm-ai-2024-issued","statement":"The White House issued the national security memorandum on advancing United States leadership in artificial intelligence, harnessing AI for national security objectives and fostering AI safety, security and trustworthiness, posted on its briefing-room page under the date 24 October 2024.","derivation":"explicit","resolution":"supported","editorialState":"seed","evidenceIds":["evidence-ab-gov-us-nsm-ai-2024-issued-1"]},{"id":"ab-gov-us-nsm-aisi-guidance-bio-chem","statement":"Subsection 3.3(e)(ii) of the national security memorandum of 24 October 2024 directs the AI Safety Institute, within 180 days, to issue guidance for AI developers on testing, evaluating and managing risks from dual-use foundation models, with the first listed topic being how to measure capabilities relevant to the risk that AI models could enable the development of biological and chemical weapons or the automation of offensive cyber operations.","resolution":"supported","evidenceIds":["evidence-ab-gov-us-nsm-aisi-guidance-bio-chem-1"],"attributes":{"provision":{"kind":"required_action","key":"us-nsm-ai-2024-sec33eii-guidance-bio-chem-measurement"}}},{"id":"ab-gov-us-nsm-aisi-two-models","statement":"Subsection 3.3(e)(i) of the national security memorandum of 24 October 2024 directs the AI Safety Institute, within 180 days and subject to private sector cooperation, to pursue voluntary preliminary testing of at least two frontier AI models before their public deployment or release, and provides that the testing shall assess models' capabilities to aid offensive cyber operations, accelerate development of biological and/or chemical weapons, autonomously carry out malicious behaviour, automate development and deployment of other models with such capabilities, and give rise to other risks identified by the institute.","resolution":"supported","evidenceIds":["evidence-ab-gov-us-nsm-aisi-two-models-1","evidence-ab-gov-us-nsm-aisi-two-models-2"],"attributes":{"provision":{"kind":"evaluation_timing","key":"us-nsm-ai-2024-sec33ei-preliminary-testing"}}},{"id":"ab-gov-us-nsm-aisi-unclassified-testing","statement":"Subsection 3.3(c) of the national security memorandum of 24 October 2024 directs the Department of Commerce to establish an enduring capability to lead voluntary unclassified pre-deployment safety testing of frontier AI models on behalf of the United States Government, including assessments of risks relating to cybersecurity, biosecurity, chemical weapons, system autonomy and other risks as appropriate, with nuclear risk assessment led by the Department of Energy.","resolution":"supported","evidenceIds":["evidence-ab-gov-us-nsm-aisi-unclassified-testing-1"],"attributes":{"provision":{"kind":"required_action","key":"us-nsm-ai-2024-sec33c-unclassified-testing-scope"}}},{"id":"ab-gov-us-nsm-classified-evaluations","statement":"Subsection 3.3(g)(i) of the national security memorandum of 24 October 2024 states that the United States Government shall advance classified evaluations of advanced AI models' capacity to generate or exacerbate deliberate chemical and biological threats, and directs the Department of Energy, the Department of Homeland Security and the AI Safety Institute, within 210 days, to develop a roadmap for such evaluations that considers their scope, scale and priority and proper safeguards to ensure that evaluations and simulations are not misconstrued as offensive capability development.","resolution":"supported","evidenceIds":["evidence-ab-gov-us-nsm-classified-evaluations-1","evidence-ab-gov-us-nsm-classified-evaluations-2"],"attributes":{"provision":{"kind":"required_action","key":"us-nsm-ai-2024-sec33gi-classified-evaluations-roadmap"}}},{"id":"ab-gov-us-nsm-fulfils-eo14110","statement":"The national security memorandum of 24 October 2024 states in its first section that it fulfils the directive set out in subsection 4.8 of Executive Order 14110.","derivation":"explicit","resolution":"supported","editorialState":"seed","evidenceIds":["evidence-ab-gov-us-nsm-fulfils-eo14110-1"],"attributes":{"commitment":{"link":"fulfils"}}},{"id":"ab-gov-us-nsm-publishing-best-practices","statement":"Subsection 3.3(g)(iv) of the national security memorandum of 24 October 2024 directs the National Science Foundation, within 180 days and in coordination with other agencies, to seek to convene academic research institutions and scientific publishers to develop voluntary best practices and standards for publishing computational biological and chemical models, data sets and approaches, including those that use AI and that could contribute to knowledge or products that could be misused to cause harm.","resolution":"supported","evidenceIds":["evidence-ab-gov-us-nsm-publishing-best-practices-1"],"attributes":{"provision":{"kind":"required_action","key":"us-nsm-ai-2024-sec33giv-publication-best-practices"}}},{"id":"ab-gov-us-nspm-11-rescinds-nsm-25","statement":"Section 3(f) of the national security presidential memorandum NSPM-11, dated 5 June 2026, states that the memorandum rescinds and replaces National Security Memorandum-25 and associated guidance.","derivation":"explicit","resolution":"supported","editorialState":"seed","evidenceIds":["evidence-ab-gov-us-nspm-11-rescinds-nsm-25-1","evidence-ab-gov-us-nspm-11-rescinds-nsm-25-2"]}],"sources":[{"id":"source-ab-gov-nsm-ai-2024","title":"Memorandum on Advancing the United States' Leadership in Artificial Intelligence; Harnessing Artificial Intelligence to Fulfill National Security Objectives; and Fostering the Safety, Security, and Trustworthiness of Artificial Intelligence","authors":["The White House (Biden administration), as preserved on bidenwhitehouse.archives.gov"],"publisher":"The White House (Biden administration), as preserved on bidenwhitehouse.archives.gov","publicationDate":null,"version":"Retrieved for the candidate pack on 2026-10-28 (SHA-256 7ade7bda82cd13e21aa9f22bd7204e183872fa98f6b9d01fd718bbd694f40f73). Archived White House briefing-room page carrying the memorandum's text, marked 'October 24, 2024' and labelled historical material frozen in time; retrieved 2026-10-28. The classified annex referred to in Section 1(a) is not part of this text. Retrieved again at admission on 2026-10-30 (SHA-256 7ade7bda82cd13e21aa9f22bd7204e183872fa98f6b9d01fd718bbd694f40f73, the same bytes). Its wording can change; earlier wording is not authenticated.","evidenceUrl":"https://bidenwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2024/10/24/memorandum-on-advancing-the-united-states-leadership-in-artificial-intelligence-harnessing-artificial-intelligence-to-fulfill-national-security-objectives-and-fostering-the-safety-security/","language":"en"}],"evidence":[{"id":"evidence-ab-gov-us-nsm-ai-2024-issued-1","sourceRole":"primary","support":"supports","verification":"machine_checked","retrievalRoute":"direct"},{"id":"evidence-ab-gov-us-nsm-aisi-guidance-bio-chem-1","support":"supports","locator":"Subsection 3.3(e)(ii)(A)","passage":"How to measure capabilities that are relevant to the risk that AI models could enable the development of biological and chemical weapons or the automation of offensive cyber operations","passageType":"quote"},{"id":"evidence-ab-gov-us-nsm-aisi-two-models-1","support":"supports","locator":"Subsection 3.3(e)(i)","passage":"AISI shall pursue voluntary preliminary testing of at least two frontier AI models prior to their public deployment or release","passageType":"quote"},{"id":"evidence-ab-gov-us-nsm-aisi-unclassified-testing-1","support":"supports","locator":"Subsection 3.3(c)","passage":"Commerce shall establish an enduring capability to lead voluntary unclassified pre-deployment safety testing of frontier AI models on behalf of the United States Government, including assessments of risks relating to cybersecurity, biosecurity, chemical weapons, system autonomy, and other risks as appropriate","passageType":"quote"},{"id":"evidence-ab-gov-us-nsm-classified-evaluations-1","support":"supports","locator":"Subsection 3.3(g)(i)","passage":"The United States Government shall advance classified evaluations of advanced AI models' capacity to generate or exacerbate deliberate chemical and biological threats","passageType":"quote"},{"id":"evidence-ab-gov-us-nsm-fulfils-eo14110-1","sourceRole":"primary","support":"supports","verification":"machine_checked","retrievalRoute":"direct"},{"id":"evidence-ab-gov-us-nsm-publishing-best-practices-1","support":"supports","locator":"Subsection 3.3(g)(iv)","passage":"convene academic research institutions and scientific publishers to develop voluntary best practices and standards for publishing computational biological and chemical models, data sets, and approaches","passageType":"quote"},{"id":"evidence-ab-gov-us-nspm-11-rescinds-nsm-25-1","sourceRole":"primary","support":"supports","verification":"machine_checked","retrievalRoute":"direct"},{"id":"evidence-ab-gov-us-nspm-11-rescinds-nsm-25-2","support":"supports","verification":"machine_checked","retrievalRoute":"direct"}],"at":{"entities":[232,1218,1220],"claims":[3333,3334,3335,3336,3337,3338,3339,3361],"sources":[1037],"evidence":[4580,4581,4582,4584,4585,4587,4588,4611,4612]},"version":"1lg47t7"}