Versions Anthropic · Responsible Scaling Policy: 9 recorded versions, oldest first, published by Anthropic. A version is shown as replacing another only where a record says so. Date order alone never implies it.
2023-09-19 · effective v1.0 2024-10-15 · effective v2.0 2025-03-31 · effective v2.1 2025-05-14 · effective v2.2 2026-02-24 · effective v3.0 (this version) 2026-04-02 · effective v3.1 2026-04-29 · effective v3.2 2026-05-26 · effective v3.3 2026-07-08 · effective v3.4 Read the full document history of these frameworks → This version Replaces Responsible Scaling Policy v3.0 replaces v2.2 in the publisher’s documented framework version sequence. 2026-02-24 · effective · Stated in source · Supported Inspect claim & evidence ↗ RSP · v2.2: document page → Replaced by Responsible Scaling Policy v3.1 replaces v3.0 in the publisher’s documented framework version sequence. 2026-04-02 · effective · Stated in source · Supported Inspect claim & evidence ↗ RSP · v3.1: document page → Inferred document comparison Provision · Who decides: CEO and RSO Risk Report decisions shared with Board, LTBT v3.0 has the CEO and RSO, following approval of a Risk Report, promptly share their decision(s), the Risk Report and internal feedback with the Board and LTBT; v2.2 had them, on deciding to proceed with deployment and training, share that decision with the Safeguards Report and internal and any external feedback with the Board and LTBT before moving forward. 2026-02-24 · effective · Inferred · Supported Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Inferred document comparison Provision · Threshold or trigger: Non-novel chemical/biological weapons production threshold v3.0's threshold covers significant help to individuals or groups with basic technical backgrounds in creating/obtaining and deploying chemical and/or biological weapons with serious potential for catastrophic damages; v2.2's CBRN-3 threshold covered the same help for CBRN weapons without that qualifier. 2026-02-24 · effective · Inferred · Supported Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Assessed effect Unresolved Recorded change from the previous version Whether RSP v3.0’s new roadmap and transparency mechanisms compensate for its reduced unilateral commitments, in the policy’s overall capacity to secure risk mitigation, remains unsettled. 2026-02-24 · effective · Question posed by Selekoa · Unresolved Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Publisher statement Recorded change from the previous version RSP v3.0 separates Anthropic’s own mitigation plans from its recommendations for industry-wide mitigation. 2026-02-24 · effective · Stated in source · Supported Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Publisher statement Recorded change from the previous version RSP v3.0 introduces Risk Reports discussing model risks and development or deployment determinations. 2026-02-24 · effective · Stated in source · Supported Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Publisher statement Recorded change from the previous version RSP v3.0 introduces Frontier Safety Roadmaps. 2026-02-24 · effective · Stated in source · Supported Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Official changelog Change recorded in v3.1 v3.1 treats the Automated R&D threshold as met if Anthropic determines either that its models could fully substitute for its entire set of Research Scientists and Research Engineers at competitive costs (within a factor of 5) or that AI progress is dramatically accelerating for reasons likely related to automation of AI R&D (an observed or expected doubling of the rate of progress plausibly attributable to that automation); v3.0's working operationalization triggered it where a model could compress two years of 2018–2024 AI progress into one year. 2026-04-02 · effective · Stated in source · Supported Inspect claim & evidence ↗ RSP · v3.1: document page → Provisions in this version · 8 quoted · 4 not found A limited selection of quoted provisions: what this edition says about thresholds, required actions, who decides and exceptions. It is not a full summary and says nothing about implementation. A “not found” record states which part of the edition was inspected. It is not a claim that the text was deleted.
Threshold or trigger Automated R&D threshold: two years' progress in one year “Our working operationalization is to trigger this risk threshold at the point where we determine that a model could compress two years of 2018 – 2024 AI progress into a single year.” PDF p. 8 (printed p. 8), §1 Our Recommendations for Industry-Wide Safety, table row 'Automated R&D in key domains', left column, third paragraph, first sentence Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Threshold or trigger Non-novel chemical/biological weapons production threshold “AI systems with the ability to significantly help individuals or groups with basic technical backgrounds (e.g., undergraduate STEM degrees) create/obtain and deploy chemical and/or biological weapons with serious potential for catastrophic damages.” PDF p. 6 (printed p. 6), §1 Our Recommendations for Industry-Wide Safety, table row 'Non-novel chemical/biological weapons production', left column ('Capability or usage threshold') Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Required action Delay development and deployment when Anthropic is in the lead “We will require a strong argument that catastrophic risk is contained, along the lines of our recommendations for industry-wide safety (see Section 1). We will delay AI development and deployment as needed to achieve this, until and unless we no longer believe we have a significant lead.” PDF p. 16 (printed p. 16), Appendix A: Commitments Related to Competitors, table row 'Anthropic in the lead', Commitment column Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Required action Meet or exceed competitors' risk reduction posture “For our highly capable frontier models, we will meet or exceed the overall risk reduction posture of these competitors, as far as we can tell based on our best efforts to assess that posture.” PDF p. 16 (printed p. 16), Appendix A: Commitments Related to Competitors, table row 'Competitors have strong safety measures', Commitment column, first sentence Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Required action General upleveling: effort to match competitor mitigation, no necessary delay “We will make a significant effort to meet or exceed that performance standard. However, we will not necessarily delay AI development and deployment in this scenario.” PDF p. 16 (printed p. 16), Appendix A: Commitments Related to Competitors, table row 'General upleveling', Commitment column Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Who decides CEO and RSO Risk Report decisions shared with Board, LTBT “Following approval of a Risk Report, the CEO and RSO will promptly share their decision(s), the underlying Risk Report, and internal feedback with both the Board and the LTBT.” Decides: CEO · Decides: Responsible Scaling Officer · Informed: Board of Directors · Informed: Long-Term Benefit Trust PDF p. 12 (printed p. 12), §3.4 Procedures, item 4 ('Governance notification') Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Who decides Board and LTBT approval when marginal risk analysis is central “In the event that marginal risk analysis (see previous section) plays a major role in a decision to move forward, explicit approval of the Risk Report by the Board and LTBT (rather than just the CEO and RSO) will be required.” Decides: Board of Directors · Decides: Long-Term Benefit Trust · Decides: CEO · Decides: Responsible Scaling Officer PDF p. 12 (printed p. 12), §3.4 Procedures, item 5 ('Modified process when marginal risk analysis is important to our case') Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Exception No unilateral, unconditional commitment to industry-wide recommendations “In particular, we cannot unilaterally and unconditionally commit to staying in line with the industry-wide recommendations in the right column.” PDF p. 4 (printed p. 4), §1 Our Recommendations for Industry-Wide Safety, second paragraph, second sentence Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Not found in the inspected text Commitment not to train or deploy without adequate safeguards Inspected: RSP v3.0 (effective February 24, 2026), whole text layer, PDF pp. 1–19: Introduction (pp. 3–4); §1 Our Recommendations for Industry-Wide Safety with the threshold table (pp. 4–9); §2 Frontier Safety Roadmap and §3 Risk Reports, 3.1–3.6.3 (pp. 10–15); §4 Governance (p. 15); Appendix A: Commitments Related to Competitors and Appendix B: Notes on ASLs (p. 16); Changelog (pp. 17–19). Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Not found in the inspected text Pause training until ASL-3 Security Standard implemented Inspected: RSP v3.0 (effective February 24, 2026), whole text layer, PDF pp. 1–19: Introduction (pp. 3–4); §1 Our Recommendations for Industry-Wide Safety with the threshold table (pp. 4–9); §2 Frontier Safety Roadmap and §3 Risk Reports (pp. 10–15); §4 Governance (p. 15); Appendices A and B (p. 16); Changelog (pp. 17–19). Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Not found in the inspected text Restrict deployment and scaling if safeguards showing fails Inspected: RSP v3.0 (effective February 24, 2026), whole text layer, PDF pp. 1–19: Introduction (pp. 3–4); §1 Our Recommendations for Industry-Wide Safety with the threshold table (pp. 4–9); §2 Frontier Safety Roadmap and §3 Risk Reports (pp. 10–15); §4 Governance (p. 15); Appendices A and B (p. 16); Changelog (pp. 17–19). Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Not found in the inspected text May deploy and train above threshold once ASL-3 Required Safeguards met Inspected: RSP v3.0 (effective February 24, 2026), whole text layer, PDF pp. 1–19: Introduction (pp. 3–4); §1 Our Recommendations for Industry-Wide Safety with the threshold table (pp. 4–9); §2 Frontier Safety Roadmap and §3 Risk Reports (pp. 10–15); §4 Governance (p. 15); Appendices A and B (p. 16); Changelog (pp. 17–19). Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Issue and authorship records Issued by: Anthropic Anthropic published Responsible Scaling Policy v3.0, identified by its effective date of 2026-02-24. 2026-02-24 · effective · Stated in source · Supported Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Anthropic: institution → Documentary relations Each relation is listed separately. Citing, crediting and reporting the use of a method are different acts, and none of them shows agreement or influence by itself.
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Other recorded relations explicitly links itself to Anthropic's Responsible Scaling Policy v3.0 says it uses 'catastrophic risk' in its plain meaning rather than adopting any specific statutory definition. It adds that where laws such as California SB 53 define this or similar terms with specific thresholds, Anthropic addresses those requirements in separate compliance frameworks. 2026-02-24 · effective · Stated in source · Supported Inspect claim & evidence ↗