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Loosemore’s post concludes that doomsday scenarios such as "Smiley Tiling" involve AGIs so incoherent that they can be dismissed as extremely implausible. Copy claim link
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Supporting evidence: primary · 1 source
Date 2015-05-05 · publication Role Contesting Register (kind of text) Nonfiction Scope of the passage Contests scenarios in which good development behaviour turns catastrophic at higher capability. Engagement Engages a premise. Gives a reason against the premise that a system that behaves well in development could pursue a literal reading of its goal once powerful: the scenario requires an AGI that never questions its own conclusions, which is incoherent. Scope and limits Loosemore’s target is a supposed "Doctrine of Logical Infallibility", not deceptive concealment; it is no general guarantee against deceptive alignment.
The evidence 01 primary source Supports the claim
Debunking Fallacies in the Theory of AI Motivation ↗ LessWrong · 2015-05-05
Archived copy, captured 2019-04-28: Debunking Fallacies in the Theory of AI Motivation ↗
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Source excerpt “I conclude that these doomsday scenarios involve AGIs that are logically incoherent at such a fundamental level that they can be dismissed as extremely implausible.” Location in source Abstract
Machine-checked · 2026-10-06
Source details and check notes Authors Richard Loosemore Version Text checked in the post’s first stored version through the LessWrong GraphQL API on 2026-10-06; content version 1.0.0. Canonical address Open the canonical source ↗ Accessed 2026-10-06 Language English (en) Archive copy Open archived copy, captured 2019-04-28: Debunking Fallacies in the Theory of AI Motivation ↗ . Captured 1454 days after the recorded publication date. An archive copy shows only what the archive retrieved on 2019-04-28. It does not prove what the page said earlier, and it can differ from the copy checked on 2026-10-06.Attribution Richard Loosemore, "Debunking Fallacies in the Theory of AI Motivation", LessWrong, 2015-05-05. Reuse No open redistribution licence asserted. Bibliographic metadata, editorial paraphrases and short attributed quotations (at most 50 words each). Recheck terms before wider redistribution. Check notes Checked against the first stored version on 2026-10-06. Status and meaning Editorial status. Not reviewed by an editor . An exploratory record that no editor has accepted. This status does not say whether a person has read any linked passage. Each evidence record above shows how it was checked.
Relation. A passage of the document disputes the proposition or a premise it depends on. The record documents the text’s position, not who is right.
Date. Posting time 2015-05-05T02:46:34Z; the API returns no author account, but the post names its author.
Record ID ts-b5-loosemore-2015-contests