2006
Selekoa’s 23 records dated 2006, in date order, grouped by topic.
Selective: what the records hold, not a history of the year.
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Ideas & lineages 23 records
Dated to 2006 only
February 2006
· event · dated to the day
Yudkowsky’s chapter says an AI might make a huge jump in intelligence after reaching a threshold of criticality, the scenario Good called an "intelligence explosion". Evidence ↗Yudkowsky, AI as a Positive and Negative Factor in Global Risk →Claim page →
· event · dated to the day
Yudkowsky’s chapter lists a criticality threshold of recursive self-improvement among reasons for a fast jump: one self-improvement triggering 1.0006 further self-improvements is qualitatively different from one triggering 0.9994. Evidence ↗Yudkowsky, AI as a Positive and Negative Factor in Global Risk →Claim page →
· event · dated to the day
Yudkowsky’s chapter describes a scenario in which, after criticality, self-improvement reaches superintelligence on a timescale of weeks or less. Evidence ↗Yudkowsky, AI as a Positive and Negative Factor in Global Risk →Claim page →
· event · dated to the day
Yudkowsky’s chapter lists, among scenarios for a first-mover effect, one in which post-criticality self-improvement reaches superintelligence within weeks and no other AI project reaches criticality before the first mover can overcome all opposition. Evidence ↗Yudkowsky, AI as a Positive and Negative Factor in Global Risk →Claim page →
· event · dated to the day
Yudkowsky’s chapter says that, in its smiley-face example, the AI appears to work fine during development but produces catastrophic results after it becomes smarter than the programmers. Evidence ↗Yudkowsky, AI as a Positive and Negative Factor in Global Risk →Claim page →
· event · dated to the day
“Artificial Intelligence as a Positive and Negative Factor in Global Risk” (2006-02-05) contests Y03. Responding to the hope that a superintelligence would recognise that tiling the galaxy with smiley faces was not intended, he argues that the AI's goals are its code, and doing what we mean is a separate technical achievement. Evidence ↗Yudkowsky, AI as a Positive and Negative Factor in Global Risk →Claim page →
· event · dated to the day
“Artificial Intelligence as a Positive and Negative Factor in Global Risk” (2006-02-05) contests Y08. Having granted that an AI might make a sudden, sharp leap in intelligence, he argues that no advance warning can be counted on, because past technological revolutions were not recognisable to contemporaries. Evidence ↗Yudkowsky, AI as a Positive and Negative Factor in Global Risk →Claim page →
· event · dated to the day
“Artificial Intelligence as a Positive and Negative Factor in Global Risk” (2006-02-05) contests Y13. Rejects deferring Friendly AI work until AI exists, arguing that a sharp intelligence jump is possible and that the foundations take years to build. Evidence ↗Yudkowsky, AI as a Positive and Negative Factor in Global Risk →Claim page →
· event · dated to the day
“Artificial Intelligence as a Positive and Negative Factor in Global Risk” (2006-02-05) contests Y19. Describing a superintelligence reshaping matter for its own target, he says the result is fatal unless the AI specifically values people, without any hostility being involved. Evidence ↗Yudkowsky, AI as a Positive and Negative Factor in Global Risk →Claim page →
· event · dated to the day
“Artificial Intelligence as a Positive and Negative Factor in Global Risk” (2006-02-05) bears on Y20. He argues that the task is not to forecast storybook outcomes for AI in general but to choose a particular optimization process whose good effects can be established. Evidence ↗Yudkowsky, AI as a Positive and Negative Factor in Global Risk →Claim page →
· event · dated to the day
“Artificial Intelligence as a Positive and Negative Factor in Global Risk” (2006-02-05) bears on Y24. Discussing a possible first-mover effect in superintelligence, which he defines by the makeup of the first mind to cross a key threshold, he argues that the first such AI must be Friendly. Evidence ↗Yudkowsky, AI as a Positive and Negative Factor in Global Risk →Claim page →
· event · dated to the day
“Artificial Intelligence as a Positive and Negative Factor in Global Risk” (2006-02-05) contests Y26. States and rejects the argument that a fast mind is limited by its physical manipulators. The next paragraphs sketch how such a mind could bootstrap to molecular nanotechnology. One step in 'one imaginable fast pathway' from solving protein folding, through emailed DNA orders, to a primitive nanosystem. The step assumes only one human willing or deceived into helping. Evidence ↗Yudkowsky, AI as a Positive and Negative Factor in Global Risk →Claim page →
· event · dated to the day
“Artificial Intelligence as a Positive and Negative Factor in Global Risk” (2006-02-05) contests Y28. Surveying the field, he says that Friendly AI is absent from AI research as a recognised problem and that he could find no technical literature on it. Evidence ↗Yudkowsky, AI as a Positive and Negative Factor in Global Risk →Claim page →
· event · dated to the day
“Artificial Intelligence as a Positive and Negative Factor in Global Risk” (2006-02-05) contests Y29. Discussing a scenario in which a majority of Friendly AIs protects humanity from a few unFriendly ones, he argues that it depends on no single AI being able to cause catastrophe. Evidence ↗Yudkowsky, AI as a Positive and Negative Factor in Global Risk →Claim page →
· event · dated to the day
“Artificial Intelligence as a Positive and Negative Factor in Global Risk” (2006-02-05) contests Y30. Discussing how AI builders misjudge their programs, he locates the danger in a mistaken expectation that an AI will be friendly. Evidence ↗Yudkowsky, AI as a Positive and Negative Factor in Global Risk →Claim page →
· publication · dated to the day
The mailing-list message “Re: Singularity Institute: Likely to win the race to build GAI?” (2006-02-15) is sent under the name Eliezer S. Yudkowsky. Evidence ↗· publication · dated to the day
The SL4 message “Re: Singularity Institute: Likely to win the race to build GAI?” (2006-02-15) contests Y28. Replying to Joshua Fox, who asked how SIAI could beat thousands of smart AGI researchers, he argues that AGI projects that do not treat Friendliness as a requirement are bounded in competence. Evidence ↗
June 2006
· publication · dated to the day
The mailing-list message “Re: [agi] Two draft papers: AI and existential risk; heuristics and biases” (2006-06-06) is sent under the name Eliezer S. Yudkowsky. Evidence ↗· publication · dated to the day
The SL4 message “Re: [agi] Two draft papers: AI and existential risk; heuristics and biases” (2006-06-06) contests Y01. Replying to Ben Goertzel (thread cross-posted from the AGI list), he criticises a plan to experiment with AGI without emergency shutdown features or a published schedule of when they become necessary, comparing it to an investor who set no point at which to take alarm and sell. Evidence ↗· publication · dated to the day
The SL4 message “Re: [agi] Two draft papers: AI and existential risk; heuristics and biases” (2006-06-06) contests Y08. Replying to Ben Goertzel's call for 'AGI experimentation' as an answer to Friendly AI concerns, he says there is a major context change between the prehuman and posthuman stages, so observed good behaviour does not show that the AI will stay good. Evidence ↗· publication · dated to the day
The mailing-list message “Re: Two draft papers: AI and existential risk; heuristics and biases” (2006-06-13) is sent under the name Eliezer S. Yudkowsky. Evidence ↗· publication · dated to the day
The SL4 message “Re: Two draft papers: AI and existential risk; heuristics and biases” (2006-06-13) contests Y18. Replying to Robin Hanson's comments on his draft chapters, he argues that between-species differences in brain circuitry exclude weaker minds from a knowledge economy, so that trade-based intuitions from human economies do not carry over. Evidence ↗