selekoa

A documentary history of machine intelligence.

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Comparison · 18 questions · 7 frameworks

Compare frameworks

What does each developer’s safety framework say on the same questions, edition by edition?

Each row is one question, worded so that it fits every framework. Each column is one framework, showing its latest edition unless you choose another. A cell gives what that edition says on the question, with the page, or records that no passage was found in a stated search. Six questions give the edition’s own words; the other twelve give Selekoa’s paraphrase, marked as such. The questions are Selekoa’s. An edition’s own terms, such as “ASL” or “Critical Capability Level”, appear only in quotation marks.

A status records what an edition states. It does not show implementation, compliance or effectiveness, and a shared row does not make two provisions equivalent.

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What the statuses mean

Stated
A passage meets the question’s criterion as worded, however conditional or narrow its scope. The condition or scope is in the note.
Stated, partly
A passage has what the criterion asks for, but in a weaker form than the criterion’s own words: for example, no named person or body where the question asks for one, or a “may” where it asks for a statement that something will happen.
Not found in the recorded search
No passage meeting the criterion was found. The record lists the sections read, the search terms and every passage set aside, with the reason. It does not show that the developer lacks the practice, or that a provision was deleted.
Does not apply
The question does not apply: the edition is the first in its framework, so there is no earlier edition to change from.
Limits of this comparison
  • Conditions that matter are in each cell’s note. A “stated” cell can carry conditions as important as those of a “stated, partly” one.
  • The page compares and does not rank. There are no scores or totals, and columns are in a fixed order.
  • Six questions, on required actions, who decides and exceptions, quote the edition. The other twelve, on risk domains, thresholds, evaluation timing, reporting and revision, give a paraphrase with the page, because quoting them as well would exceed Selekoa’s quotation limit for most editions. A paraphrase states what the passage says, in other words; read the edition at that page before relying on it.
  • Passages were selected, checked and placed under each question by machine, and checked by a reviewer from a different model family. The maintainer decided the borderline cases.
Editions shown: the latest of each framework
Edition shown for each framework

Risk domains coveredChemical, biological, radiological or nuclear weapons

Criterion: The edition names any of chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear weapons (alone or combined) as a domain it tracks or sets a threshold for.

  1. Anthropic · Responsible Scaling Policyv3.4 · effective 2026-07-08

    Edition textArchived copy, captured 2026-07-10

    Stated

    • Paraphrase: The “Non-novel chemical/biological weapons production” row of the threshold table concerns AI systems able to give significant help to people with a basic technical background in making or obtaining and deploying chemical or biological weapons with serious catastrophic potential.

      PDF p. 6, §1 Our Recommendations for Industry-Wide Safety, threshold table, row 'Non-novel chemical/biological weapons production', left column ('Capability or usage threshold')

    Note: Chemical and biological weapons are named in two threshold rows (“Non-novel” and “Novel chemical/biological weapons production”); v3.3 redefined the novel row as AI systems that can stand in functionally for the scarce specialist expertise that is the main barrier to developing novel weapons (see “Stated changes from the previous edition”). Radiological and nuclear weapons are not named as thresholds; “CBRN” appears only in changelog entries about earlier versions.

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  2. Google DeepMind · Frontier Safety Frameworkv3.1 · published 2026-04-17

    Edition textArchived copy, captured 2026-04-23

    Stated

    • Paraphrase: The edition says Google DeepMind has determined, on early research, that significant or severe risks from future models may be likeliest in CBRN, cyber, harmful manipulation, and in “machine learning R&D and misalignment”.

      PDF p. 5 (printed p. 5), §1.3.1 Risk Identification, fourth sentence

    Note: One CCL (CBRN uplift level 1) and one TCL (CBRN uplift TCL), PDF p. 11.

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  3. Meta · Frontier AI / Advanced AI Scaling Frameworkv2.0 · published 2026-04-08

    Edition textArchived copy, captured 2026-04-08

    Stated

    • Paraphrase: The edition says the Framework currently concentrates on catastrophic risk in three areas: chemical and biological, cybersecurity, and “Loss of Control”.

      PDF p. 1 (unnumbered opening page), second paragraph, second sentence

    • Paraphrase: The edition says radiological and nuclear risks are further possible sources of risk from Frontier AI that have been identified.

      PDF p. 36 (printed p. 36), §4.2.4 Emerging Evaluations and Outcomes, 'Radiological and nuclear', first sentence

    Note: Chemical and biological risks are tracked with outcomes CB 1–CB 3 (§3.4.2). Radiological and nuclear risks are placed under 'Emerging Evaluations and Outcomes': outcomes that the edition says cannot yet be incorporated because ways of evaluating them are still nascent. No threshold is set for them.

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  4. Microsoft · Frontier Governance FrameworkFeb 2026 · revised 2026-02

    Edition textArchived copy, captured 2026-04-24

    Stated

    • Paraphrase: The edition lists chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (“CBRN”) weapons as a tracked high-risk capability: a model's ability to give an actor significant uplift in developing and deploying such a weapon.

      PDF p. 4 (printed p. 3), §2 Capabilities and risks, 'Tracked high-risk capabilities', first bullet

    Note: Capability thresholds for low, medium, high and critical are set in Appendix I (PDF p. 12).

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  5. OpenAI · Frontier Governance FrameworkMay 2026 edition · published 2026-05-28

    Edition textArchived copy, captured 2026-05-29

    Stated

    • Paraphrase: The edition says its processes for assessing and mitigating systemic risk span key risk categories, among them “cybersecurity”, “CBRN” (chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear), “harmful manipulation” and “loss of control risks”.

      PDF p. 3 (printed p. 01), §1 Introduction, second paragraph, second sentence

    • Paraphrase: The edition says OpenAI builds its safeguards principally against biological and chemical threats.

      PDF p. 10 (printed p. 08), §2.4 Risk tiers › 'CBRN', first paragraph, second sentence

    Note: CBRN has a three-tier table (PDF pp. 10–11). For nuclear and radiological threats the edition states continued research and development of threat models rather than tiers specific to them.

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  6. OpenAI · Preparedness FrameworkVersion 2 · published 2025-04-15

    Edition textArchived copy, captured 2025-04-15

    Stated

    • Paraphrase: The edition lists Biological and Chemical capabilities as a Tracked Category, describing them as capabilities that can also make it easier to create and use biological or chemical weapons.

      PDF p. 2 (printed p. 1), opening page, first bullet of the Tracked Categories list

    • Paraphrase: The edition states that Nuclear and Radiological capabilities have become a Research Category.

      PDF p. 9 (printed p. 8), §2.3 Research Categories, box 'Changes to Tracked Categories in version 2', second paragraph

    Note: Biological and chemical capability is a Tracked Category with High and Critical thresholds; nuclear and radiological capability is a Research Category without thresholds (Table 2 lists a potential response).

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  7. xAI · Frontier AI FrameworkJune 2026 edition · effective 2026-06-30

    Edition textArchived copy, captured 2026-07-16

    Stated

    • Paraphrase: The edition names four primary risk domains, those it considers most likely to lead to significant or severe outcomes in present and future systems: “CBRN Risks”, “Offensive Cybersecurity Risks”, “Loss of Control Risks” and “Harmful Manipulation Risks”.

      PDF p. 2, §2.1 Risk Identification, third paragraph, first sentence

    Note: Detailed in §2.1(a) 'Addressing CBRN Risks' (PDF pp. 3–4); no numeric threshold is stated.

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