Memorandum on Advancing the United States' Leadership in Artificial Intelligence; Harnessing Artificial Intelligence to Fulfill National Security Objectives; and Fostering the Safety, Security, and Trustworthiness of Artificial Intelligence
As posted on the White House briefing-room page of 24 October 2024 (archived copy). Publication date from the archived White House page's own date line ('October 24, 2024'); the cached text carries no signature line or Federal Register citation, so no signature date is recorded. Whether the memorandum was later revoked or superseded was not established in this pass (open question).
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- Dates
- Published 2024-10-24
Publication date from the archived White House page's own date line ('October 24, 2024'); the cached text carries no signature line or Federal Register citation, so no signature date is recorded. Whether the memorandum was later revoked or superseded was not established in this pass (open question).
- Exact source
- Memorandum on Advancing the United States' Leadership in Artificial Intelligence; Harnessing Artificial Intelligence to Fulfill National Security Objectives; and Fostering the Safety, Security, and Trustworthiness of Artificial Intelligence The White House (Biden administration), as preserved on bidenwhitehouse.archives.gov · publication date unknown · Retrieved for the candidate pack on 2026-10-28 (SHA-256 7ade7bda82cd13e21aa9f22bd7204e183872fa98f6b9d01fd718bbd694f40f73). Archived White House briefing-room page carrying the memorandum's text, marked 'October 24, 2024' and labelled historical material frozen in time; retrieved 2026-10-28. The classified annex referred to in Section 1(a) is not part of this text. Retrieved again at admission on 2026-10-30 (SHA-256 7ade7bda82cd13e21aa9f22bd7204e183872fa98f6b9d01fd718bbd694f40f73, the same bytes). Its wording can change; earlier wording is not authenticated.
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us-nsm-ai: 1 recorded version, oldest first, published by The White House. A version is shown as replacing another only where a record says so. Date order alone never implies it.
- 2024-10-24 · publishedAs posted on the White House briefing-room page of 24 October 2024 (archived copy) (this version)
This version
Provisions in this version · 5 quoted
A limited selection of quoted provisions: what this edition says about thresholds, required actions, who decides and exceptions, and other statements of the text. It is not a full summary and says nothing about implementation. A “not found” record states which part of the edition was inspected. It is not a claim that the text was deleted.
- Required actionEnduring capability for voluntary unclassified pre-deployment safety testing, including biosecurity and chemical weapons assessments (Sec. 3.3(c))“Commerce shall establish an enduring capability to lead voluntary unclassified pre-deployment safety testing of frontier AI models on behalf of the United States Government, including assessments of risks relating to cybersecurity, biosecurity, chemical weapons, system autonomy, and other risks as appropriate”Subsection 3.3(c)Inspect claim & evidence ↗
- Required actionGuidance topic: how to measure capabilities relevant to the risk that AI models could enable development of biological and chemical weapons (Sec. 3.3(e)(ii)(A))“How to measure capabilities that are relevant to the risk that AI models could enable the development of biological and chemical weapons or the automation of offensive cyber operations”Subsection 3.3(e)(ii)(A)Inspect claim & evidence ↗
- Required actionClassified evaluations of AI models' capacity to generate or exacerbate deliberate chemical and biological threats, with a roadmap and safeguards (Sec. 3.3(g)(i))“The United States Government shall advance classified evaluations of advanced AI models' capacity to generate or exacerbate deliberate chemical and biological threats”Subsection 3.3(g)(i)Inspect claim & evidence ↗
- Required actionConvening on voluntary best practices for publishing computational biological and chemical models and data sets (Sec. 3.3(g)(iv))“convene academic research institutions and scientific publishers to develop voluntary best practices and standards for publishing computational biological and chemical models, data sets, and approaches”Subsection 3.3(g)(iv)Inspect claim & evidence ↗
- Evaluation timingVoluntary preliminary pre-deployment testing of at least two frontier AI models, assessing biological and chemical weapons capabilities (Sec. 3.3(e)(i))“AISI shall pursue voluntary preliminary testing of at least two frontier AI models prior to their public deployment or release”Subsection 3.3(e)(i)Inspect claim & evidence ↗
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Other recorded relations
- The White House enacted this documentThe White House issued the national security memorandum on advancing United States leadership in artificial intelligence, harnessing AI for national security objectives and fostering AI safety, security and trustworthiness, posted on its briefing-room page under the date 24 October 2024.2024-10-24 · publication · Stated in source · Supported Inspect claim & evidence ↗
- explicitly links itself toThe national security memorandum of 24 October 2024 states in its first section that it fulfils the directive set out in subsection 4.8 of Executive Order 14110.2024-10-24 · publication · Stated in source · Supported Inspect claim & evidence ↗
- National Security Presidential Memorandum/NSPM-11 revoked this documentSection 3(f) of the national security presidential memorandum NSPM-11, dated 5 June 2026, states that the memorandum rescinds and replaces National Security Memorandum-25 and associated guidance.2026-06-05 · publication · Stated in source · Supported Inspect claim & evidence ↗