Can large language models democratize access to dual-use biotechnology?
arXiv v1 (6 June 2023). The arXiv abstract page for 2306.03809v1 records the v1 submission as 6 June 2023 (`arxiv-2306-03809-abs`). The PDF text layer carries no date.
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- arXiv (from the version record)
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- No authorship claim recorded yet. The source records list arXiv (Cornell University) and arXiv (preprint, Emily H. Soice, Rafael Rocha, Kimberlee Cordova, Michael Specter, Kevin M. Esvelt).
- Dates
- Published 2023-06-06
The arXiv abstract page for 2306.03809v1 records the v1 submission as 6 June 2023 (`arxiv-2306-03809-abs`). The PDF text layer carries no date.
- Exact source
- arXiv abstract page for 2306.03809v1 (submission history) arXiv (Cornell University) · publication date unknown · Retrieved for the candidate pack on 2026-10-28 (SHA-256 28e8f611fd8130bd519b35594c214b1fbf23c4fee9d528708cd24e7cc2ddf691). Abstract page as served on 2026-10-28; used only for the v1 submission date Retrieved again at admission on 2026-10-30 (SHA-256 90fb4537c1ebbf342ac51f06924097f1bb97b9ae15271593cd85744c567f5cc0). Its wording can change; earlier wording is not authenticated.
- Can large language models democratize access to dual-use biotechnology? arXiv (preprint, Emily H. Soice, Rafael Rocha, Kimberlee Cordova, Michael Specter, Kevin M. Esvelt) · publication date unknown · Retrieved for the candidate pack on 2026-10-28 (SHA-256 78647f96bb8fed0e988de8807caa503cebd4b1148f47ad9d518b9cc401a2bbfe). arXiv v1 of 6 June 2023 (PDF at /pdf/2306.03809v1) Retrieved again at admission on 2026-10-30 (SHA-256 78647f96bb8fed0e988de8807caa503cebd4b1148f47ad9d518b9cc401a2bbfe, the same bytes).
- Earliest located in Arguments about AI and biological risk for D1 Currently available AI systems increase an actor's biological-misuse capability →
- Earliest located text contesting D2 The binding barrier is physical execution rather than information in Arguments about AI and biological risk →
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- Arguments about AI and biological risk →3 records on this document
Versions
soice-llm-dual-use: 1 recorded version, oldest first, published by arXiv. A version is shown as replacing another only where a record says so. Date order alone never implies it.
- 2023-06-06 · publishedarXiv v1 (6 June 2023) (this version)
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Earliest version recorded here; no replacement is recorded.
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Articulates · 1
Propositions whose criterion a passage of this document meets. The record says what the text states, in its register; it is not evidence that the proposition is true.
- Currently available AI systems increase an actor's biological-misuse capabilityThe preprint “Can large language models democratize access to dual-use biotechnology?” (arXiv v1, 6 June 2023) states that its results suggest that large language models will make pandemic-class agents widely accessible as soon as they are credibly identified, even to people with little or no laboratory training.2023-06-06 · publication · Stated in source · Supported Inspect claim & evidence ↗Currently available AI systems increase an actor's biological-misuse capability: propositions page →
Contests · 1
Propositions a passage of this document disputes, or a premise they depend on.
- The binding barrier is physical execution rather than informationThe preprint "Can large language models democratize access to dual-use biotechnology?" (arXiv v1, 6 June 2023) states that the agents it discusses would become widely accessible as soon as they are credibly identified, even to people with little or no laboratory training, against the premise that laboratory execution is the binding barrier.2023-06-06 · publication · Stated in source · Supported Inspect claim & evidence ↗The binding barrier is physical execution rather than information: propositions page →
Bears on · 1
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- Synthesis-order screening is a control point for AI-related biological riskThe preprint of 6 June 2023 states that promising nonproliferation measures include pre-release evaluations of language models by third parties, curation of training datasets, and verifiable screening of all DNA generated by synthesis providers.2023-06-06 · publication · Stated in source · Supported Inspect claim & evidence ↗Synthesis-order screening is a control point for AI-related biological risk: propositions page →
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