Anthropic Responsible Scaling Policy — v3.3

Versions

Anthropic · Responsible Scaling Policy: 9 recorded versions, oldest first, published by Anthropic. A version is shown as replacing another only where a record says so. Date order alone never implies it.

1. 2023-09-19 · effectivev1.0
2. 2024-10-15 · effectivev2.0
3. 2025-03-31 · effectivev2.1
4. 2025-05-14 · effectivev2.2
5. 2026-02-24 · effectivev3.0
6. 2026-04-02 · effectivev3.1
7. 2026-04-29 · effectivev3.2
8. 2026-05-26 · effectivev3.3 (this version)
9. 2026-07-08 · effectivev3.4

This version

• ReplacesResponsible Scaling Policy v3.3 replaces v3.2 in the publisher’s documented framework version sequence.2026-05-26 · effective · Stated in source · Supported Inspect claim & evidence ↗RSP · v3.2: document page →
• Replaced byResponsible Scaling Policy v3.4 replaces v3.3 in the publisher’s documented framework version sequence.2026-07-08 · effective · Stated in source · Supported Inspect claim & evidence ↗RSP · v3.4: document page →
• Official changelogProvision · Threshold or trigger: Novel chemical/biological weapons production thresholdv3.3’s threshold covers AI systems that can functionally substitute for the scarce human expertise that is currently the primary barrier to novel development of chemical and biological weapons with potential for catastrophic harm (footnoted as consequences comparable to or worse than COVID-19); that is, a well-resourced team could use the model for the end-to-end agent design and deployment, including formulation and dissemination, that would otherwise require recruiting one of a small number of world-leading specialists. v3.2’s threshold covered AI systems able to significantly help threat actors, such as moderately resourced expert-backed teams, create or obtain and deploy such weapons with potential for catastrophic damages far beyond past catastrophes such as COVID-19.2026-05-26 · effective · Stated in source · Supported Inspect claim & evidence ↗
• Official changelogChange recorded in v3.4v3.4 counts the dramatic-acceleration scenario of the Automated R&D threshold as having occurred where the observed or expected doubling of AI progress is measured against both the rate Anthropic would expect and the fastest rate of extended progress it has observed (over at least three model generations) without significant AI contributions to AI R&D, and where continuing the trend “seems likely to lead to” even greater acceleration; v3.3 measured the doubling against the expected rate alone, and continuing the trend “could lead to” even greater acceleration.2026-07-08 · effective · Stated in source · Supported Inspect claim & evidence ↗RSP · v3.4: document page →
• Official changelogChange recorded in v3.4RSP v3.4 allows a Risk Report coverage date up to 30 days before publication.2026-07-08 · effective · Stated in source · Supported Inspect claim & evidence ↗RSP · v3.4: document page →
• Official changelogChange recorded in v3.4RSP v3.4 changes fully unredacted Risk Report sharing to at least 200 employees, instead of all regular-clearance staff.2026-07-08 · effective · Stated in source · Supported Inspect claim & evidence ↗RSP · v3.4: document page →

Provisions in this version · 6 quoted · 1 not found

A limited selection of quoted provisions: what this edition says about thresholds, required actions, who decides and exceptions. It is not a full summary and says nothing about implementation. A “not found” record states which part of the edition was inspected. It is not a claim that the text was deleted.

• Threshold or triggerAutomated R&D threshold: when dramatic acceleration counts as occurring“We would consider scenario (2) to have occurred where (a) we observe or expect double the rate of progress8 in AI aggregate capabilities compared to the rate we’d expect in the absence of significant AI contributions to AI R&D”PDF p. 9 (printed p. 9), §1 Our Recommendations for Industry-Wide Safety, table row 'Automated R&D in key domains', left column ('Capability or usage threshold'), paragraph beginning 'We would consider scenario (2)', to the end of condition (a)Inspect claim & evidence ↗
• Threshold or triggerNovel chemical/biological weapons production threshold“AI systems that can functionally substitute for the scarce human expertise that is currently the primary barrier to novel development of chemical and biological weapons with potential for catastrophic harm.”PDF p. 7 (printed p. 7), §1 Our Recommendations for Industry-Wide Safety, table row 'Novel chemical/biological weapons production', left column, first sentenceInspect claim & evidence ↗
• Required actionDelay development and deployment when Anthropic is in the lead“We will require a strong argument that catastrophic risk is contained, along the lines of our recommendations for industry-wide safety (see Section 1). We will delay AI development and deployment as needed to achieve this, until and unless we no longer believe we have a significant lead.”PDF p. 17 (printed p. 16), Appendix A: Commitments Related to Competitors, table row 'Anthropic in the lead', Commitment columnInspect claim & evidence ↗
• Who decidesCEO and RSO Risk Report decisions shared with Board, LTBT“Following approval of a Risk Report, the CEO and RSO will promptly share their decision(s), the underlying Risk Report, and internal feedback with both the Board and the LTBT.”Decides: CEO · Decides: Responsible Scaling Officer · Informed: Board of Directors · Informed: Long-Term Benefit TrustPDF p. 13 (printed p. 12), §3.4 Procedures, item 4 ('Governance notification')Inspect claim & evidence ↗
• Who decidesExternal review of a Risk Report on LTBT request“In addition, upon the LTBT’s request, we will conduct a public or private external review of our Risk Report or sections thereof, subject to the procedures outlined below.”Decides: Long-Term Benefit TrustPDF p. 14 (printed p. 13), §3.6 External Review, final paragraph before §3.6.1Inspect claim & evidence ↗
• Who decidesBoard and LTBT approval when marginal risk analysis is central“In the event that marginal risk analysis (see previous section) plays a major role in a decision to move forward, explicit approval of the Risk Report by the Board and LTBT (rather than just the CEO and RSO) will be required.”Decides: Board of Directors · Decides: Long-Term Benefit Trust · Decides: CEO · Decides: Responsible Scaling OfficerPDF p. 13 (printed p. 12), §3.4 Procedures, item 5 ('Modified process when marginal risk analysis is important to our case')Inspect claim & evidence ↗
• Not found in the inspected textCommitment not to train or deploy without adequate safeguardsInspected: RSP v3.3 (effective May 26, 2026), whole text layer, PDF pp. 1–20: Introduction (pp. 3–4); §1 with the threshold table (pp. 4–10, columns on p. 9 read individually because the text layer interleaves them); §2–§3 Risk Reports (pp. 11–16); §4 Governance (p. 16); Appendix A (pp. 16–17); Appendix B (p. 17); Changelog (pp. 18–20).Inspect claim & evidence ↗

Issue and authorship records

• Issued by: AnthropicAnthropic published Responsible Scaling Policy v3.3, identified by its effective date of 2026-05-26.2026-05-26 · effective · Stated in source · Supported Inspect claim & evidence ↗Anthropic: institution →

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