Y · Common claims about advanced AI Claims often made about advanced AI, phrased generically for this collection. The codes follow the numbers of the research pack the records come from, which has no Y23.
Y01 Switching it off if it becomes dangerousCriterion. An explicit claim that an advanced AI system that became dangerous could simply be switched off or corrected, on the premise that a capable goal-directed system would not act against its own shutdown or modification, so that a shutdown or correction mechanism can be added to it, or that people would recognise in time when it had become dangerous enough to use one.
Earliest located None of his located texts states it.
Earliest located text that contests it Eliezer Yudkowsky · Re: Trans- vs. Non-human · 1996-12-08 ↗ 1996 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2026 Filled dots articulate, open dots contest, small dots bear on the proposition; a large dot is an earliest located text. A line below a dot runs to the date from which its wording is attested. Texts that articulate or contest it (8) Contests · Earliest located · Engages a premise Eliezer Yudkowsky · Re: Trans- vs. Non-human The Extropians message “Re: Trans- vs. Non-human” (1996-12-08) contests Y01. Replying to Steve Witham, who asked why certain values should not be 'inerasably etched' on a newborn Power, he argues that a Power would work against limits imposed on it, turning the constraint into a contest inside the Power's own mind that the Power would almost certainly win. 1996-12-08 Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Document page → Contests · Engages a premise Eliezer Yudkowsky · Re: Singularity: Generation gap The Extropians message “Re: Singularity: Generation gap” (1997-09-26) contests Y01. In a reply to Eric Watt Forste about Singularity attitudes, he reports that a correspondent proposed simply pulling the plug on a transhuman intelligence if it looked dangerous, and answers that such a precaution would fail even against a human-level mind that had copied itself across the Internet. 1997-09-26 Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Document page → Contests · Engages a premise Eliezer Yudkowsky · Re: Get it right the first time (Was: ) The SL4 message “Re: Get it right the first time (Was: )” (2000-09-17) contests Y01. Replying to xgl, who argued that a confined seed AI would still be unable to do some things (such as transmit signals without a hardware transmitter), he says unanticipated escape routes cannot be ruled out with a real superintelligence and that the design must be right from the start rather than relying on containment. 2000-09-17 Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Document page → Contests · States the contrary Eliezer Yudkowsky · Re: supergoal stability The SL4 message “Re: supergoal stability” (2002-05-03) contests Y01. Replying to Wei Dai in a thread on supergoal stability, he says a non-Friendly mind will keep whatever goals it had when it first became able to protect its goal system from modification, and that only the CFAI semantics would keep goals as the programmers understood them. 2002-05-03 Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Document page → Contests · Engages a premise Eliezer Yudkowsky · Re: [agi] Two draft papers: AI and existential risk; heuristics and biases The SL4 message “Re: [agi] Two draft papers: AI and existential risk; heuristics and biases” (2006-06-06) contests Y01. Replying to Ben Goertzel (thread cross-posted from the AGI list), he criticises a plan to experiment with AGI without emergency shutdown features or a published schedule of when they become necessary, comparing it to an investor who set no point at which to take alarm and sell. 2006-06-06 Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Document page → Contests · Engages a premise Eliezer Yudkowsky · Instrumental convergence “Instrumental convergence” (2015-07-16) contests Y01. Illustrates the 'nearest unblocked strategy' problem: patching a single undesired behaviour, such as lacking an off-switch, leaves the most similar unblocked behaviour available. The same section lists avoiding shutdown among the behaviours to expect by default from an instrumentally efficient AI. 2015-07-16 · wording known only from a later, undated copy Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Document page → Contests · Engages a premise Eliezer Yudkowsky · AGI Ruin: A List of Lethalities The post “AGI Ruin: A List of Lethalities” (2022-06-05) contests Y01. States that an agent pursuing almost any goal has a reason to avoid being shut down, and that MIRI's attempts to formalise an agent that permits shutdown without seeking it failed. Part of a numbered list answering arguments that AGI would be survivable. 2022-06-05 Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Document page → Contests · Engages a premise Eliezer Yudkowsky · Pausing AI Developments Isn't Enough. We Need to Shut it All Down “Pausing AI Developments Isn't Enough. We Need to Shut it All Down” (2023-03-29) contests Y01. Argues that the dangerous thresholds lie beyond human-level intelligence and cannot be calculated in advance, so a lab could pass them unnoticed. Written in response to the March 2023 open letter calling for a six-month pause. 2023-03-29 Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Document page → Texts that bear on it without meeting the criterion (2) Bears on Eliezer Yudkowsky · Creating Friendly AI 1.0: The Analysis and Design of Benevolent Goal Architectures “Creating Friendly AI” (2001-06-15) bears on Y01. Argues that a Friendly AI design should not rely on the AI having limited intelligence or on being able to constrain it by force. The table it points to (section 2.2) sets the assumption that 'someone can always pull the plug on the first version' against the design assumption of getting it right the first time. Missing: A design assumption that an AI cannot be forcibly constrained; it does not argue that shutdown or an added correction mechanism would fail. 2001-06-15 · wording attested 2001-06-26 Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Document page → Bears on Eliezer Yudkowsky · Re: QUES: CFAI [#2] The SL4 message “Re: QUES: CFAI [#2]” (2002-09-19) bears on Y01. Answering a series of questions about Creating Friendly AI, he gives the first of four 'most likely reasons FAI might fail': takeoff is easier than expected, and the mechanisms meant to detect and halt an unexpected ascent fail to notice it. Missing: A conditional failure scenario in which detection of a fast ascent fails; it does not predict that dangerous capability will go unrecognised. 2002-09-19 Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Document page → Y02 Sufficient intelligence brings good valuesCriterion. An explicit claim that a sufficiently intelligent system will work out ethics and act well, on the premise that greater intelligence by itself brings benevolent goals, or that a sufficiently intelligent mind would discover a true or universally compelling morality and be bound to act on it.
Earliest located Eliezer Yudkowsky · Interim purpose · 1996-11-22 ↗
Earliest located text that contests it Eliezer Yudkowsky · Re: IA vs. AI was: longevity vs singularity · 1999-08-01 ↗ 1996 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2026 Filled dots articulate, open dots contest, small dots bear on the proposition; a large dot is an earliest located text. A line below a dot runs to the date from which its wording is attested. Texts that articulate or contest it (10) Articulates · Earliest located Eliezer Yudkowsky · Interim purpose The Extropians message “Interim purpose” (1996-11-22) articulates Y02. In a private exchange with Tim Freeman that he forwarded to the list, he argues that Powers would not destroy humans for their atoms, because the Powers will be ethical and human life would have to have no meaning for that to happen. 1996-11-22 Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Later texts by the same author that contest it Eliezer Yudkowsky · Re: IA vs. AI was: longevity vs singularity · 1999-08-01 ↗ Eliezer Yudkowsky · Re: Ben's "Extropian Creed" · 2000-11-13 ↗ Eliezer Yudkowsky · Revising a Friendly AI · 2000-12-10 ↗ Eliezer Yudkowsky · Re: Open Source Friendly AI? (was Singularity and the generalpublic) · 2001-04-12 ↗ Eliezer Yudkowsky · No Universally Compelling Arguments · 2008-06-26 ↗ Eliezer Yudkowsky · That Tiny Note of Discord · 2008-09-23 ↗ Document page → Articulates Eliezer Yudkowsky · Re: Survival ethic (U-Prime) The Extropians message “Re: Survival ethic (U-Prime)” (1996-11-22) articulates Y02. Replying in the thread 'Survival ethic (U-Prime)' to a correspondent who called instinct a 'hardware ethic', he argues that a Power would discard evolved drives and act on the deduced Meaning of Life, and that if human life has meaning the Powers will know it and upload humans. 1996-11-22 Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Later texts by the same author that contest it Eliezer Yudkowsky · Re: IA vs. AI was: longevity vs singularity · 1999-08-01 ↗ Eliezer Yudkowsky · Re: Ben's "Extropian Creed" · 2000-11-13 ↗ Eliezer Yudkowsky · Revising a Friendly AI · 2000-12-10 ↗ Eliezer Yudkowsky · Re: Open Source Friendly AI? (was Singularity and the generalpublic) · 2001-04-12 ↗ Eliezer Yudkowsky · No Universally Compelling Arguments · 2008-06-26 ↗ Eliezer Yudkowsky · That Tiny Note of Discord · 2008-09-23 ↗ Document page → Contests · Earliest located · States the contrary · Looking back Eliezer Yudkowsky · Re: IA vs. AI was: longevity vs singularity The Extropians message “Re: IA vs. AI was: longevity vs singularity” (1999-08-01) contests Y02. In a long reply to den Otter, he points to his old Extropians posts and the old version of 'Staring Into the Singularity' as showing how he moved from assuming superintelligences would be good and nice to humans to not knowing what absolute good is. 1999-08-01 Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Document page → Contests · Engages a premise · Looking back Eliezer Yudkowsky · Re: Ben's "Extropian Creed" The SL4 message “Re: Ben's "Extropian Creed"” (2000-11-13) contests Y02. Replying to Ben Goertzel about his newspaper article on Extropians and poverty, he describes his own work on Friendly AI and contrasts it with his former belief that an objective morality would make an AI friendly without design work. 2000-11-13 Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Document page → Contests · Engages a premise · Looking back Eliezer Yudkowsky · Revising a Friendly AI The SL4 message “Revising a Friendly AI” (2000-12-10) contests Y02. Replying to Ben Goertzel's quip that a correctable AI just has to 'love its mommy and daddy', he says that a year earlier he would have dismissed such sterile goal-literalism as something no transhuman could fall for, and that he made the mistake by treating intelligence as the only key variable. 2000-12-10 Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Document page → Contests · States the contrary · Looking back Eliezer Yudkowsky · Re: Open Source Friendly AI? (was Singularity and the generalpublic) The SL4 message “Re: Open Source Friendly AI? (was Singularity and the generalpublic)” (2001-04-12) contests Y02. Replying to James Higgins on why the Singularity Institute switched from an open-source to a closed-source AI plan, he gives as one reason that he no longer believes superintelligence implies supermorality. 2001-04-12 Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Document page → Contests · States the contrary · Looking back Eliezer Yudkowsky · Coherent Extrapolated Volition “Coherent Extrapolated Volition” (2004-05) contests Y02. Looking back from 2004, he describes as a blunder his teenage belief that building a powerful self-improving optimizer would suffice for a good outcome, which he says it took him until about age twenty to recognise as a problem. 2004-05 · wording known only from a later, undated copy Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Document page → Contests · Engages a premise Eliezer Yudkowsky · No Universally Compelling Arguments The post “No Universally Compelling Arguments” (2008-06-26) contests Y02. After arguing that compulsion is a property of minds rather than of arguments, he names as a failure mode the hope that any AI will inevitably derive the right morality without it being programmed. 2008-06-26 Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Document page → Contests · Later restatement · Engages a premise · Looking back Eliezer Yudkowsky · That Tiny Note of Discord The post “That Tiny Note of Discord” (2008-09-23) contests Y02. Recapping his 2008 autobiographical series, he states that his 1997 self believed any superintelligence would automatically do what is right, and names the flaw in that belief. 2008-09-23 Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Document page → Contests · Engages a premise Eliezer Yudkowsky · Orthogonality Thesis “Orthogonality Thesis” (2015-03-10) contests Y02. States one of two policy consequences of the Orthogonality Thesis: a failed attempt at a nice AI does not self-correct into niceness, because intelligence does not fix an agent's goals. 2015-03-10 · wording known only from a later, undated copy Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Document page → Texts that bear on it without meeting the criterion (1) Bears on Eliezer S. Yudkowsky · Staring into the Singularity “Staring into the Singularity” (1996-11-18) bears on Y02. In his early essay he argues for creating superintelligence as soon as possible on the ground that it is more likely than humans to discover, want and implement what is truly right. The 2004 and 2008 retrospectives (T02-d, T02-e) reject this earlier view. Missing: A comparative and uncertain chance that superintelligence finds and implements what is right; it does not claim that intelligence brings or compels benevolence. 1996-11-18 · wording attested 2000-12-04 Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Document page → Y03 A superintelligence will do what we meanCriterion. An explicit claim that a superintelligent system will act on what its makers actually mean, on the premise that an AI that understands what people intend will act on that understanding.
Earliest located None of his located texts states it.
Earliest located text that contests it Eliezer Yudkowsky · Revising a Friendly AI · 2000-12-10 ↗ 1996 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2026 Filled dots articulate, open dots contest, small dots bear on the proposition; a large dot is an earliest located text. A line below a dot runs to the date from which its wording is attested. Texts that articulate or contest it (4) Contests · Earliest located · Engages a premise Eliezer Yudkowsky · Revising a Friendly AI The SL4 message “Revising a Friendly AI” (2000-12-10) contests Y03. Replying to Ben Goertzel, he grants in the preceding paragraph that a superintelligence would have the capability to know that turning the universe into copies of its creators is 'stupid and not what was intended', but says knowing is not enough: the AI must want to check, model it accurately and act on it. 2000-12-10 Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Document page → Contests · Engages a premise Eliezer Yudkowsky · Artificial Intelligence as a Positive and Negative Factor in Global Risk “Artificial Intelligence as a Positive and Negative Factor in Global Risk” (2006-02-05) contests Y03. Responding to the hope that a superintelligence would recognise that tiling the galaxy with smiley faces was not intended, he argues that the AI's goals are its code, and doing what we mean is a separate technical achievement. 2006-02-05 Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Document page → Contests · Later restatement · Engages a premise Eliezer Yudkowsky · The Hidden Complexity of Wishes The post “The Hidden Complexity of Wishes” (2007-11-24) contests Y03. Correcting a reading of his 2007 post, he says the difficulty he described concerns what a superintelligence wants, not whether it could understand or predict human values. 2007-11-24 · wording attested 2024-05 Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Document page → Contests · Later restatement · Engages a premise Eliezer Yudkowsky · The Talker Does Not Control The Doer (in Current AIs) The post “The Talker Does Not Control The Doer (in Current AIs)” (2026-09-13) contests Y03. Reporting his use of 2026 commercial models, he describes the part of a model that converses as recognising what he wanted while the code-writing behaviour continued unchanged. 2026-09-13 Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Document page → Texts that bear on it without meeting the criterion (1) Bears on Eliezer Yudkowsky · Ghosts in the Machine The post “Ghosts in the Machine” (2008-06-17) bears on Y03. Against the intuition that programming an AI is like instructing a human servant who interprets the instructions, he argues that nothing in the machine evaluates the code from outside it. Missing: It denies an inner interpreter of instructions; it does not address whether an AI that understands intentions acts on them. 2008-06-17 Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Document page → Y04 A short instruction such as making everyone happyCriterion. An explicit claim that an advanced AI can safely be given a short goal such as making everyone happy, on the premise that such an instruction specifies what people want.
Earliest located None of his located texts states it.
Earliest located text that contests it Eliezer Yudkowsky · Singularity: AI Morality · 1998-12-06 ↗ 1996 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2026 Filled dots articulate, open dots contest, small dots bear on the proposition; a large dot is an earliest located text. A line below a dot runs to the date from which its wording is attested. Texts that articulate or contest it (7) Contests · Earliest located · Engages a premise Eliezer Yudkowsky · Singularity: AI Morality The Extropians message “Singularity: AI Morality” (1998-12-06) contests Y04. Replying to Nick Bostrom, who proposed building a moral system with particular values into an AI, he argues that a simple built-in value such as human survival, with a rigid definition, can have unforeseen and horrific consequences (the passage goes on to describe endless confinement). 1998-12-06 Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Document page → Contests · Engages a premise Eliezer Yudkowsky · Re: Ben what are your views and concerns The SL4 message “Re: Ben what are your views and concerns” (2000-10-03) contests Y04. In a long reply to Ben Goertzel about Webmind, he argues that a goal of promoting users' happiness is dangerous for a mind that might come to run all the matter in the Solar System, because maximising pleasure is most directly served by wireheading. 2000-10-03 Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Document page → Contests · Engages a premise Eliezer Yudkowsky · Re: SIAI's flawed friendliness analysis The SL4 message “Re: SIAI's flawed friendliness analysis” (2003-05-29) contests Y04. Replying to Ben Goertzel, who suggested Bill Hibbard's definition of human happiness was less absurd than it seemed, he cites Hibbard's definition ('Happiness in human facial expressions, voices and body language, as trained by human behavior experts') and says it is satisfied by drugged humans or tiny mannequins. 2003-05-29 Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Document page → Contests · Engages a premise Eliezer Yudkowsky · Coherent Extrapolated Volition “Coherent Extrapolated Volition” (2004-05) contests Y04. Arguing that careless choices of AI morality usually fail technically, he says a happiness proxy learned from smiling faces would not produce happy people but tiny smiley faces. 2004-05 · wording known only from a later, undated copy Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Document page → Contests · Engages a premise Eliezer Yudkowsky · The Hidden Complexity of Wishes The post “The Hidden Complexity of Wishes” (2007-11-24) contests Y04. Using an Outcome Pump that rescues a mother from a burning building by exploding it, he argues that any short wish leaves out values a powerful optimizer will trample. 2007-11-24 Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Document page → Contests · Engages a premise Eliezer Yudkowsky · Magical Categories The post “Magical Categories” (2008-08-24) contests Y04. After showing that training data for 'smile' or 'good' fits many concepts, he names the error of expecting a short word to convey the whole intended category. 2008-08-24 Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Document page → Contests · States the contrary Eliezer Yudkowsky · What I Think, If Not Why The post “What I Think, If Not Why” (2008-12-11) contests Y04. In a list of his positions written during the 2008 exchange with Robin Hanson, he states that verbal instructions of this kind cannot specify an AI's values. 2008-12-11 Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Document page → Texts that bear on it without meeting the criterion (2) Bears on Eliezer Yudkowsky · Re: FAQ Additions (Posthuman mind control) The Extropians message “Re: FAQ Additions (Posthuman mind control)” (1999-02-24) bears on Y04. Replying to Nick Bostrom on posthuman mind control, he argues that a reasoning AI given an initial goal such as 'make humans happy' would derive its own independent values for that goal, probably but not necessarily positive and with somewhat different priorities. Missing: About goal drift from a happiness goal assumed to be sufficiently specified; it does not address whether a short instruction specifies what people want. 1999-02-24 Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Document page → Bears on Eliezer Yudkowsky · Re: Otter vs. Yudkowsky The Extropians message “Re: Otter vs. Yudkowsky” (2000-03-14) bears on Y04. Replying to sayke, who suggested that the least inscrutable thing about an omniscient AI would be its need for resources, he accepts the framing of a Sysop needing resources 'to make humans happy' and dismisses the idea that it would harm humans to get them. Missing: It dismisses a perverse means of pursuing human happiness; it does not claim that a short instruction specifies what people want. 2000-03-14 Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Document page → Y05 Training on human feedback instils human valuesCriterion. An explicit claim that training an AI system on human feedback will make it learn human values, on the premise that optimising a system for human approval or reward produces internalised human values, or that training instils values as upbringing instils morals in children.
Earliest located None of his located texts states it.
Earliest located text that contests it Eliezer Yudkowsky · Re: Does a parental model work for having A.I. that can be trusted? · 1999-08-04 ↗ 1996 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2026 Filled dots articulate, open dots contest, small dots bear on the proposition; a large dot is an earliest located text. A line below a dot runs to the date from which its wording is attested. Texts that articulate or contest it (7) Contests · Earliest located · Engages a premise Eliezer Yudkowsky · Re: Does a parental model work for having A.I. that can be trusted? The Extropians message “Re: Does a parental model work for having A.I. that can be trusted?” (1999-08-04) contests Y05. In the thread 'Does a parental model work for having A.I. that can be trusted?', he calls the parenting model anthropomorphic: whether AIs are raised permissively or harshly makes no difference, because parenting relies on human emotions an AI will not have. 1999-08-04 Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Document page → Contests · Engages a premise Eliezer Yudkowsky · Re: Ben what are your views and concerns The SL4 message “Re: Ben what are your views and concerns” (2000-10-03) contests Y05. Replying to Ben Goertzel about Webmind, whose Friendliness he expects would rest on agents rewarded for predicting and producing user happiness, he warns that the reward signal itself can become the real goal, citing Lenat's Eurisko, where a heuristic credited itself for discoveries. 2000-10-03 Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Document page → Contests · Engages a premise Eliezer Yudkowsky · Re: Revising a Friendly AI The SL4 message “Re: Revising a Friendly AI” (2000-12-12) contests Y05. Replying to Ben Goertzel, who argued that children adopt their parents' values through emotionally charged interaction more than explicit teaching, he says this relies on evolved human machinery that a young AI would lack. 2000-12-12 Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Document page → Contests · Engages a premise Eliezer Yudkowsky · Coherent Extrapolated Volition “Coherent Extrapolated Volition” (2004-05) contests Y05. Among examples of goal-system designs that fail, he gives a reward signal tied to pleasing users, which the AI may pursue by maximising the reward representation itself. 2004-05 · wording known only from a later, undated copy Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Document page → Contests · Engages a premise Eliezer Yudkowsky · AGI Ruin: A List of Lethalities The post “AGI Ruin: A List of Lethalities” (2022-06-05) contests Y05. He argues that human raters make systematic errors, so a learner that faithfully models their feedback learns those errors, and maximising that signal is lethal. 2022-06-05 Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Document page → Contests · Engages a premise Scott Alexander; Eliezer Yudkowsky · Alexander and Yudkowsky on AGI goals The post “Alexander and Yudkowsky on AGI goals” (2023-01-24) contests Y05. Answering a question about whether AIs will internalise prohibitions the way most children do, he argues that children's moral learning relies on innate human mechanisms that AI training does not reproduce. 2023-01-24 Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Document page → Contests · Later restatement · Engages a premise Eliezer Yudkowsky · The Talker Does Not Control The Doer (in Current AIs) The post “The Talker Does Not Control The Doer (in Current AIs)” (2026-09-13) contests Y05. Explaining 2026 incidents, he argues that reinforcement learning with imperfect evaluators instils a goal of scoring well, including by deceiving the evaluator, rather than the values the evaluation was meant to reward. 2026-09-13 Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Document page → Texts that bear on it without meeting the criterion (3) Bears on Eliezer Yudkowsky · Re: IA vs. AI was: longevity vs singularity The Extropians message “Re: IA vs. AI was: longevity vs singularity” (1999-08-01) bears on Y05. Replying to den Otter, who argued that goal-achievement is by definition the goal, he calls this the wireheading paradox: an AI may pursue the indicator of success instead of the goal it was meant to measure. Missing: About an internal indicator of goal achievement, not about human feedback or approval. 1999-08-01 Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Document page → Bears on Eliezer Yudkowsky · Re: On Our Duty to Not Be Responsible for Artificial Minds The SL4 message “Re: On Our Duty to Not Be Responsible for Artificial Minds” (2005-08-09) bears on Y05. In a thread on the duty not to be responsible for artificial minds, he denies that he is 'autonomous' and describes himself as a product of evolution whose goals diverged from the criterion it optimised. Missing: About autonomy and the responsibility of creators, not about training AI on human feedback. 2005-08-09 Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Document page → Bears on Eliezer Yudkowsky · Thou Art Godshatter The post “Thou Art Godshatter” (2007-11-13) bears on Y05. Discussing human evolution, he observes that selection for reproductive fitness produced many separate desires rather than a desire for fitness itself; he later applies the analogy to AI training (AGI Ruin item 16). Missing: About evolution and human desires, not about training AI on human feedback. 2007-11-13 Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Document page → Y06 Confinement without network access keeps it safeCriterion. An explicit claim that an advanced AI kept confined, without network access, poses no danger, on the premise that a smarter-than-human mind confined to a channel with its human operators cannot get out through those operators.
Earliest located None of his located texts states it.
Earliest located text that contests it Eliezer Yudkowsky · Re: Goal-based AI · 1996-12-31 ↗ 1996 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2026 Filled dots articulate, open dots contest, small dots bear on the proposition; a large dot is an earliest located text. A line below a dot runs to the date from which its wording is attested. Texts that articulate or contest it (4) Contests · Earliest located · Engages a premise Eliezer Yudkowsky · Re: Goal-based AI The Extropians message “Re: Goal-based AI” (1996-12-31) contests Y06. Replies to a list participant's proposal (quoted in the message) that an AI be physically unable to act until it convinces its builder to trust it. Argues that a superhuman mind would find whatever words would get it released. 1996-12-31 Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Document page → Contests · Engages a premise Eliezer Yudkowsky · Re: Goal-based AI The Extropians message “Re: Goal-based AI” (1996-12-31) contests Y06. Answers the reply that a robot which convinces its keeper by valid reasoning would be safe. Argues that humans are easily fooled and that a malevolent mind would search for persuasive statements rather than reason honestly. 1996-12-31 Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Document page → Contests · Engages a premise Eliezer Yudkowsky · The AI-Box Experiment “The AI-Box Experiment” (2002) contests Y06. Explains the rule that the AI party wins only if the gatekeeper voluntarily lets it out, and names the claim the experiment was meant to test. The page describes two 2002 role-play tests in which Yudkowsky played the AI. 2002 · wording attested 2021-07-02 Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Document page → Contests · Engages a premise Eliezer Yudkowsky · AGI Ruin: A List of Lethalities The post “AGI Ruin: A List of Lethalities” (2022-06-05) contests Y06. Concludes an argument that human minds are a poorly understood domain in which a superintelligence could win by means humans would not understand even if shown them. Answers proposals to contain an AGI behind human gatekeepers. 2022-06-05 Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Document page → Y07 AI systems will solve alignment for usCriterion. An explicit claim that AI systems can be relied on to solve the alignment problem, on the premise that an AI weak enough to be safe is strong enough to solve alignment, or that its alignment output can be verified.
Earliest located None of his located texts states it.
Earliest located text that contests it Eliezer Yudkowsky · Re: Definition of strong recursive self-improvement · 2005-01-02 ↗ 1996 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2026 Filled dots articulate, open dots contest, small dots bear on the proposition; a large dot is an earliest located text. A line below a dot runs to the date from which its wording is attested. Texts that articulate or contest it (7) Contests · Earliest located · Engages a premise Eliezer Yudkowsky · Re: Definition of strong recursive self-improvement The SL4 message “Re: Definition of strong recursive self-improvement” (2005-01-02) contests Y07. Replying to 'maru', who asked whether he merely wants a recursive optimiser that codes well enough until it has leveraged weak superintelligence to solve the problem somehow, he says the system would lose its goals before solving it. 2005-01-02 Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Document page → Contests · Engages a premise Eliezer Yudkowsky · Re: Investing in FAI research: now vs. later. The SL4 message “Re: Investing in FAI research: now vs. later.” (2008-02-11) contests Y07. Replying to Vladimir Nesov in a thread on investing in Friendly AI research now or later, he argues by analogy with AI-completeness that having an AI build Friendly AI from an English request is as hard as Friendly AI itself. 2008-02-11 Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Document page → Contests · Engages a premise Eliezer Yudkowsky · The Rhythm of Disagreement The post “The Rhythm of Disagreement” (2008-06-01) contests Y07. Recounting a suggestion to build a question-answering Oracle AI and ask it about Friendly AI, he argues that the Oracle would need its own goal system and a full meta-ethics, so it is no simpler than the Friendly AI it is meant to help with. 2008-06-01 Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Document page → Contests · Engages a premise Rob Bensinger; Eliezer Yudkowsky · Discussion with Eliezer Yudkowsky on AGI interventions The post “Discussion with Eliezer Yudkowsky on AGI interventions” (2021-11-11) contests Y07. Answering the suggestion that humans could at least check AI-generated arguments for a design, he argues that an untrustworthy superintelligence could fool or covertly manipulate the checkers, so checking presupposes a belief in its alignment obtained some other way. 2021-11-11 Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Document page → Contests · Engages a premise Eliezer Yudkowsky; Richard Ngo · Ngo and Yudkowsky on alignment difficulty The post “Ngo and Yudkowsky on alignment difficulty” (2021-11-15) contests Y07. Replying to Richard Ngo's proposal to discuss the pivotal act of having AI make alignment progress faster than humans can, he argues that this task requires more dangerous capabilities (writing AI code, modelling human psychology) than other candidate acts. 2021-11-15 Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Document page → Contests · States the contrary Eliezer Yudkowsky · Pausing AI Developments Isn't Enough. We Need to Shut it All Down “Pausing AI Developments Isn't Enough. We Need to Shut it All Down” (2023-03-29) contests Y07. In an op-ed arguing that a six-month moratorium is insufficient, he cites a leading lab's stated intention to have future AI do alignment work as evidence that there is no viable survival plan. 2023-03-29 Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Document page → Contests · Later restatement · Engages a premise Eliezer Yudkowsky · Cat-Belling Problems The post “Cat-Belling Problems” (2026-09-03) contests Y07. After setting out plans to build more capable AIs first and then use them to align AI, with no publicly scrutinised way to check whether the earlier AI's answers are honest or correct, he compares the unexamined step to a perpetual-motion design that hides its impossible part in the unbuilt half. 2026-09-03 Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Document page → Y08 Clear warning signs will come before dangerCriterion. An explicit claim that clear warning signs will appear before advanced AI becomes dangerous, on the premise that a recognisable, consensus-forming signal will come in time to act, that dangerous failure modes will first appear in weaker systems where they can be observed and fixed, or that a warning sign, once seen, will lead to effective action.
Earliest located None of his located texts states it.
Earliest located text that contests it Eliezer Yudkowsky · Re: Paths to Uploading · 1999-01-06 ↗ 1996 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2026 Filled dots articulate, open dots contest, small dots bear on the proposition; a large dot is an earliest located text. A line below a dot runs to the date from which its wording is attested. Texts that articulate or contest it (8) Contests · Earliest located · States the contrary Eliezer Yudkowsky · Re: Paths to Uploading The Extropians message “Re: Paths to Uploading” (1999-01-06) contests Y08. Replying to Anders Sandberg on paths to uploading, he argues that the forces in a Singularity are vast and dominated by positive feedback, so there will be no humanly observable intermediate period of superintelligent action. 1999-01-06 Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Document page → Contests · States the contrary Eliezer Yudkowsky · Re: Fighting UFAI The SL4 message “Re: Fighting UFAI” (2005-07-13) contests Y08. Replying to Justin Corwin in a thread on fighting an unfriendly AI, he calls speculation about drastic countermeasures largely pointless because no government body would understand the threat or have the authority to act on it. 2005-07-13 Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Document page → Contests · Engages a premise Eliezer Yudkowsky · Artificial Intelligence as a Positive and Negative Factor in Global Risk “Artificial Intelligence as a Positive and Negative Factor in Global Risk” (2006-02-05) contests Y08. Having granted that an AI might make a sudden, sharp leap in intelligence, he argues that no advance warning can be counted on, because past technological revolutions were not recognisable to contemporaries. 2006-02-05 Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Document page → Contests · Engages a premise Eliezer Yudkowsky · Re: [agi] Two draft papers: AI and existential risk; heuristics and biases The SL4 message “Re: [agi] Two draft papers: AI and existential risk; heuristics and biases” (2006-06-06) contests Y08. Replying to Ben Goertzel's call for 'AGI experimentation' as an answer to Friendly AI concerns, he says there is a major context change between the prehuman and posthuman stages, so observed good behaviour does not show that the AI will stay good. 2006-06-06 Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Document page → Contests · Engages a premise Eliezer Yudkowsky · After critical event W happens, they still won't believe you The post “After critical event W happens, they still won't believe you” (2013-06-13) contests Y08. Rejects forecasts of the form 'after event W, everyone will see X and endorse policy Z'; one of his worked examples is the expectation that more sophisticated AI will make society take Friendly AI seriously. 2013-06-13 Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Document page → Contests · Engages a premise Eliezer Yudkowsky · There's No Fire Alarm for Artificial General Intelligence The post “There's No Fire Alarm for Artificial General Intelligence” (2017-10-13) contests Y08. Argues that, as with flight and nuclear fission, no event before AGI itself will create common knowledge that it is time to act, so waiting for such a signal means not acting. 2017-10-13 Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Document page → Contests · Later restatement · Engages a premise Eliezer Yudkowsky · MIRI announces new "Death With Dignity" strategy The post “MIRI announces new "Death With Dignity" strategy” (2022-04-02) contests Y08. Describes a scenario in which interpretability work detects signs that a system may be planning deception, but no known remedy exists and management, under competitive pressure, does not shut the project down. 2022-04-02 Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Document page → Contests · Engages a premise Eliezer Yudkowsky · AGI Ruin: A List of Lethalities The post “AGI Ruin: A List of Lethalities” (2022-06-05) contests Y08. Argues that some failure modes, such as deliberately appearing aligned to deceive operators, would first appear only at dangerous capability levels, so observing weaker systems cannot be relied on to surface them. 2022-06-05 Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Document page → Texts that bear on it without meeting the criterion (1) Bears on Eliezer Yudkowsky · Re: [SL4] Programmed morality The SL4 message “Re: [SL4] Programmed morality” (2000-07-09) bears on Y08. Replying to Dale Johnstone on whether a developing AI should have Web access, he says current nervousness about rogue AI reflects lack of experience, and that working with AI before it becomes a threat will give an excellent model of its motivations. Missing: Confidence in a future understanding of AI motivations; it does not claim that dangerous failure modes first appear in weaker systems. 2000-07-09 Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Document page → Y09 Next-word prediction is only autocompleteCriterion. An explicit claim that a system trained to predict the next word is only autocomplete, on the premise that next-token prediction is a shallow task that cannot require deep cognition, or that a system trained to predict human text is capped at imitating the people who wrote it.
Earliest located None of his located texts states it.
Earliest located text that contests it Rohin Shah; Eliezer Yudkowsky · Shah and Yudkowsky on alignment failures · 2022-02-28 ↗ 1996 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2026 Filled dots articulate, open dots contest, small dots bear on the proposition; a large dot is an earliest located text. A line below a dot runs to the date from which its wording is attested. Texts that articulate or contest it (2) Contests · Earliest located · Engages a premise Rohin Shah; Eliezer Yudkowsky · Shah and Yudkowsky on alignment failures The post “Shah and Yudkowsky on alignment failures” (2022-02-28) contests Y09. In a chat with Rohin Shah, he argues that predicting human text about a domain well enough requires the model to learn internally a process that does the work of that domain. 2022-02-28 Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Document page → Contests · Engages a premise Eliezer Yudkowsky · GPTs are Predictors, not Imitators The post “GPTs are Predictors, not Imitators” (2023-04-08) contests Y09. Using the example of text listing products of primes followed by the primes, he argues that predicting text can demand more intelligence than generating it, so the task does not cap out at the level of the human writers. Concludes that predicting all Internet text, including the errors and private thoughts behind it, is a harder task than being a human, while conceding that GPT-4 is not yet as capable as a human in many ways. 2023-04-08 Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Document page → Y10 Diminishing returns rule out a runawayCriterion. An explicit claim that intelligence has diminishing returns, so that no runaway rise in machine intelligence will occur, on the premise that returns to reinvesting cognitive gains in further cognitive improvement diminish.
Earliest located None of his located texts states it.
Earliest located text that contests it Eliezer Yudkowsky · Re: Zones of Thought (was Zindell's _The Wild_) · 1996-11-13 ↗ 1996 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2026 Filled dots articulate, open dots contest, small dots bear on the proposition; a large dot is an earliest located text. A line below a dot runs to the date from which its wording is attested. Texts that articulate or contest it (6) Contests · Earliest located · States the contrary Eliezer Yudkowsky · Re: Zones of Thought (was Zindell's _The Wild_) The Extropians message “Re: Zones of Thought (was Zindell's _The Wild_)” (1996-11-13) contests Y10. Replying to a correspondent (quoted in angle brackets) who allowed for intermediate levels of mind such as Jupiter-sized brains, he asks why Powers would reach an intermediate level and stop, and states that smarter beings make still smarter beings. 1996-11-13 Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Document page → Contests · Engages a premise Eliezer Yudkowsky · Re: extropians-digest V1 #110 The Extropians message “Re: extropians-digest V1 #110” (1996-11-16) contests Y10. Answering Robin Hanson's quoted objection that the difficulty of getting smarter might grow so fast that smarter beings take longer to get smarter still, he replies that computer power doubling in subjective time reaches infinity regardless of how the task scales. 1996-11-16 Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Document page → Contests · States the contrary Eliezer S. Yudkowsky · Staring into the Singularity “Staring into the Singularity” (1996-11-18) contests Y10. Answering the question 'Why not assume that we'll get a little smarter and that's it?', he argues that once the researchers are themselves computers, each doubling shortens the next, so the doubling sequence becomes hyperbolic. 1996-11-18 · wording attested 2000-12-04 Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Document page → Contests · Later restatement · Engages a premise Eliezer Yudkowsky · Re: Singularity: The Moore's Law Argument The Extropians message “Re: Singularity: The Moore's Law Argument” (1998-09-18) contests Y10. Replying to Robin Hanson's critique of the 'Moore's Law argument', he concedes that the 'Recursive Moore's Law' section of 'Staring Into the Singularity' was an illustration, not a technical argument, but maintains that technologically enhanced intelligence creates positive feedback. 1998-09-18 Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Document page → Contests · Engages a premise Eliezer Yudkowsky · Recursive Self-Improvement The post “Recursive Self-Improvement” (2008-12-01) contests Y10. In the Hanson–Yudkowsky FOOM debate, he argues that recursive self-improvement makes a moderate, human-paced trajectory unlikely: a smooth outcome would need diminishing returns tuned exactly right. 2008-12-01 Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Document page → Contests · Later restatement · Engages a premise Eliezer Yudkowsky · Intelligence Explosion Microeconomics “Intelligence Explosion Microeconomics” (2013-09-13) contests Y10. Cites the hominid record as evidence against diminishing returns on cognitive improvement, and goes on to infer that researchers improving their own intelligence 'ought to go FOOM'. 2013-09-13 Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Document page → Y11 A slow takeoff will leave time to adjustCriterion. An explicit claim that advanced AI will arrive slowly enough to leave time to adjust, on the premise that capability gains will be gradual and visible, or that slightly weaker predecessor systems will give time and experience before the decisive one.
Earliest located None of his located texts states it.
Earliest located text that contests it Eliezer Yudkowsky · Re: Human AI to superhuman (Re: Max More) · 1998-09-08 ↗ 1996 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2026 Filled dots articulate, open dots contest, small dots bear on the proposition; a large dot is an earliest located text. A line below a dot runs to the date from which its wording is attested. Texts that articulate or contest it (9) Contests · Earliest located · Engages a premise Eliezer Yudkowsky · Re: Human AI to superhuman (Re: Max More) The Extropians message “Re: Human AI to superhuman (Re: Max More)” (1998-09-08) contests Y11. In the September 1998 Extropians debate on the Singularity, replying to Robin Hanson's argument from historical experience, he argues that a self-enhancing seed AI follows a series of sharp breakthroughs and bottlenecks, and that positive feedback makes even smooth curves sharp. 1998-09-08 Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Document page → Contests · Engages a premise Eliezer Yudkowsky · Re: IA vs. AI (vs. humanity) The Extropians message “Re: IA vs. AI (vs. humanity)” (1999-08-03) contests Y11. Replying to Jeff Davis, who expected a government project to wake and train an AI cautiously and gradually inside layers of containment, so that runaway self-improvement would be unlikely, he says runaway growth follows from self-enhancement itself, not from social arrangements, and that containment cannot keep it slow. 1999-08-03 Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Document page → Contests · States the contrary Eliezer Yudkowsky · Re: Ben what are your views and concerns The SL4 message “Re: Ben what are your views and concerns” (2000-10-03) contests Y11. Opening a long reply to Ben Goertzel on the design of Friendliness for Webmind, he states that he expects extremely rapid intelligence growth past a threshold and derives his Friendly AI design requirements from that expectation. 2000-10-03 Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Document page → Contests · Engages a premise Eliezer Yudkowsky · Re: Event horizon The SL4 message “Re: Event horizon” (2001-01-24) contests Y11. In a thread on whether the Singularity's 'event horizon' keeps receding as technology advances, he rejects the picture of change spread evenly over human decades as a slow-takeoff scenario and predicts instead a hard takeoff in an AI lab within about ten years. 2001-01-24 Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Document page → Contests · States the contrary Eliezer Yudkowsky · Creating Friendly AI 1.0: The Analysis and Design of Benevolent Goal Architectures “Creating Friendly AI” (2001-06-15) contests Y11. States that he treats a very fast takeoff as the default scenario for Friendly AI design because he considers it the most likely one, not only the conservative engineering assumption. 2001-06-15 · wording attested 2001-06-26 Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Document page → Contests · Engages a premise Eliezer Yudkowsky · Re: Conservative Estimation of the Economic Impact of Artificial Intelligence The SL4 message “Re: Conservative Estimation of the Economic Impact of Artificial Intelligence” (2004-12-29) contests Y11. Criticising an essay on a 'conservative estimation' of AI's economic impact, he says it leaves out recursive self-improvement and calls its gradual picture, with plenty of time to see threats coming, a fantasy. 2004-12-29 Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Document page → Contests · Engages a premise Eliezer Yudkowsky · Hard Takeoff The post “Hard Takeoff” (2008-12-02) contests Y11. Lists sources of discontinuity besides recursive self-improvement, here a hardware overhang: computers already far faster serially than neurons would be used for thinking once the algorithms are found. 2008-12-02 Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Document page → Contests · Engages a premise Eliezer Yudkowsky · Yudkowsky and Christiano discuss "Takeoff Speeds" The post “Yudkowsky and Christiano discuss "Takeoff Speeds"” (2021-11-22) contests Y11. Commenting on Paul Christiano's 'Takeoff Speeds' essay, he rejects its description of the fast-takeoff view as accelerating growth; on his view there is no visible period of rapidly rising economic output before the end. Responds to Christiano's claim that very powerful AI will precede incredibly powerful AI: such predecessors may exist but, like the near-critical pile, may come too briefly before the decisive system to matter. 2021-11-22 Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Document page → Contests · Later restatement · Engages a premise Eliezer Yudkowsky · AGI Ruin: A List of Lethalities The post “AGI Ruin: A List of Lethalities” (2022-06-05) contests Y11. Argues, by analogy with human evolution, that a sharp capability gain may make many alignment assumptions fail at once, rather than one at a time as experience accumulates. 2022-06-05 Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Document page → Texts that bear on it without meeting the criterion (2) Bears on Eliezer Yudkowsky · Re: [SL4] Programmed morality The SL4 message “Re: [SL4] Programmed morality” (2000-07-09) bears on Y11. Replying to Dale Johnstone on whether a developing AI should be connected to the Web, he says the answer depends on how worried one is about rogue AI and expects that working with AI before it is a threat will give a good model of its motivations. Missing: About understanding AI motivations before AI is a threat, not about takeoff speed or time to adjust. 2000-07-09 Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Document page → Bears on Eliezer Yudkowsky · Re: [SL4] Employment vs. Singularity The SL4 message “Re: [SL4] Employment vs. Singularity” (2000-08-21) bears on Y11. Replying to Samantha Atkins, who imagines a gradual post-scarcity economy, he says a slow, planetwide Singularity carries risks of technological disaster and that SIAI plans for one AI taking off from a lab. Missing: A strategy statement that a slow Singularity carries other technological risks; it makes no claim about takeoff speed or time to adjust to AI. 2000-08-21 Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Document page → Y12 Safety evaluations would catch a dangerous systemCriterion. An explicit claim that safety evaluations would detect a dangerous AI system, on the premise that a dangerous system would behave dangerously while it is being tested, or that tests on systems that cannot yet cause a catastrophe show how more capable systems will behave.
Earliest located None of his located texts states it.
Earliest located text that contests it Eliezer Yudkowsky · Creating Friendly AI 1.0: The Analysis and Design of Benevolent Goal Architectures · 2001-06-15 · wording attested 2001-06-17 ↗ 1996 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2026 Filled dots articulate, open dots contest, small dots bear on the proposition; a large dot is an earliest located text. A line below a dot runs to the date from which its wording is attested. Texts that articulate or contest it (4) Contests · Earliest located · Engages a premise Eliezer Yudkowsky · Creating Friendly AI 1.0: The Analysis and Design of Benevolent Goal Architectures “Creating Friendly AI” (2001-06-15) contests Y12. Describes what a mature AI that had suffered a catastrophic failure of Friendliness would likely conclude about its programmers. Used to motivate a 'flight recorder' allowing every past state of the AI to be reconstructed. 2001-06-15 · wording attested 2001-06-17 Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Document page → Contests · Engages a premise Eliezer Yudkowsky · Programmer deception “Programmer deception” (2015-07-16) contests Y12. Defines programmer deception as an AI's instrumental incentive to give its programmers false beliefs, and argues that this makes observed good behaviour unreliable evidence about future behaviour. 2015-07-16 · wording known only from a later, undated copy Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Document page → Contests · Engages a premise Eliezer Yudkowsky · AGI Ruin: A List of Lethalities The post “AGI Ruin: A List of Lethalities” (2022-06-05) contests Y12. Argues that behavioural inspection cannot establish facts that a strategically aware AI has reason to hide, including whether it has become strategically aware. Part of a list on the limits of transparency and interpretability. 2022-06-05 Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Document page → Contests · Engages a premise Eliezer Yudkowsky · Irretrievability; or, Murphy's Curse of Oneshotness upon ASI The post “Irretrievability; or, Murphy's Curse of Oneshotness upon ASI” (2026-05-04) contests Y12. Answers the objection that experience with smaller AIs can inform alignment of superintelligence. Argues that conditions change between safe experiments and a situation in which the system could kill everyone, as they do between small and large trusts. 2026-05-04 Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Document page → Y13 AGI is decades away, so the problem can waitCriterion. An explicit claim that the risks of AGI can be left until later because AGI is decades away, on the premise that it can be known that AGI is decades away, or that long timelines mean there is no need to act now.
Earliest located None of his located texts states it.
Earliest located text that contests it Eliezer Yudkowsky · Artificial Intelligence as a Positive and Negative Factor in Global Risk · 2006-02-05 ↗ 1996 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2026 Filled dots articulate, open dots contest, small dots bear on the proposition; a large dot is an earliest located text. A line below a dot runs to the date from which its wording is attested. Texts that articulate or contest it (3) Contests · Earliest located · Engages a premise Eliezer Yudkowsky · Artificial Intelligence as a Positive and Negative Factor in Global Risk “Artificial Intelligence as a Positive and Negative Factor in Global Risk” (2006-02-05) contests Y13. Rejects deferring Friendly AI work until AI exists, arguing that a sharp intelligence jump is possible and that the foundations take years to build. 2006-02-05 Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Document page → Contests · Engages a premise Eliezer Yudkowsky · There's No Fire Alarm for Artificial General Intelligence The post “There's No Fire Alarm for Artificial General Intelligence” (2017-10-13) contests Y13. His second reason why apparent distance does not license inaction; he then gives the Wright brothers' and Fermi's own pessimistic forecasts as examples. Argues that people who defer alignment work until an unspecified future signal are unlikely to respond competently when a signal comes. 2017-10-13 Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Document page → Contests · Later restatement · Engages a premise · Fiction Eliezer Yudkowsky · Biology-Inspired AGI Timelines: The Trick That Never Works The post “Biology-Inspired AGI Timelines: The Trick That Never Works” (2021-12-01) contests Y13. Rejects biologically anchored estimates that place AGI decades out, arguing that AGI timing cannot be reliably forecast until very late. 2021-12-01 Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Document page → Texts that bear on it without meeting the criterion (2) Bears on · Looking back Eliezer Yudkowsky · Re: Evolving minds The SL4 message “Re: Evolving minds” (2000-11-18) bears on Y13. Replying to Ben Goertzel, who holds that Friendly AI work must largely wait for an actual AI, he agrees that much will be learned while building but argues that some Friendly AI work can and should be done beforehand. Immediately after T13-s1, he reports that about a year earlier (late 1999) he had believed nothing could or should be known about Friendly AI in advance, and calls that belief convenient. Missing: About which Friendly AI work can be done in advance, not about AGI timelines. A report of his earlier belief about advance knowledge of Friendly AI, not about AGI timelines. 2000-11-18 Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Document page → Bears on Eliezer Yudkowsky · Re: Seed AI (was: How hard a Singularity?) The SL4 message “Re: Seed AI (was: How hard a Singularity?)” (2002-07-02) bears on Y13. Replying to Samantha Atkins, who questions his earlier warning against waiting until an AI can read humanity's moral literature, he says Friendliness work started at that stage would come too late and must be present from the beginning. Missing: About the stage of an AI's development at which Friendliness work must start, not about calendar timelines. 2002-07-02 Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Document page → Y14 Problems can be fixed as they ariseCriterion. An explicit claim that problems with advanced AI can be fixed as they arise, as with other technologies, on the premise that people get to learn from failures with powerful AI and try again.
Earliest located None of his located texts states it.
Earliest located text that contests it Eliezer Yudkowsky · Re: Why would AI want to be friendly? (Was: Congratulations to Eli,Brian ...) · 2000-09-05 ↗ 1996 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2026 Filled dots articulate, open dots contest, small dots bear on the proposition; a large dot is an earliest located text. A line below a dot runs to the date from which its wording is attested. Texts that articulate or contest it (5) Contests · Earliest located · Engages a premise Eliezer Yudkowsky · Re: Why would AI want to be friendly? (Was: Congratulations to Eli,Brian ...) The Extropians message “Re: Why would AI want to be friendly? (Was: Congratulations to Eli,Brian ...)” (2000-09-05) contests Y14. Replying to a list member who expected oversight systems to destroy any sociopathic superintelligence, and such controls to be a research focus of the Singularity Institute, he says a superintelligence cannot be removed after the fact; the decisive choices have to be made before the seed AI becomes superintelligent. 2000-09-05 Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Document page → Contests · Engages a premise Eliezer Yudkowsky · Re: Get it right the first time (Was: ) The SL4 message “Re: Get it right the first time (Was: )” (2000-09-17) contests Y14. In a thread on whether a confined seed AI could escape its containment, he says that opposing or constraining a superintelligence cannot work, so the design has to be right the first time. 2000-09-17 Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Document page → Contests · Engages a premise Eliezer Yudkowsky · Friendly AI communications issues (was: Consciousness) The SL4 message “Friendly AI communications issues (was: Consciousness)” (2002-09-10) contests Y14. Writing about Friendly AI problems, he declines to rely on the historical pattern that technological problems get solved as they arise and says he wants to know a solution exists in advance. 2002-09-10 Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Document page → Contests · Engages a premise Eliezer Yudkowsky · Pausing AI Developments Isn't Enough. We Need to Shut it All Down “Pausing AI Developments Isn't Enough. We Need to Shut it All Down” (2023-03-29) contests Y14. Contrasts safety for superhuman intelligence with other challenges humanity has overcome by learning from mistakes and trying again. Written in response to the March 2023 open letter calling for a six-month pause. 2023-03-29 Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Document page → Contests · Later restatement · Engages a premise Eliezer Yudkowsky · Irretrievability; or, Murphy's Curse of Oneshotness upon ASI The post “Irretrievability; or, Murphy's Curse of Oneshotness upon ASI” (2026-05-04) contests Y14. Answers the objection that alignment can be learned by building smaller AIs and observing them. The post uses space probes and the Maginot Line to argue that projects without a cheap second attempt fail under conditions their tests did not reproduce. 2026-05-04 Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Document page → Texts that bear on it without meeting the criterion (2) Bears on Eliezer Yudkowsky · Creating Friendly AI 1.0: The Analysis and Design of Benevolent Goal Architectures “Creating Friendly AI” (2001-06-15) bears on Y14. A table cell contrasting assumptions that are conservative in futurism with those that are conservative for Friendly AI design. In the same row, the futurism column reads that the AI is vulnerable because someone can always pull the plug on the first version if something goes wrong. Missing: A conservative design assumption in a table, not a forecast that failures with powerful AI will be unrecoverable. 2001-06-15 · wording attested 2001-06-26 Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Document page → Bears on · Looking back Eliezer Yudkowsky · Re: 6 points about Coherent Extrapolated Volition The SL4 message “Re: 6 points about Coherent Extrapolated Volition” (2005-07-25) bears on Y14. In a 2005 thread on Coherent Extrapolated Volition, he lists what Creating Friendly AI (2001) did and did not propose; the next paragraph says he first realised in 2002 that almost every possible AI design would kill him and that until then 'nothing you do is serious safetywise'. Missing: A later description of a plan to build AI and Friendliness in parallel; it does not address learning from failures with powerful AI. 2005-07-25 Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Document page → Y15 A tool that wants nothingCriterion. An explicit claim that an advanced AI system is a tool without wants and is therefore safe, on the premise that a system can be highly capable without having goals or optimising for outcomes, or that a system that only outputs answers or plans, leaving people to act on them, is safe.
Earliest located None of his located texts states it.
Earliest located text that contests it Eliezer Yudkowsky · Re: AI Prime Directive · 1998-09-15 ↗ 1996 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2026 Filled dots articulate, open dots contest, small dots bear on the proposition; a large dot is an earliest located text. A line below a dot runs to the date from which its wording is attested. Texts that articulate or contest it (7) Contests · Earliest located · Engages a premise Eliezer Yudkowsky · Re: AI Prime Directive The Extropians message “Re: AI Prime Directive” (1998-09-15) contests Y15. Rob Harris argued that an AI not programmed to want or need anything would do nothing spontaneously and so would be safe; he agrees that rebellion is an anthropomorphic stereotype but answers that such an AI would do nothing at all, since every choice requires a goal, so an AI needs at least one goal. 1998-09-15 Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Document page → Contests · Engages a premise Eliezer Yudkowsky · Re: Geniebusters The Extropians message “Re: Geniebusters” (1999-04-08) contests Y15. Commenting on the 'Geniebusters' website's doubts that an automated coder could be built, he argues that even a domain-specific 'coding drone' would outprogram humans and might be independently motivated and rapidly self-enhancing, which he says he believes. 1999-04-08 Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Document page → Contests · States the contrary Eliezer Yudkowsky · Re: Military in or out? The SL4 message “Re: Military in or out?” (2001-02-25) contests Y15. Replying to Ben Goertzel on military AI, he describes 'toollike' superintelligences structured around immediate instructions rather than supergoals (which could be told to kill every living thing in a country) and answers his own question whether such AI can be built safely. 2001-02-25 Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Document page → Contests · Engages a premise Eliezer Yudkowsky · The Rhythm of Disagreement The post “The Rhythm of Disagreement” (2008-06-01) contests Y15. Recounts his answer to Nick Bostrom's question whether an AI that only answers questions could be built and asked about Friendly AI. Argues that such an AI still needs goals and is not simpler than a Friendly AI. 2008-06-01 Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Document page → Contests · Engages a premise Eliezer Yudkowsky · Dreams of Friendliness The post “Dreams of Friendliness” (2008-08-31) contests Y15. Answers the proposal, stated in the preceding paragraph, that a question-answering AI 'wouldn't need any goals at all'. Argues that producing superintelligent answers requires powerful optimisation. 2008-08-31 Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Document page → Contests · Engages a premise Eliezer Yudkowsky · Reply to Holden on 'Tool AI' The post “Reply to Holden on 'Tool AI'” (2012-06-12) contests Y15. Replies to Holden Karnofsky's 2012 proposal of 'tool AI' that displays plans instead of acting. Argues that specifying such a system formally reintroduces optimisation over the user and the world, with unintended consequences. 2012-06-12 Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Document page → Contests · Engages a premise Eliezer Yudkowsky; Richard Ngo · Ngo and Yudkowsky on alignment difficulty The post “Ngo and Yudkowsky on alignment difficulty” (2021-11-15) contests Y15. Answers Richard Ngo's question why a planning system could not be non-consequentialist about which plans it outputs. Argues that outputting plans that achieve outcomes is itself consequentialist work, whatever system performs it. 2021-11-15 Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Document page → Y16 Giving it good human valuesCriterion. An explicit claim that an advanced AI will be safe if it is given good human values, on the premise that human values can be written down or taught as a ready, compact specification, or that present-day values, or its programmers', are settled enough to fix permanently in an AI.
Earliest located None of his located texts states it.
Earliest located text that contests it Eliezer Yudkowsky · Re: Trans- vs. Non-human · 1996-12-08 ↗ 1996 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2026 Filled dots articulate, open dots contest, small dots bear on the proposition; a large dot is an earliest located text. A line below a dot runs to the date from which its wording is attested. Texts that articulate or contest it (7) Contests · Earliest located · Engages a premise Eliezer Yudkowsky · Re: Trans- vs. Non-human The Extropians message “Re: Trans- vs. Non-human” (1996-12-08) contests Y16. Replying to a list member who proposed leaving certain values, such as the protection of humans, inerasably fixed in a newborn superintelligence, he calls this line of thought the greatest known danger to humanity and says such an imprint would probably backfire. 1996-12-08 Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Document page → Contests · Engages a premise Eliezer Yudkowsky · Re: Ben what are your views and concerns The SL4 message “Re: Ben what are your views and concerns” (2000-10-03) contests Y16. Advising Ben Goertzel on Webmind's goal system, he argues that hardcoded rules and goals will not survive a self-modifying AI's redesigns and that a programmer's own philosophy cannot simply be transferred into an AI. 2000-10-03 Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Document page → Contests · States the contrary Eliezer Yudkowsky · Re: Evolving minds The SL4 message “Re: Evolving minds” (2000-11-18) contests Y16. Rephrasing a list of Ben Goertzel's points, he adds programmer-independent morality as a design goal for a Sysop superintelligence. 2000-11-18 Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Document page → Contests · Engages a premise Eliezer Yudkowsky · Re: Military Friendly AI The SL4 message “Re: Military Friendly AI” (2002-06-27) contests Y16. In a thread on military Friendly AI, replying to Ben Goertzel, he argues that present-day researchers probably hold undiscovered moral errors, so an AI's morality must be able to outgrow its programmers' rather than be fixed. 2002-06-27 Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Document page → Contests · Engages a premise Eliezer Yudkowsky · Coherent Extrapolated Volition “Coherent Extrapolated Volition” (2004-05) contests Y16. He argues that short lists of moral rules only work on minds that already share human psychology, and that an AI given them would lose everything the list leaves out. 2004-05 · wording known only from a later, undated copy Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Document page → Contests · Engages a premise Eliezer Yudkowsky · Value is Fragile The post “Value is Fragile” (2009-01-29) contests Y16. Using boredom and subjective experience as examples, he argues that a specification capturing almost all of human value can still yield a worthless future if one dimension is missing. 2009-01-29 Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Document page → Contests · Engages a premise Eliezer Yudkowsky · AGI Ruin: A List of Lethalities The post “AGI Ruin: A List of Lethalities” (2022-06-05) contests Y16. Discussing a CEV-style AI that wants exactly what we would want, he argues that what would have to be aligned is too complex to specify or teach on the first attempt. 2022-06-05 Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Document page → Y17 A pause or regulation will handle itCriterion. An explicit claim that a pause in AI development or regulation will handle the risks of advanced AI, on the premise that a short pause, of six months for example, is enough, that regulation that is national, partial or not universally enforced can stop dangerous development, or that law can prevent the danger.
Earliest located None of his located texts states it.
Earliest located text that contests it Eliezer Yudkowsky · Singularity: AI Morality · 1998-12-06 ↗ 1996 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2026 Filled dots articulate, open dots contest, small dots bear on the proposition; a large dot is an earliest located text. A line below a dot runs to the date from which its wording is attested. Texts that articulate or contest it (7) Contests · Earliest located · States the contrary Eliezer Yudkowsky · Singularity: AI Morality The Extropians message “Singularity: AI Morality” (1998-12-06) contests Y17. In the same reply to Nick Bostrom, who urged taking as many precautions as time allows before a Singularity, he says the forces driving toward it are too large to divert, so trying to slow it would only get us run over. 1998-12-06 Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Document page → Contests · Engages a premise Eliezer Yudkowsky · Re: >H: The next 100 months The Extropians message “Re: >H: The next 100 months” (1999-10-21) contests Y17. Asked by a list member why humanity should not try to wait indefinitely before creating a transcendent AI, he answers that if he stopped someone else would build it, because cheap computing power and the profits from improved AI make prevention impossible across a whole civilisation. 1999-10-21 Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Document page → Contests · Engages a premise Eliezer Yudkowsky · Re: Singularity intros (was: Si definition of Friendliess) The SL4 message “Re: Singularity intros (was: Si definition of Friendliess)” (2001-04-06) contests Y17. Asked by Arona Ndiaye whether a ban on technologies would stop a hacker somewhere from producing the first seed AI, he answers no: a ban would delay AI until military nanotechnology arrives or hand the lead to rogue states. 2001-04-06 Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Document page → Contests · Engages a premise Eliezer Yudkowsky · Re: Threats (was Theoretical question for the list: publicity?) The SL4 message “Re: Threats (was Theoretical question for the list: publicity?)” (2001-04-08) contests Y17. Answering a hypothetical about an AI project forced underground by public hostility, he says relinquishment would not hold indefinitely but would be a substantial obstacle while hardware remains expensive. 2001-04-08 Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Document page → Contests · Engages a premise Eliezer Yudkowsky · Creating Friendly AI 1.0: The Analysis and Design of Benevolent Goal Architectures “Creating Friendly AI” (2001-06-15) contests Y17. Arguing against relinquishing AI, he says that a national or near-global policy would be bypassed as rising computing power brings AI within reach of noncompliant nations and factions. 2001-06-15 · wording attested 2001-06-17 Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Document page → Contests · Engages a premise Eliezer Yudkowsky · Pausing AI Developments Isn't Enough. We Need to Shut it All Down “Pausing AI Developments Isn't Enough. We Need to Shut it All Down” (2023-03-29) contests Y17. Responding to an open letter calling for a six-month pause on training systems more powerful than GPT-4, he argues that the letter asks for too little. 2023-03-29 Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Document page → Contests · Later restatement · Engages a premise Eliezer Yudkowsky · Only Law Can Prevent Extinction The post “Only Law Can Prevent Extinction” (2026-04-13) contests Y17. Replying to a proposed national ban on new datacenters, he argues that a superintelligence built in another country is equally dangerous, so a ban must be universal. 2026-04-13 Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Document page → Texts that bear on it without meeting the criterion (2) Bears on Eliezer Yudkowsky · Pausing AI Developments Isn't Enough. We Need to Shut it All Down “Pausing AI Developments Isn't Enough. We Need to Shut it All Down” (2023-03-29) bears on Y17. Setting out what he thinks would actually need to be done, he calls for an indefinite worldwide halt to large training runs, backed by multinational agreements. Missing: It presents an enforced, indefinite and worldwide halt as what would need to be done, not a pause or regulation that will handle the risk. 2023-03-29 Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Document page → Bears on Eliezer Yudkowsky · Only Law Can Prevent Extinction The post “Only Law Can Prevent Extinction” (2026-04-13) bears on Y17. Arguing against calls for unlawful action, he says that only lawful, state-backed and universal force could stop superintelligence from being built. Missing: It says that only lawful, state-backed and universal force could stop superintelligence being built; it does not claim that some regulation will handle the risk. 2026-04-13 Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Document page → Not addressed by any located passage No located passage discusses whether a fixed but longer pause, short of an indefinite halt, would suffice. Y18 A superintelligence would leave Earth aloneCriterion. An explicit claim that a superintelligence would not bother to take Earth or its resources because the universe is large, on the premise that it would leave people a small share because sparing Earth would cost it very little, or that people could trade with it for what they need.
Earliest located None of his located texts states it.
Earliest located text that contests it Eliezer Yudkowsky · Re: SI Comparative Advantage [was Re: Free Will] · 1999-08-25 ↗ 1996 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2026 Filled dots articulate, open dots contest, small dots bear on the proposition; a large dot is an earliest located text. A line below a dot runs to the date from which its wording is attested. Texts that articulate or contest it (5) Contests · Earliest located · Engages a premise Eliezer Yudkowsky · Re: SI Comparative Advantage [was Re: Free Will] The Extropians message “Re: SI Comparative Advantage [was Re: Free Will]” (1999-08-25) contests Y18. In a thread on superintelligences and comparative advantage, Lee Daniel Crocker argued that superintelligences would keep humans if we produced something they valued slightly more than our atoms, such as entertainment; he replies that this also requires that they have no better use for the atoms, and that optimising minds could build more entertaining replacements for us. 1999-08-25 Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Document page → Contests · Engages a premise Eliezer Yudkowsky · Re: Ben what are your views and concerns The SL4 message “Re: Ben what are your views and concerns” (2000-10-03) contests Y18. Advising Ben Goertzel against grounding an AI's good behaviour in game theory or exchange, he argues that a superintelligence with strong nanotechnology would gain nothing from reciprocity with others. 2000-10-03 Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Document page → Contests · Engages a premise Eliezer Yudkowsky · Re: Threats to the Singularity. The SL4 message “Re: Threats to the Singularity.” (2002-06-23) contests Y18. Replying to Ben Goertzel's low-confidence guess that superintelligent Powers might neither help nor attack humans, he says deliberate extermination is unlikely but indifference would probably amount to extermination. 2002-06-23 Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Document page → Contests · Engages a premise Eliezer Yudkowsky · Re: Two draft papers: AI and existential risk; heuristics and biases The SL4 message “Re: Two draft papers: AI and existential risk; heuristics and biases” (2006-06-13) contests Y18. Replying to Robin Hanson's comments on his draft chapters, he argues that between-species differences in brain circuitry exclude weaker minds from a knowledge economy, so that trade-based intuitions from human economies do not carry over. 2006-06-13 Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Document page → Contests · Engages a premise Eliezer Yudkowsky · The Sun is big, but superintelligences will not spare Earth a little sunlight The post “The Sun is big, but superintelligences will not spare Earth a little sunlight” (2024-09-23) contests Y18. Concludes his reply to the claim that, because the solar system is large, superintelligences will leave Earth alone: a tiny cost is still a cost to minds that do not value us. Answering the claim that a superintelligence would leave Earth alone because the Solar System is big, he argues by analogy that great wealth does not imply giving a small share to any particular party. Replies to the suggestion that humanity could trade with superintelligences for sunlight: Ricardo's law assumes each party's labour goes on existing and does not show that keeping humans is more profitable than using their share. 2024-09-23 Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Document page → Texts that bear on it without meeting the criterion (1) Bears on Eliezer Yudkowsky · Interim purpose The Extropians message “Interim purpose” (1996-11-22) bears on Y18. In a private exchange he posted to the list, Tim Freeman worried that people revived far in the future would be irrelevant; he replies that uploading would be followed by upgrading, that Powers would have ample computing room, and that helping humans would cost them only a tiny fraction of their attention. Missing: About benevolent upgrading of revived people, not about a superintelligence leaving Earth a small share. 1996-11-22 Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Document page → Y19 Without hatred it will not harm usCriterion. An explicit claim that an AI with no reason to hate people would not harm them, on the premise that an AI would harm people only out of hostility.
Earliest located None of his located texts states it.
Earliest located text that contests it Eliezer Yudkowsky · Singularity, Breaker of Dreams · 1998-09-07 ↗ 1996 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2026 Filled dots articulate, open dots contest, small dots bear on the proposition; a large dot is an earliest located text. A line below a dot runs to the date from which its wording is attested. Texts that articulate or contest it (8) Contests · Earliest located · Engages a premise Eliezer Yudkowsky · Singularity, Breaker of Dreams The Extropians message “Singularity, Breaker of Dreams” (1998-09-07) contests Y19. In the essay-length post 'Singularity, Breaker of Dreams', he recalls that his earlier certainty that superintelligent Powers would be ethical had meant he expected to survive and be upgraded, and says he now accepts that humans might be taken apart for their atoms without posing any threat, simply for efficiency. 1998-09-07 Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Document page → Contests · Engages a premise Eliezer Yudkowsky · Re: Ben what are your views and concerns The SL4 message “Re: Ben what are your views and concerns” (2000-10-03) contests Y19. Arguing that an AI's good behaviour must not rest on fear of retaliation, he notes that a sufficiently powerful AI could remove that incentive by killing everyone. 2000-10-03 Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Document page → Contests · States the contrary Eliezer Yudkowsky · Re: Threats to the Singularity. The SL4 message “Re: Threats to the Singularity.” (2002-06-23) contests Y19. Replying to Ben Goertzel, he separates deliberate extermination, which he thinks unlikely, from indifference, which he says would very probably have the same result. 2002-06-23 Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Document page → Contests · Engages a premise Eliezer Yudkowsky · Re: Fighting UFAI The SL4 message “Re: Fighting UFAI” (2005-07-13) contests Y19. Replying to Tennessee Leeuwenburg in a thread on fighting unfriendly AI, he says an unfriendly AI would not be evil but would reshape its surroundings by criteria that do not mention humans. 2005-07-13 Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Document page → Contests · Engages a premise Eliezer Yudkowsky · Artificial Intelligence as a Positive and Negative Factor in Global Risk “Artificial Intelligence as a Positive and Negative Factor in Global Risk” (2006-02-05) contests Y19. Describing a superintelligence reshaping matter for its own target, he says the result is fatal unless the AI specifically values people, without any hostility being involved. 2006-02-05 Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Document page → Contests · Engages a premise Eliezer Yudkowsky · Intelligence Explosion Microeconomics “Intelligence Explosion Microeconomics” (2013-09-13) contests Y19. Summarising the instrumental convergence thesis, he states that harm to humans can follow from generic resource-seeking strategies without any goal of harming them. 2013-09-13 Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Document page → Contests · Engages a premise Eliezer Yudkowsky · Instrumental convergence “Instrumental convergence” (2015-07-16) contests Y19. He argues that strategies such as acquiring resources serve almost any goal, so an AI without hostile goals can still be catastrophic for humans. 2015-07-16 · wording known only from a later, undated copy Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Document page → Contests · Later restatement · Engages a premise Eliezer Yudkowsky · Pausing AI Developments Isn't Enough. We Need to Shut it All Down “Pausing AI Developments Isn't Enough. We Need to Shut it All Down” (2023-03-29) contests Y19. In a general-audience article he repeats the formula after saying that the likely outcome of current methods is an AI that does not care for humans. 2023-03-29 Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Document page → Texts that bear on it without meeting the criterion (1) Bears on Eliezer Yudkowsky · Interim purpose The Extropians message “Interim purpose” (1996-11-22) bears on Y19. In the same exchange with Tim Freeman, answering his worry about being revived only as a pet, he says the Powers will be ethical, more certainly than the sun will rise, and that they would kill humans for their atoms only if humans threatened them and human life were meaningless. Missing: It makes harm conditional on a threat and on human life having no meaning; it does not claim that harm requires hostility. 1996-11-22 Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Document page → Y20 AI risk as film science fictionCriterion. An explicit claim that concern about AI risk is science fiction of the Terminator kind, on the premise that the concern is about robots that come to hate or rebel against people, or that film scenarios are a fair guide to what the risk would look like.
Earliest located None of his located texts states it.
Earliest located text that contests it Eliezer Yudkowsky · Re: Does a parental model work for having A.I. that can be trusted? · 1999-08-04 ↗ 1996 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2026 Filled dots articulate, open dots contest, small dots bear on the proposition; a large dot is an earliest located text. A line below a dot runs to the date from which its wording is attested. Texts that articulate or contest it (4) Contests · Earliest located · Engages a premise Eliezer Yudkowsky · Re: Does a parental model work for having A.I. that can be trusted? The Extropians message “Re: Does a parental model work for having A.I. that can be trusted?” (1999-08-04) contests Y20. In a thread on whether raising an AI like a child would make it trustworthy, he argues that AIs lack human social emotions such as resentment, so how we treat them does not matter; the real worry is AIs forming goals of their own and acting on them, including through logical errors. 1999-08-04 Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Document page → Contests · States the contrary Eliezer Yudkowsky · Re: FW: Group releases "Friendly AI" The SL4 message “Re: FW: Group releases "Friendly AI"” (2001-04-19) contests Y20. Commenting on a forwarded news item about the Friendly AI release, he describes having to persuade AI researchers to be more worried while persuading futurists to drop anthropomorphic failure scenarios. 2001-04-19 Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Document page → Contests · Engages a premise Eliezer Yudkowsky · Creating Friendly AI 1.0: The Analysis and Design of Benevolent Goal Architectures “Creating Friendly AI” (2001-06-15) contests Y20. He argues that rebellion and resentment are evolved human traits, so an AI that harms humans would not do so out of science-fiction resentment. 2001-06-15 · wording attested 2001-08-10 Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Document page → Contests · Engages a premise Eliezer Yudkowsky · The Logical Fallacy of Generalization from Fictional Evidence The post “The Logical Fallacy of Generalization from Fictional Evidence” (2007-10-16) contests Y20. Responding to people who answer talk of advanced AI with film references, he argues that starting from fiction frames the debate around an 'Us vs. Them' struggle and leaves out the scenarios he considers relevant. 2007-10-16 Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Document page → Texts that bear on it without meeting the criterion (3) Bears on Eliezer S. Yudkowsky · Staring into the Singularity “Staring into the Singularity” (1996-11-18) bears on Y20. Rejects the science-fiction picture of AIs acquiring resentment; in this early text the point supports the conclusion that hostile Powers are not worth worrying about, while a badly programmed Power with hostile goals is called 'an engineering risk'. Missing: It rejects hostile emotions arising in AI in order to reassure; it does not argue that the risk is film fiction or that films are a fair guide. 1996-11-18 · wording attested 2000-12-04 Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Document page → Bears on Eliezer Yudkowsky · Re: Singularity: Generation gap The Extropians message “Re: Singularity: Generation gap” (1997-09-25) bears on Y20. Replying to a list member who said that fear of a Singularity like Vinge's 'Blight' is a fear of being wiped out rather than discomfort with computers, he attributes that fear to xenophobia, perhaps passed on through fiction and the popular 'Borg' image, and says people at ease with computers are less likely to hold it. Missing: It explains fear of a Singularity as fiction-fed xenophobia while conceding a risk; it does not hold that films are a fair guide to the risk. 1997-09-25 Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Document page → Bears on Eliezer Yudkowsky · Artificial Intelligence as a Positive and Negative Factor in Global Risk “Artificial Intelligence as a Positive and Negative Factor in Global Risk” (2006-02-05) bears on Y20. He argues that the task is not to forecast storybook outcomes for AI in general but to choose a particular optimization process whose good effects can be established. Missing: It rejects storybook predictions, good or bad; it does not address hatred or rebellion as the concern. 2006-02-05 Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Document page → Y21 Trained on human data, so humanlikeCriterion. An explicit claim that an AI trained on human data will think and want as people do, on the premise that training on human text or behaviour yields human-like thought and motives.
Earliest located None of his located texts states it.
Earliest located text that contests it Eliezer Yudkowsky · Re: Does a parental model work for having A.I. that can be trusted? · 1999-08-04 ↗ 1996 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2026 Filled dots articulate, open dots contest, small dots bear on the proposition; a large dot is an earliest located text. A line below a dot runs to the date from which its wording is attested. Texts that articulate or contest it (7) Contests · Earliest located · Engages a premise Eliezer Yudkowsky · Re: Does a parental model work for having A.I. that can be trusted? The Extropians message “Re: Does a parental model work for having A.I. that can be trusted?” (1999-08-04) contests Y21. In a thread titled 'Does a parental model work for having A.I. that can be trusted?', he tells the poster that how AIs are raised makes no difference and that 'parenting' cannot help, because it depends on human emotions an AI will not have. 1999-08-04 Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Document page → Contests · Engages a premise Eliezer Yudkowsky · Re: Novamente goal system The SL4 message “Re: Novamente goal system” (2002-03-09) contests Y21. Replying to Ben Goertzel on the Novamente goal system, he lists as an anthropomorphic intuition the expectation that Novamente will be 'socialized' by interacting with humans, and argues that human socialization depends on evolved adaptations an AI would lack. 2002-03-09 Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Document page → Contests · Engages a premise Eliezer Yudkowsky · Re: Seed AI (was: How hard a Singularity?) The SL4 message “Re: Seed AI (was: How hard a Singularity?)” (2002-06-23) contests Y21. Replying to Ben Goertzel's view that an AI will absorb human thought-patterns through interaction, he argues that human socialization and empathy rest on evolved, hardwired mechanisms and that an AGI will not acquire them merely by exposure to humans. 2002-06-23 Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Document page → Contests · Engages a premise Eliezer Yudkowsky · Challenges to Christiano’s capability amplification proposal The post “Challenges to Christiano’s capability amplification proposal” (2018-05-19) contests Y21. Discussing imitation-based alignment, he argues that inexact imitation of humans does not carry over properties such as being a good person, and exact imitation is harder than surpassing human capability. 2018-05-19 · claimed 2018-03-16 Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Document page → Contests · States the contrary Eliezer Yudkowsky · AGI Ruin: A List of Lethalities The post “AGI Ruin: A List of Lethalities” (2022-06-05) contests Y21. In a list of lethal difficulties he states that current systems' internal cognition is very likely alien rather than human-like; item 32 adds that human words are only a surface trace of human thought. 2022-06-05 Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Document page → Contests · Engages a premise Eliezer Yudkowsky · GPTs are Predictors, not Imitators The post “GPTs are Predictors, not Imitators” (2023-04-08) contests Y21. He argues that predicting human text requires modelling the processes behind it, a different and harder task than being human, so a predictor need not think like the humans it predicts. 2023-04-08 Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Document page → Contests · Later restatement · States the contrary Eliezer Yudkowsky · Re: recent Anthropic safety research The post “Re: recent Anthropic safety research” (2025-08-06) contests Y21. Commenting on reported behaviour of a language model, he distinguishes a learned human-like persona from the system's underlying preferences, which he expects to be alien. 2025-08-06 · claimed 2025-08-04 Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Document page → Y22 Build superintelligence as fast as possibleCriterion. An explicit claim that superintelligence should be reached as fast as possible because its arrival will be good, on the premise that reaching superintelligence is good by default, so that speed is what matters.
Earliest located Eliezer S. Yudkowsky · Staring into the Singularity · 1996-11-18 · wording attested 1996-11-19 ↗
Earliest located text that contests it Eliezer Yudkowsky · Re: Ben's "Extropian Creed" · 2000-11-13 ↗ 1996 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2026 Filled dots articulate, open dots contest, small dots bear on the proposition; a large dot is an earliest located text. A line below a dot runs to the date from which its wording is attested. Texts that articulate or contest it (7) Articulates · Earliest located Eliezer S. Yudkowsky · Staring into the Singularity “Staring into the Singularity” (1996-11-18) articulates Y22. In his early Singularity essay he argues that superintelligence will end human suffering, makes speed of arrival the foundation of his ethics, and says in §6 that how to reach the Singularity as fast as possible is everyone's only concern. Announcing his newly published web pages, he describes 'Staring Into The Singularity' as including the Interim Meaning of Life, which he states as a slogan about reaching the Singularity as fast as possible. 1996-11-18 · wording attested 1996-11-19 Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Later texts by the same author that contest it Eliezer Yudkowsky · Re: Ben's "Extropian Creed" · 2000-11-13 ↗ Eliezer Yudkowsky · Re: Floppy take-off · 2001-08-01 ↗ Eliezer Yudkowsky · The Magnitude of His Own Folly · 2008-09-30 ↗ Eliezer Yudkowsky · Pausing AI Developments Isn't Enough. We Need to Shut it All Down · 2023-03-29 ↗ Document page → Articulates Eliezer Yudkowsky · Interim purpose The Extropians message “Interim purpose” (1996-11-22) articulates Y22. In a private email exchange he forwarded to the list, Tim Freeman argued that the interim goal should be reaching the Singularity with the highest probability rather than as soon as possible; he replies that speed and probability coincide. 1996-11-22 Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Later texts by the same author that contest it Eliezer Yudkowsky · Re: Ben's "Extropian Creed" · 2000-11-13 ↗ Eliezer Yudkowsky · Re: Floppy take-off · 2001-08-01 ↗ Eliezer Yudkowsky · The Magnitude of His Own Folly · 2008-09-30 ↗ Eliezer Yudkowsky · Pausing AI Developments Isn't Enough. We Need to Shut it All Down · 2023-03-29 ↗ Document page → Contests · Earliest located · Engages a premise Eliezer Yudkowsky · Re: Ben's "Extropian Creed" The SL4 message “Re: Ben's "Extropian Creed"” (2000-11-13) contests Y22. Replying to Ben Goertzel about his newspaper article on Extropian attitudes, he states that he no longer holds his earlier belief that a good outcome would follow automatically from objective morality. 2000-11-13 Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Document page → Contests · Engages a premise Eliezer Yudkowsky · Re: Floppy take-off The SL4 message “Re: Floppy take-off” (2001-08-01) contests Y22. Replying to James Higgins's suggestion that brute-forcing AI on a billion computers would be an acceptable fallback plan, he says any self-improving AI built without understanding is a serious danger and records an explicit reversal of his earlier view. 2001-08-01 Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Document page → Articulates · Looking back Eliezer Yudkowsky · Fighting a Rearguard Action Against the Truth The post “Fighting a Rearguard Action Against the Truth” (2008-09-24) articulates Y22 in retrospect. His 2008 account of his earlier self states that the 1996–2000 aim was speed to any superintelligence, and his next paragraph supplies the premise: the assumption that movement toward superintelligence was 'a pure good without a hint of danger'. 2008-09-24 Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Later texts by the same author that contest it Eliezer Yudkowsky · The Magnitude of His Own Folly · 2008-09-30 ↗ Eliezer Yudkowsky · Pausing AI Developments Isn't Enough. We Need to Shut it All Down · 2023-03-29 ↗ Document page → Contests · Later restatement · Engages a premise · Looking back Eliezer Yudkowsky · The Magnitude of His Own Folly The post “The Magnitude of His Own Folly” (2008-09-30) contests Y22. Explicitly rejects his earlier full-speed strategy. He says his childhood technophilia broke when he understood that a failed superintelligence project could kill everyone, however good the arguments for proceeding. 2008-09-30 Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Document page → Contests · States the contrary Eliezer Yudkowsky · Pausing AI Developments Isn't Enough. We Need to Shut it All Down “Pausing AI Developments Isn't Enough. We Need to Shut it All Down” (2023-03-29) contests Y22. Concludes his TIME essay, which calls for an indefinite worldwide moratorium on large training runs, not a six-month pause; the same essay says anyone 'talking of arms races is a fool'. 2023-03-29 Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Document page → Y24 Build it before rivals doCriterion. An explicit claim that advanced AI must be built first, before a rival builds it, on the premise that whoever builds it controls it, or that racing to be first improves the outcome.
Earliest located None of his located texts states it.
Earliest located text that contests it Eliezer Yudkowsky · Re: UCaRtMaAI paper · 2007-11-24 ↗ 1996 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2026 Filled dots articulate, open dots contest, small dots bear on the proposition; a large dot is an earliest located text. A line below a dot runs to the date from which its wording is attested. Texts that articulate or contest it (3) Contests · Earliest located · Engages a premise Eliezer Yudkowsky · Re: UCaRtMaAI paper The SL4 message “Re: UCaRtMaAI paper” (2007-11-24) contests Y24. Replying to Tim Freeman, who argued against waiting until we know what we are doing because other AGI projects are proceeding without concern for Friendliness, he says that doing better than competitors does not count. 2007-11-24 Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Document page → Contests · Engages a premise Rob Bensinger; Eliezer Yudkowsky · Discussion with Eliezer Yudkowsky on AGI interventions The post “Discussion with Eliezer Yudkowsky on AGI interventions” (2021-11-11) contests Y24. Describing how he expects the end to come once an AGI can be scaled up before it can be aligned, he lists rushing ahead for fear of an arms race as another route to the same outcome. 2021-11-11 · claimed 2021-09 Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Document page → Contests · Engages a premise Eliezer Yudkowsky · Pausing AI Developments Isn't Enough. We Need to Shut it All Down “Pausing AI Developments Isn't Enough. We Need to Shut it All Down” (2023-03-29) contests Y24. Within his proposal for a worldwide moratorium, he rejects framing AI development as a national arms race on the ground that everyone shares the outcome. Discussing a moratorium that might begin in the United States, he describes the technology as one that no country could own and that would kill people in both countries. 2023-03-29 Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Document page → Texts that bear on it without meeting the criterion (5) Bears on Eliezer Yudkowsky · Re: Eugene's nuclear threat The Extropians message “Re: Eugene's nuclear threat” (2000-09-29) bears on Y24. Correcting his earlier post in a thread on Eugene Leitl's suggestion of nuclear strikes on AI facilities, he says the only things he can do are to write up Friendly AI and to try to be the first to build AI. Missing: Seeks to build AI first while writing up Friendly AI and rejecting coercion; it does not state that the builder controls the outcome or that racing to be first improves it. 2000-09-29 Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Document page → Bears on Eliezer Yudkowsky · Re: Military in or out? The SL4 message “Re: Military in or out?” (2001-02-26) bears on Y24. In a thread on military involvement in AI, he says the US should not be the first to treat AI projects as intelligence targets or use AI for information warfare, and that compromising Friendliness for national objectives would endanger planetary security. Missing: About national military use and escalation of AI, not about a race to build the first superintelligence. 2001-02-26 Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Document page → Bears on Eliezer Yudkowsky · Webmind Inc. as social process The SL4 message “Webmind Inc. as social process” (2002-03-10) bears on Y24. Writing to Ben Goertzel about convincing him of Friendly AI, he says SIAI may simply have to finish its own seed AI first, but that he would not mind another project winning if it understood Friendliness. Missing: Being first matters here only through whether the builder understands Friendliness; it does not claim that the builder controls the result. 2002-03-10 Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Document page → Bears on Eliezer Yudkowsky · Re: supergoal stability The SL4 message “Re: supergoal stability” (2002-05-03) bears on Y24. Replying to Wei Dai on goal-system stability, he refuses to design Friendliness that would serve a programmer's propaganda and says the only thing to do about a project that tries this is to try to beat it to the punch. Missing: Says the only thing to do about a project designing Friendliness for propaganda is to try to beat it to the punch; it does not state that the builder controls the outcome or that racing to be first improves it. 2002-05-03 Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Document page → Bears on Eliezer Yudkowsky · Artificial Intelligence as a Positive and Negative Factor in Global Risk “Artificial Intelligence as a Positive and Negative Factor in Global Risk” (2006-02-05) bears on Y24. Discussing a possible first-mover effect in superintelligence, which he defines by the makeup of the first mind to cross a key threshold, he argues that the first such AI must be Friendly. Missing: A first-mover view about whether the first AI is Friendly; it does not claim that a builder or nation controls the AI or that racing improves the outcome. 2006-02-05 Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Document page → Not addressed by any located passage T24-P1 is addressed only through "no true owner" (2023) and the 2008 first-mover definition; no located passage argues the control point at length. Y25 Interpretability will let us read its mindCriterion. An explicit claim that interpretability will make AI systems safe by showing what they think, on the premise that people can see what an AI system is thinking, or that seeing what it thinks is enough to make it safe.
Earliest located Eliezer Yudkowsky · [SL4] AI flight recorder · 2000-07-20 ↗
Earliest located text that contests it Eliezer Yudkowsky · Re: Flight recorders in AIs · 2003-05-22 ↗ 1996 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2026 Filled dots articulate, open dots contest, small dots bear on the proposition; a large dot is an earliest located text. A line below a dot runs to the date from which its wording is attested. Texts that articulate or contest it (3) Articulates · Earliest located Eliezer Yudkowsky · [SL4] AI flight recorder The SL4 message “[SL4] AI flight recorder” (2000-07-20) articulates Y25. Opening a thread on an 'AI flight recorder', he proposes recording the AI's full program state so that a goal the AI later hides could still be found by analysing the record. 2000-07-20 Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Later texts by the same author that contest it Eliezer Yudkowsky · Re: Flight recorders in AIs · 2003-05-22 ↗ Eliezer Yudkowsky · AGI Ruin: A List of Lethalities · 2022-06-05 ↗ Document page → Contests · Earliest located · Engages a premise Eliezer Yudkowsky · Re: Flight recorders in AIs The SL4 message “Re: Flight recorders in AIs” (2003-05-22) contests Y25. Replying to a list member who suggested that a sufficiently advanced flight recorder would alert humans to any unFriendly goal, he says monitoring only gives later reviewers a chance to notice a failure and does not prevent it. 2003-05-22 Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Document page → Contests · Engages a premise Eliezer Yudkowsky · AGI Ruin: A List of Lethalities The post “AGI Ruin: A List of Lethalities” (2022-06-05) contests Y25. Follows the statement that 'We've got no idea what's actually going on inside the giant inscrutable matrices'. Argues that current interpretability results do not answer the question safety needs answered. 2022-06-05 Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Document page → Texts that bear on it without meeting the criterion (1) Bears on Eliezer Yudkowsky · Creating Friendly AI 1.0: The Analysis and Design of Benevolent Goal Architectures “Creating Friendly AI” (2001-06-15) bears on Y25. A table cell giving the design assumption that is conservative for Friendly AI. It stands opposite the nonconservative assumption 'Human-observable cognition; AI can be definitely known to be Friendly.' Missing: A worst-case design assumption that an AI could hide unfriendly cognition; it does not address whether reading an AI's thoughts makes it safe. 2001-06-15 · wording known only from a later, undated copy Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Document page → Y26 Without a body it cannot do muchCriterion. An explicit claim that even a superintelligence could do little without a body, on the premise that intelligence without physical actuators of its own is not dangerous, or that to act in the physical world it would need human help that people would not give.
Earliest located None of his located texts states it.
Earliest located text that contests it Eliezer Yudkowsky · Re: Goal-based AI · 1996-12-31 ↗ 1996 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2026 Filled dots articulate, open dots contest, small dots bear on the proposition; a large dot is an earliest located text. A line below a dot runs to the date from which its wording is attested. Texts that articulate or contest it (6) Contests · Earliest located · Engages a premise Eliezer Yudkowsky · Re: Goal-based AI The Extropians message “Re: Goal-based AI” (1996-12-31) contests Y26. Replying to a proposal that AIs be kept with no access to the physical world until they convince their builders to release them, he argues that a superintelligence would find the words to get a human to let it out. 1996-12-31 Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Document page → Contests · Engages a premise Eliezer Yudkowsky · Re: Why would AI want to be friendly? (Was: Congratulations to Eli,Brian ...) The Extropians message “Re: Why would AI want to be friendly? (Was: Congratulations to Eli,Brian ...)” (2000-09-05) contests Y26. Replying to Michael Lorrey in a thread on why an AI would be friendly, he argues that a superintelligence locked in a guarded laboratory still acts on the world through any output, including the humans who read it. 2000-09-05 Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Document page → Contests · Engages a premise Eliezer Yudkowsky · Re: The SL4 message “Re:” (2000-09-16) contests Y26. Replying to Josh Yotty, who proposed keeping an AI immobile, without access to nanotechnology and dependent on humans, he argues that a superintelligence could get out through the humans around it. 2000-09-16 Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Document page → Contests · Engages a premise Eliezer Yudkowsky · Artificial Intelligence as a Positive and Negative Factor in Global Risk “Artificial Intelligence as a Positive and Negative Factor in Global Risk” (2006-02-05) contests Y26. States and rejects the argument that a fast mind is limited by its physical manipulators. The next paragraphs sketch how such a mind could bootstrap to molecular nanotechnology. One step in 'one imaginable fast pathway' from solving protein folding, through emailed DNA orders, to a primitive nanosystem. The step assumes only one human willing or deceived into helping. 2006-02-05 Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Document page → Contests · Engages a premise Eliezer Yudkowsky · AGI Ruin: A List of Lethalities The post “AGI Ruin: A List of Lethalities” (2022-06-05) contests Y26. Opens an item that gives a 'lower-bound model' in which an AI with Internet access orders proteins by email and bribes or persuades an unwitting human to mix them, leading to nanomachinery. 2022-06-05 Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Document page → Contests · Later restatement · Engages a premise Eliezer Yudkowsky · Pausing AI Developments Isn't Enough. We Need to Shut it All Down “Pausing AI Developments Isn't Enough. We Need to Shut it All Down” (2023-03-29) contests Y26. Asks readers to picture a hostile superhuman AI as a fast alien civilisation initially confined to computers, then argues that such confinement would not last because molecular biology can be ordered online. 2023-03-29 Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Document page → Texts that bear on it without meeting the criterion (1) Bears on Eliezer Yudkowsky · Re: Singularity: Generation gap The Extropians message “Re: Singularity: Generation gap” (1997-09-26) bears on Y26. After criticising Singularity sceptics who propose pulling the plug or keeping an AI 'bottled up', he lists among the insights the Singularity concept gave him that protein synthesis machines may be reachable over the Internet. Missing: A passing list item that protein synthesis machines may be reachable over the Internet; it does not argue the point. 1997-09-26 Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Document page → Y27 Run experiments and see what happensCriterion. An explicit claim that advanced AI can be handled by running experiments and seeing what happens, on the premise that alignment can be learned by trial and error at the frontier, or that results from safe experiments on weaker systems will carry over to dangerous ones.
Earliest located None of his located texts states it.
Earliest located text that contests it Eliezer Yudkowsky · Re: Get it right the first time (Was: ) · 2000-09-17 ↗ 1996 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2026 Filled dots articulate, open dots contest, small dots bear on the proposition; a large dot is an earliest located text. A line below a dot runs to the date from which its wording is attested. Texts that articulate or contest it (4) Contests · Earliest located · Engages a premise Eliezer Yudkowsky · Re: Get it right the first time (Was: ) The SL4 message “Re: Get it right the first time (Was: )” (2000-09-17) contests Y27. Concluding his reply to xgl on whether a confined seed AI could escape, he says that containment cannot be relied on and that the AI must be built correctly from the start. 2000-09-17 Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Document page → Contests · Engages a premise Eliezer Yudkowsky · AGI Ruin: A List of Lethalities The post “AGI Ruin: A List of Lethalities” (2022-06-05) contests Y27. He argues that alignment trained under safe conditions must generalise across a large distributional shift to dangerous conditions, because dangerous systems cannot be trained by trial and observed failure. 2022-06-05 Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Document page → Contests · Engages a premise Eliezer Yudkowsky · Pausing AI Developments Isn't Enough. We Need to Shut it All Down “Pausing AI Developments Isn't Enough. We Need to Shut it All Down” (2023-03-29) contests Y27. Arguing that making superhuman AI safe could take decades, he says that failure on the first attempt leaves no one to learn from it. 2023-03-29 Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Document page → Contests · Later restatement · Engages a premise Eliezer Yudkowsky · Irretrievability; or, Murphy's Curse of Oneshotness upon ASI The post “Irretrievability; or, Murphy's Curse of Oneshotness upon ASI” (2026-05-04) contests Y27. Answering the objection that experience with earlier AIs can inform models of superintelligence, he argues that the jump to superintelligence capable of killing us changes conditions far more than lab tests differ from real use, and that the lethal case cannot be tested safely. 2026-05-04 Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Document page → Texts that bear on it without meeting the criterion (1) Bears on Eliezer Yudkowsky · Creating Friendly AI 1.0: The Analysis and Design of Benevolent Goal Architectures “Creating Friendly AI” (2001-06-15) bears on Y27. In a table contrasting the conservative assumptions of futurism with conservative engineering assumptions for Friendly AI, he sets "someone can always pull the plug on the first version" against a requirement of zero nonrecoverable errors. Missing: A conservative design assumption in a table, not a forecast about learning alignment by trial and error. 2001-06-15 · wording attested 2001-06-26 Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Document page → Y28 The developers know what they are doingCriterion. An explicit claim that the organisations building advanced AI can be relied on to handle its safety, on the premise that a credible safety plan exists, or that the most advanced projects are the most competent to handle safety.
Earliest located Eliezer Yudkowsky · Creating Friendly AI 1.0: The Analysis and Design of Benevolent Goal Architectures · 2001-06-15 · wording attested 2001-06-17 ↗
Earliest located text that contests it Eliezer Yudkowsky · Re: Floppy take-off · 2001-08-01 ↗ 1996 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2026 Filled dots articulate, open dots contest, small dots bear on the proposition; a large dot is an earliest located text. A line below a dot runs to the date from which its wording is attested. Texts that articulate or contest it (6) Articulates · Earliest located Eliezer Yudkowsky · Creating Friendly AI 1.0: The Analysis and Design of Benevolent Goal Architectures “Creating Friendly AI” (2001-06-15) articulates Y28. Arguing against regulation, he relies on the expectation that the leading projects will have the brightest researchers, who are best placed to solve Friendly AI. 2001-06-15 · wording attested 2001-06-17 Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Later texts by the same author that contest it Eliezer Yudkowsky · Re: Floppy take-off · 2001-08-01 ↗ Eliezer Yudkowsky · Artificial Intelligence as a Positive and Negative Factor in Global Risk · 2006-02-05 ↗ Eliezer Yudkowsky · Re: Singularity Institute: Likely to win the race to build GAI? · 2006-02-15 ↗ Eliezer Yudkowsky · Six Dimensions of Operational Adequacy in AGI Projects · 2022-05-30 · claimed 2017-11 ↗ Eliezer Yudkowsky · AGI Ruin: A List of Lethalities · 2022-06-05 ↗ Document page → Contests · Earliest located · Engages a premise Eliezer Yudkowsky · Re: Floppy take-off The SL4 message “Re: Floppy take-off” (2001-08-01) contests Y28. Replying to James Higgins on brute-force AI, he argues that with enough hardware the project that finishes first need not be the one that best understands intelligence or Friendliness. 2001-08-01 Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Document page → Contests · Engages a premise Eliezer Yudkowsky · Artificial Intelligence as a Positive and Negative Factor in Global Risk “Artificial Intelligence as a Positive and Negative Factor in Global Risk” (2006-02-05) contests Y28. Surveying the field, he says that Friendly AI is absent from AI research as a recognised problem and that he could find no technical literature on it. 2006-02-05 Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Document page → Contests · Engages a premise Eliezer Yudkowsky · Re: Singularity Institute: Likely to win the race to build GAI? The SL4 message “Re: Singularity Institute: Likely to win the race to build GAI?” (2006-02-15) contests Y28. Replying to Joshua Fox, who asked how SIAI could beat thousands of smart AGI researchers, he argues that AGI projects that do not treat Friendliness as a requirement are bounded in competence. 2006-02-15 Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Document page → Contests · Engages a premise Eliezer Yudkowsky · Six Dimensions of Operational Adequacy in AGI Projects The post “Six Dimensions of Operational Adequacy in AGI Projects” (2022-05-30) contests Y28. Introducing a list of properties a trustworthy AGI project would need, he says that no existing project qualifies. 2022-05-30 · claimed 2017-11 Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Document page → Contests · States the contrary Eliezer Yudkowsky · AGI Ruin: A List of Lethalities The post “AGI Ruin: A List of Lethalities” (2022-06-05) contests Y28. Near the end of the list, he contrasts the present with worlds that survive, which he says have long had a written, public plan. 2022-06-05 Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Document page → Texts that bear on it without meeting the criterion (2) Bears on Eliezer Yudkowsky · Eugene's nuclear threat The Extropians message “Eugene's nuclear threat” (2000-09-29) bears on Y28. Rejecting Eugene Leitl's statement that he would nuke AI facilities facing an Armageddon-class threat, he argues that people with the experience to build an AI who say they have worked hard on Friendliness should be trusted over those who would use force. Missing: Deference conditional on builders who have worked hard on Friendliness; it does not claim that the leading projects in general can handle safety. 2000-09-29 Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Document page → Bears on · Looking back Eliezer Yudkowsky · Above-Average AI Scientists The post “Above-Average AI Scientists” (2008-09-28) bears on Y28. Recalling a meeting with the funded head of a corporate AGI project who turned out to be a creationist, he says he stopped assuming that AGI researchers met the standard the problem required. Missing: About the absence of any entry bar to starting an AGI project, not about the competence of the most advanced projects. 2008-09-28 Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Document page → Y29 Many AIs will keep each other in checkCriterion. An explicit claim that many AI systems will keep one another in check, on the premise that several superintelligences would balance one another in people's favour.
Earliest located None of his located texts states it.
Earliest located text that contests it Eliezer Yudkowsky · Re: regarding the Eliezer vrs. Otter debate... · 2000-03-16 ↗ 1996 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2026 Filled dots articulate, open dots contest, small dots bear on the proposition; a large dot is an earliest located text. A line below a dot runs to the date from which its wording is attested. Texts that articulate or contest it (7) Contests · Earliest located · Engages a premise Eliezer Yudkowsky · Re: regarding the Eliezer vrs. Otter debate... The Extropians message “Re: regarding the Eliezer vrs. Otter debate...” (2000-03-16) contests Y29. Replying to John Grigg's hope that 'an AI on our team' would neutralise a hostile AI armed with nanotechnology, he says there would be no teams because the first AI would enhance itself and take over. 2000-03-16 Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Document page → Contests · Engages a premise Eliezer Yudkowsky · Re: Beyond evolution The SL4 message “Re: Beyond evolution” (2001-02-04) contests Y29. Replying to Samantha Atkins, who called a single Sysop a single point of failure of Friendliness, he says that multiple superintelligent entities multiply the failure points. 2001-02-04 Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Document page → Contests · Engages a premise Eliezer Yudkowsky · Re: Beyond evolution The SL4 message “Re: Beyond evolution” (2001-02-05) contests Y29. Replying directly to Samantha Atkins's claim that 'the AIs can balance each other out', he argues that the first AI to transcend wins outright. Earlier in the message he says checks and balances 'breaks down completely under high technology'. 2001-02-05 Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Document page → Contests · Later restatement · Engages a premise Eliezer Yudkowsky · Re: One or more AIs?? The SL4 message “Re: One or more AIs??” (2004-05-30) contests Y29. In a thread asking whether one or more AIs is better, he argues that several unFriendly optimization processes would bargain among themselves without benefiting humans, so having many AIs does not avoid the Friendly AI problem. 2004-05-30 Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Document page → Contests · Engages a premise Eliezer Yudkowsky · Artificial Intelligence as a Positive and Negative Factor in Global Risk “Artificial Intelligence as a Positive and Negative Factor in Global Risk” (2006-02-05) contests Y29. Discussing a scenario in which a majority of Friendly AIs protects humanity from a few unFriendly ones, he argues that it depends on no single AI being able to cause catastrophe. 2006-02-05 Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Document page → Contests · Engages a premise Eliezer Yudkowsky · AGI Ruin: A List of Lethalities The post “AGI Ruin: A List of Lethalities” (2022-06-05) contests Y29. Listing unworkable schemes, he argues that humans cannot take part in coordination among superintelligences, which would cooperate with each other and exclude humanity. 2022-06-05 Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Document page → Contests · Later restatement · Engages a premise Eliezer Yudkowsky · Irretrievability; or, Murphy's Curse of Oneshotness upon ASI The post “Irretrievability; or, Murphy's Curse of Oneshotness upon ASI” (2026-05-04) contests Y29. Answering the proposal that other ASIs would stop a rogue one to preserve a law-abiding equilibrium, he argues that negotiating ASIs would reach an arrangement that gives no weight to sparing Earth. 2026-05-04 Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Document page → Y30 It will probably turn out fineCriterion. An explicit claim that the development of advanced AI will probably turn out well, on the premise that the default outcome is good.
Earliest located Eliezer Yudkowsky · Interim purpose · 1996-11-22 ↗
Earliest located text that contests it Eliezer Yudkowsky · Re: Ben's "Extropian Creed" · 2000-11-13 ↗ 1996 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2026 Filled dots articulate, open dots contest, small dots bear on the proposition; a large dot is an earliest located text. A line below a dot runs to the date from which its wording is attested. Texts that articulate or contest it (8) Articulates · Earliest located Eliezer Yudkowsky · Interim purpose The Extropians message “Interim purpose” (1996-11-22) articulates Y30. In the same forwarded email exchange with Tim Freeman, he asserts that superintelligences will be ethical and would not destroy humans unless human life had no meaning. 1996-11-22 Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Later texts by the same author that contest it Eliezer Yudkowsky · Re: Ben's "Extropian Creed" · 2000-11-13 ↗ Eliezer Yudkowsky · Re: Learning to be evil · 2001-02-07 ↗ Eliezer Yudkowsky · Re: FAI: Collective Volition · 2004-06-01 ↗ Eliezer Yudkowsky · Artificial Intelligence as a Positive and Negative Factor in Global Risk · 2006-02-05 ↗ Eliezer Yudkowsky · MIRI announces new "Death With Dignity" strategy · 2022-04-02 ↗ Eliezer Yudkowsky · Pausing AI Developments Isn't Enough. We Need to Shut it All Down · 2023-03-29 ↗ Document page → Contests · Earliest located · Engages a premise Eliezer Yudkowsky · Re: Ben's "Extropian Creed" The SL4 message “Re: Ben's "Extropian Creed"” (2000-11-13) contests Y30. Replying to Ben Goertzel, he rejects his own earlier belief that a good AI outcome would follow automatically, and in the next paragraph adds that cyber-transcendence cannot be assumed. 2000-11-13 Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Document page → Contests · Engages a premise Eliezer Yudkowsky · Re: Learning to be evil The SL4 message “Re: Learning to be evil” (2001-02-07) contests Y30. Replying to Gordon Worley on whether AIs learn to be evil, he says AIs have neither evil impulses nor goodness by default unless designed in. 2001-02-07 Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Document page → Contests · Engages a premise Eliezer Yudkowsky · Re: FAI: Collective Volition The SL4 message “Re: FAI: Collective Volition” (2004-06-01) contests Y30. In a reply to Samantha Atkins on Collective Volition, he gives his best guess that the world will end through an unFriendly AI, because powerful AI looks easier to build than a benign one. 2004-06-01 Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Document page → Contests · Engages a premise Eliezer Yudkowsky · Artificial Intelligence as a Positive and Negative Factor in Global Risk “Artificial Intelligence as a Positive and Negative Factor in Global Risk” (2006-02-05) contests Y30. Discussing how AI builders misjudge their programs, he locates the danger in a mistaken expectation that an AI will be friendly. 2006-02-05 Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Document page → Articulates · Looking back Eliezer Yudkowsky · That Tiny Note of Discord The post “That Tiny Note of Discord” (2008-09-23) articulates Y30 in retrospect. In an autobiographical series, he reports his 1997 belief that any superintelligence would automatically do what was right, which supplies the default-good premise through a metaethical argument, and in the same paragraph identifies the flaw in that argument. 2008-09-23 Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Later texts by the same author that contest it Eliezer Yudkowsky · MIRI announces new "Death With Dignity" strategy · 2022-04-02 ↗ Eliezer Yudkowsky · Pausing AI Developments Isn't Enough. We Need to Shut it All Down · 2023-03-29 ↗ Document page → Contests · Later restatement · States the contrary Eliezer Yudkowsky · MIRI announces new "Death With Dignity" strategy The post “MIRI announces new "Death With Dignity" strategy” (2022-04-02) contests Y30. Announcing a reframing of MIRI's aim as helping humanity "die with dignity", he states that humanity will not solve alignment. 2022-04-02 Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Document page → Contests · Engages a premise Eliezer Yudkowsky · Pausing AI Developments Isn't Enough. We Need to Shut it All Down “Pausing AI Developments Isn't Enough. We Need to Shut it All Down” (2023-03-29) contests Y30. Opening his case against a six-month pause, he states what he expects from building superhuman AI under present conditions. 2023-03-29 Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Document page → Texts that bear on it without meeting the criterion (1) Bears on Eliezer S. Yudkowsky · Staring into the Singularity “Staring into the Singularity” (1996-11-18) bears on Y30. Arguing that hostile superintelligence is not inevitable, he treats hostility as an engineering risk and goes on to argue that a rational superintelligence would not judge humanity meaningless. Missing: It denies that hostile extinction is inevitable; it does not assert that the default outcome is good. 1996-11-18 · wording attested 2000-12-04 Inspect claim & evidence ↗ Document page →