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Subsection 3.3(c) of the national security memorandum of 24 October 2024 directs the Department of Commerce to establish an enduring capability to lead voluntary unclassified pre-deployment safety testing of frontier AI models on behalf of the United States Government, including assessments of risks relating to cybersecurity, biosecurity, chemical weapons, system autonomy and other risks as appropriate, with nuclear risk assessment led by the Department of Energy. Copy claim link
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Machine-checked, not reviewed by an editor Stated in source Supported
Supporting evidence: primary · 1 source
Provision Required action · provision ID us-nsm-ai-2024-sec33c-unclassified-testing-scope Subject version As posted on the White House briefing-room page of 24 October 2024 (archived copy) · Published 2024-10-24 · Effective date not established Date 2024-10-24 · publication Scope and limits A directive, and testing that the memorandum itself describes as voluntary. It is not evidence that any capability was established, that any model was tested, or that any developer took part. A presidential memorandum of 5 June 2026 states that it rescinds and replaces this memorandum and its associated guidance (recorded separately). The provision stays on record as the 2024 text stated it, and no implementation, continuing force or wider legal consequence is inferred.
The evidence 01 primary source Supports the claim
Memorandum on Advancing the United States' Leadership in Artificial Intelligence; Harnessing Artificial Intelligence to Fulfill National Security Objectives; and Fostering the Safety, Security, and Trustworthiness of Artificial Intelligence ↗ The White House (Biden administration), as preserved on bidenwhitehouse.archives.gov · Publication date unknown
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Source excerpt “Commerce shall establish an enduring capability to lead voluntary unclassified pre-deployment safety testing of frontier AI models on behalf of the United States Government, including assessments of risks relating to cybersecurity, biosecurity, chemical weapons, system autonomy, and other risks as appropriate” Location in source Subsection 3.3(c)
How it was read Retrieved directly from the publisher
Machine-checked · 2026-10-30
Source details and check notes Authors The White House (Biden administration), as preserved on bidenwhitehouse.archives.gov Version Retrieved for the candidate pack on 2026-10-28 (SHA-256 7ade7bda82cd13e21aa9f22bd7204e183872fa98f6b9d01fd718bbd694f40f73). Archived White House briefing-room page carrying the memorandum's text, marked 'October 24, 2024' and labelled historical material frozen in time; retrieved 2026-10-28. The classified annex referred to in Section 1(a) is not part of this text. Retrieved again at admission on 2026-10-30 (SHA-256 7ade7bda82cd13e21aa9f22bd7204e183872fa98f6b9d01fd718bbd694f40f73, the same bytes). Its wording can change; earlier wording is not authenticated. Canonical address Open the canonical source ↗ Accessed 2026-10-28 Language English (en) Attribution The White House (Biden administration), as preserved on bidenwhitehouse.archives.gov, “Memorandum on Advancing the United States' Leadership in Artificial Intelligence; Harnessing Artificial Intelligence to Fulfill National Security Objectives; and Fostering the Safety, Security, and Trustworthiness of Artificial Intelligence”. Reuse No open redistribution licence asserted. Bibliographic metadata, editorial paraphrases and short attributed quotations (at most 50 words each). Recheck terms before wider redistribution. Check notes Candidate pack passage, AI and biosecurity (research/ai-bio). The quotation (41 words) matched the text retrieved for the candidate pack on 2026-10-28 and again at admission on 2026-10-30, in a fresh retrieval whose SHA-256 equals the pack’s. Matching ignored differences of whitespace, case, quotation marks, dashes and Unicode compatibility forms, so the source’s typography can differ. The subsection continues that nuclear risk is excluded from this capability, its assessment being led by DOE. A cross-family machine check (2026-10-30, item 86) re-read the record’s sources and found full support. No human editorial review. Status and meaning Editorial status. Not reviewed by an editor . An exploratory record that no editor has accepted. This status does not say whether a person has read any linked passage. Each evidence record above shows how it was checked.
Relation. An exact framework edition, or another document with an exact expression, states one provision: a capability threshold or risk level and its trigger, a required safeguard or action, a decision authority (who decides, recommends, can overrule or is informed), a stated exception, or another statement of its content, such as a licence term or a prospectus statement. The passage records what the document says, not implementation, compliance or effectiveness. Provisions with the same key align across editions of one family.
Date. Dated by the memorandum's posting; the subsection states no deadline for this directive.
Record ID ab-gov-us-nsm-aisi-unclassified-testing