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v3.3’s threshold covers AI systems that can functionally substitute for the scarce human expertise that is currently the primary barrier to novel development of chemical and biological weapons with potential for catastrophic harm (footnoted as consequences comparable to or worse than COVID-19); that is, a well-resourced team could use the model for the end-to-end agent design and deployment, including formulation and dissemination, that would otherwise require recruiting one of a small number of world-leading specialists. v3.2’s threshold covered AI systems able to significantly help threat actors, such as moderately resourced expert-backed teams, create or obtain and deploy such weapons with potential for catastrophic damages far beyond past catastrophes such as COVID-19. Copy claim link
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Supporting evidence: primary · 2 sources
Basis of the change Official changelog Provision Threshold or trigger · provision ID rsp-novel-cb-threshold Subject version v3.3 · Publication date unknown · Effective 2026-05-26 Object version v3.2 · Publication date unknown · Effective 2026-04-29 Date 2026-05-26 · effective Scope and limits A textual difference between the two editions’ wording of this keyed provision. It is not an assessment of whether the change strengthened or weakened the framework, and not evidence of implementation.
The evidence 03 primary source Supports the claim
Responsible Scaling Policy — v3.3 ↗ Anthropic · Publication date unknown
Archived copy, captured 2026-05-28: Responsible Scaling Policy — v3.3 ↗
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Paraphrase v3.3’s threshold row describes AI systems that can functionally substitute for the scarce human expertise that is the primary barrier to novel chemical and biological weapons with potential for catastrophic harm; footnote 4 specifies consequences comparable to or worse than those of COVID-19, and the row’s next sentence says a well-resourced team could use the model for end-to-end agent design and deployment that would otherwise require one of a small number of world-leading specialists.
Location in source PDF p. 7 (printed p. 7), §1 Our Recommendations for Industry-Wide Safety, table row 'Novel chemical/biological weapons production', left column, with footnotes 4–7
Machine-checked · 2026-10-03
Source details and check notes Authors Anthropic Version Responsible Scaling Policy v3.3; effective date 2026-05-26. Version date 2026-05-26 Canonical address Open the canonical source ↗ Accessed 2026-09-18 Language English (en) Archive copy Open archived copy, captured 2026-05-28: Responsible Scaling Policy — v3.3 ↗ . Captured 2 days after the recorded version date. An archive copy shows only what the archive retrieved on 2026-05-28. It does not prove what the page said earlier, and it can differ from the copy checked on 2026-09-18.Attribution Anthropic, Responsible Scaling Policy — v3.3. Reuse No open redistribution licence asserted. Selekoa practice: metadata, attributed paraphrases and short attributed quotations under the editorial policy (at most 50 words each; at most 400 quoted words per document across the dataset, and about 10% of a document under about 2,000 words). Documents are linked externally, not redistributed. Publisher terms that forbid quotation override this practice. Check notes Paraphrase checked by an automated research assistant on 2026-10-03 against the cited edition; the edition’s own wording is quoted in its provision record. Human editorial review is pending. primary source Supports the claim
Responsible Scaling Policy — v3.2 ↗ Anthropic · Publication date unknown
Archived copy, captured 2026-05-05: Responsible Scaling Policy — v3.2 ↗
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Paraphrase RSP v3.2 states that its novel chemical/biological weapons production threshold covers AI systems with the ability to significantly help threat actors (for example, moderately resourced expert-backed teams) create/obtain and deploy chemical and/or biological weapons with potential for catastrophic damages far beyond those of past catastrophes such as COVID-19.
Location in source PDF p. 7 (printed p. 7), §1 Our Recommendations for Industry-Wide Safety, table row 'Novel chemical/biological weapons production', left column
Machine-checked · 2026-10-03
Source details and check notes Authors Anthropic Version Responsible Scaling Policy v3.2; effective date 2026-04-29. Version date 2026-04-29 Canonical address Open the canonical source ↗ Accessed 2026-09-18 Language English (en) Archive copy Open archived copy, captured 2026-05-05: Responsible Scaling Policy — v3.2 ↗ . Captured 6 days after the recorded version date. An archive copy shows only what the archive retrieved on 2026-05-05. It does not prove what the page said earlier, and it can differ from the copy checked on 2026-09-18.Attribution Anthropic, Responsible Scaling Policy — v3.2. Reuse No open redistribution licence asserted. Selekoa practice: metadata, attributed paraphrases and short attributed quotations under the editorial policy (at most 50 words each; at most 400 quoted words per document across the dataset, and about 10% of a document under about 2,000 words). Documents are linked externally, not redistributed. Publisher terms that forbid quotation override this practice. Check notes Paraphrase checked by an automated research assistant on 2026-10-03 against the cited edition; the edition’s own wording is quoted in its provision record. Human editorial review is pending. primary source Supports the claim
Responsible Scaling Policy — v3.3 ↗ Anthropic · Publication date unknown
Archived copy, captured 2026-05-28: Responsible Scaling Policy — v3.3 ↗
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Paraphrase The v3.3 change log lists, as item (1), a revision of the novel chemical/biological weapons production threshold to better track the threat model of concern.
Location in source Changelog entry 'May 26, 2026 (RSP v3.3)', item (1), PDF p. 20 (printed p. 19)
Machine-checked · 2026-10-03
Source details and check notes Authors Anthropic Version Responsible Scaling Policy v3.3; effective date 2026-05-26. Version date 2026-05-26 Canonical address Open the canonical source ↗ Accessed 2026-09-18 Language English (en) Archive copy Open archived copy, captured 2026-05-28: Responsible Scaling Policy — v3.3 ↗ . Captured 2 days after the recorded version date. An archive copy shows only what the archive retrieved on 2026-05-28. It does not prove what the page said earlier, and it can differ from the copy checked on 2026-09-18.Attribution Anthropic, Responsible Scaling Policy — v3.3. Reuse No open redistribution licence asserted. Selekoa practice: metadata, attributed paraphrases and short attributed quotations under the editorial policy (at most 50 words each; at most 400 quoted words per document across the dataset, and about 10% of a document under about 2,000 words). Documents are linked externally, not redistributed. Publisher terms that forbid quotation override this practice. Check notes Paraphrase checked by an automated research assistant on 2026-10-03 against the cited edition; the edition’s own wording is quoted in its provision record. Human editorial review is pending. Status and meaning Editorial status. Not reviewed by an editor . An exploratory record that no editor has accepted. This status does not say whether a person has read any linked passage. Each evidence record above shows how it was checked.
Relation. One scoped difference between document versions. The claim identifies publisher-stated change, official changelog/redline, or an explicitly inferred comparison. It does not establish implementation, effectiveness or a safety ranking.
Date. Dated by the later edition’s effective date.
Record ID provchange-rsp-v3-3-novel-cb-threshold