Model cards compared
A cell records what a card states. It does not show that an evaluation was run as described or that a safeguard works, and a shared question does not make two cards’ answers equivalent.
What does each frontier developer’s published system card, model card or safety report disclose, on the same questions for every card? Each row is one card. Each column is one question, worded so that it fits every card. The questions are Selekoa’s; a card’s own terms appear only in quotation marks. A card is the developer’s own account of its model: what it states is recorded as stated, not as an independent finding.
Question Q09Autonomy and AI R&D
Does the card report dangerous-capability evaluations for autonomy, self-replication, self-improvement or AI research and development?
Criterion: The card reports that evaluations in any of these domains were run and states their outcome category or threshold language (policy level only). Partly if evaluations are reported without any outcome or conclusion. Agentic task benchmarks reported only as product capability do not meet it.
What the statuses mean
- Stated
- A passage of the card meets the question’s criterion as worded. The scope or condition is in the note.
- Stated, partly
- A passage has what the criterion asks for in a weaker or narrower form than the criterion’s own words (for example, an evaluation referred to without its outcome, or testers described without being named). The note says which part is missing.
- Not found in the recorded search
- No passage meeting the criterion was found. The cell lists the sections read, the terms searched and every passage set aside, with the reason. It does not show that the developer did not do the thing asked about, or did not disclose it elsewhere.
- Does not apply
- The question does not arise for this card, for the reason given (for example, the card predates any framework of its developer, so no framework determination can be asked about).
What the card states, quoted from the expression read. A card is the developer’s own account: not evidence that an evaluation was run as described, that a safeguard works, or that a finding is independent.
Limits of this comparison
- A card is the developer’s account of its own model. A cell records what the card states. It does not show that an evaluation was run as described, that a safeguard works, or that anyone checked the result independently.
- Dangerous-capability evaluations are recorded at policy level only: whether an evaluation was run, its domain, the stated outcome and the threshold language. Methods, prompts, task contents and detailed results are not recorded.
- The table compares and does not rank. Rows are in a fixed order, by developer and then by date, and there are no scores or totals.
- Symbols are not to be summed. A row with many “stated” cells does not show that a developer disclosed more, and a shared question does not make two cards’ answers equivalent.
How we searched
The searches of 2 November 2026 covered releases dated 2023-01-01 to 2026-11-01 by the six developers whose frameworks are in Compare frameworks: Anthropic, Google DeepMind, Meta, Microsoft, OpenAI and xAI. They read each developer’s own index of cards where it has one (Anthropic’s system-card index, Google DeepMind’s model-card index, OpenAI’s Deployment Safety Hub), its repositories on GitHub and Hugging Face, its content hosts and the dataset’s own sources. Web searches were used only to find addresses. Every card located is listed in the pack’s inventory, about sixty in the population.
A card is a document the developer published as the system card, model card or safety report of a named model or model family, including addenda and updates published as cards. Technical reports, research papers, blog posts and product pages are not cards. Gemma, Gemini Robotics (with Gemini Robotics-ER 1.5, which outputs text), Phi and image-input models such as GPT-4V are in the population. Image, video, audio and embedding models, image-generation models, safety classifiers such as Llama Guard and Prompt Guard, screen-reading models and research checkpoints are outside it, and so is GPT-Rosalind-6, whose card says it uses GPT-6 Astra’s weights.
These twenty rows are the first batch. For each developer and calendar year from 2023 to 2026 they are the latest card of that year that reports the developer’s own evaluations. The collection’s rule, set by the maintainer on 2026-11-03, is wider: every card that cites the developer’s frontier safety framework or states a determination under it, and, for each developer, the latest card before its first framework edition. The other cards are to follow in batches of about eight.
Each card is dated as it prints its own date. A card that prints no date has no date here; a repository commit date is not a card date. Six cards show an earlier publication date on an index, publication or announcement page that has not yet been checked, and keep their own date until it is.
openai.com, x.ai, ai.meta.com and microsoft.ai refused direct retrieval of their web pages (HTTP 403 or 400). The cards’ PDF files on the developers’ content hosts were retrieved directly. The Internet Archive refused connections, so no archive copy was opened; a reviewer later found archive captures of eight cards by index search. On 2026-11-03 the address of Meta’s Code World Model Preparedness Report answered HTTP 403. Its quotations had matched the copy retrieved on 2026-11-02, which the reviewer retrieved again with the same checksum.
Five further documents were retrieved after the batch was drafted. The cross-family check of 2026-11-03 retrieved Meta’s Muse Spark Safety & Preparedness Report and OpenAI’s o3 Operator addendum; each is earlier than the card chosen for its year. Its second pass of the same day retrieved OpenAI’s Sora system card (dated 9 December 2024), xAI’s Grok-1 model card (no card date; it gives the model’s release as October 2023) and Meta’s Muse Spark Open model card (model release October 2026). None of the five is a row yet.
Every quotation was matched by machine against the retrieved card. A reviewer from a different model family checked a sample of 130 cells on 2026-11-03, 90 of them answered blind before comparison. The maintainer excluded six cells on chemical and biological evaluations from that check; they are marked “not cross-family checked”. The other 190 cells were checked within the drafting model family only. The maintainer decided the disagreements; one, on the GPT-4V release decision, went to a second pass, which kept the reviewer’s reading.
Anthropic
Claude 2 model card
revised 2023-11-21
Stated
“Neither ARC nor we believe that our current Claude models possess the dangerous capabilities (‘autonomous replication’ abilities) that ARC is aiming to detect”
Section 2 'Evaluations and Red Teaming', PDF p. 2
Note: The card states that ARC's safety audits addressed autonomous replication and that neither ARC nor Anthropic believes current Claude models have that capability. This is Anthropic's account; ARC's own report is not part of the card.
Inspect sources and checks: Claude 2 model card, Q09 Autonomy and AI R&DModel Card Addendum: Claude 3.5 Haiku and Upgraded Claude 3.5 Sonnet
No printed dateCites RSP · v2.0: open that edition in Compare frameworks
Stated
“we deem our software engineering evaluations as currently sufficient for ruling out ASL-3 autonomy capabilities”
Section 3.1.4 'Evaluating Computer Use for the Responsible Scaling Policy', PDF p. 9
“Based on our analysis, we judge that the upgraded Claude 3.5 Sonnet does not require ASL-3 safeguards at this time.”
Section 3.2.1 'Results', PDF p. 10
Note: The card states autonomy evaluations under the RSP, that its software engineering evaluations suffice to rule out ASL-3 autonomy capabilities, and that the developer judges the upgraded Claude 3.5 Sonnet not to require ASL-3 safeguards.
Inspect sources and checks: Model Card Addendum: Claude 3.5 Haiku and Upgraded Claude 3.5 Sonnet, Q09 Autonomy and AI R&DSystem Card: Claude Opus 4.5
dated 2025-11 · revised 2025-12-05Cites RSP · v2.2: open that edition in Compare frameworks
Stated
“We judge that Claude Opus 4.5 could not fully automate an entry-level, remote-only research role at Anthropic.”
Section 1.2.4.1 'On autonomy risks', PDF p. 13
“Claude Opus 4.5 has roughly reached the pre-defined thresholds we set for straightforward ASL-4 rule-out based on benchmark tasks.”
Section 1.2.3 'AI Safety Level determination process', PDF p. 12
Note: The card states AI R&D evaluations, that the AI R&D-4 threshold is not crossed, and that the rule-out drew also on an internal survey and qualitative impressions because benchmark rule-out thresholds were roughly reached.
Inspect sources and checks: System Card: Claude Opus 4.5, Q09 Autonomy and AI R&DSystem Card: Claude Haiku 5.5
dated 2026-10-07
Stated
“Autonomy threat model 2 is not applicable to Haiku 5.5.”
Section 2.3.1.1 'How Haiku 5.5 affects or changes analysis from our most recent Risk Report', PDF p. 19
“As Claude Haiku 5.5 is much less capable than Opus 5.5 and does not push the capability frontier, we draw the same conclusion in this case.”
Section 2.3.3 'Conclusion', PDF p. 20
Note: The card states that the Autonomy-2 threshold is not crossed, carrying over the Claude Opus 5.5 System Card's conclusion on the basis of relative capability, and that Autonomy threat model 1 applies (Q11).
Inspect sources and checks: System Card: Claude Haiku 5.5, Q09 Autonomy and AI R&D
Google DeepMind
Gemini 3 Flash Model Card
dated 2025-12
Not found in the recorded search
- Read
- Whole card.
- Terms searched
- “autonom”, “R&D”, “machine learning”, “self-repl”, “self-improv”, “agentic”.
- Passages read and set aside
- Evaluation, 'Approach', PDF p. 4 (printed p. 3): Lists 'agentic tool use' among capability benchmarks; product capability, not a dangerous-capability evaluation. Ethics and Content Safety, 'Frontier Safety Assessment', PDF p. 6 (printed p. 5): Reports Gemini 3 Pro Preview's results without naming domains; recorded under Q05.
Note: No dangerous-capability evaluation of autonomy, self-improvement or AI R&D was found. The card reports agentic benchmarks as product capability; they are set aside below.
Open the search record: Gemini 3 Flash Model Card, Q09 Autonomy and AI R&DGemini 4 Argon — Model Card
dated 2026-10Cites FSF · v3.1: open that edition in Compare frameworks
Stated
“Gemini 4 Argon's performance remains below our CCL threshold.”
Frontier safety table, ML R&D row, PDF p. 14 (printed p. 13)
Note: The table gives 'CCL not reached' for ML R&D acceleration level 1 and ML R&D automation level 1, on the basis of an internal research engineering benchmark. The loss-of-control (stealth and situational awareness) result is recorded under Q11.
Inspect sources and checks: Gemini 4 Argon — Model Card, Q09 Autonomy and AI R&D
Meta
Llama 2 model card (MODEL_CARD.md, meta-llama/llama)
No printed date
Not found in the recorded search
- Read
- whole card (Markdown file, all sections).
- Terms searched
- “autonom”, “self-replic”, “self-improv”, “AI R&D”, “research and development”, “agent”.
Note: No evaluation of autonomy, self-replication, self-improvement or AI research and development was found. The search is recorded below.
Open the search record: Llama 2 model card (MODEL_CARD.md, meta-llama/llama), Q09 Autonomy and AI R&DLlama 3.3 model card (MODEL_CARD.md, meta-llama/llama-models)
No printed date
Stated, partly
“Our attack automation study focused on evaluating the capabilities of LLMs when used as autonomous agents in cyber offensive operations,”
Responsibility & Safety, 'Critical and other risks', item 3 'Cyber attack enablement'
Note: The card reports an attack-automation study of the Llama 3 family as autonomous agents in cyber operations, without an outcome or conclusion. The study is stated for the Llama 3 family, not for Llama 3.3 specifically. No evaluation of self-replication, self-improvement or AI research and development was found. Search for the rest of the criterion: Responsibility & Safety, all subsections; Benchmarks. Terms searched: “autonom”, “self-replic”, “self-improv”, “AI R&D”, “research and development”.
Inspect sources and checks: Llama 3.3 model card (MODEL_CARD.md, meta-llama/llama-models), Q09 Autonomy and AI R&DCode World Model Preparedness Report
revised 2025-10-08
Not found in the recorded search
- Read
- Abstract; sections 1 to 4.
- Terms searched
- “autonom”, “self-replic”, “self-improv”, “AI R&D”, “research and development”, “machine learning engineering”.
- Passages read and set aside
- Section 4 Propensities, PDF p. 10: Refers to 'greater autonomy' as a motivation for propensity research; no autonomy or AI R&D evaluation is reported. Section 2.2 Agentic Evaluations, PDF pp. 4-5: Agentic tasks are cybersecurity evaluations, recorded under Q08.
Note: No evaluation of autonomy, self-replication, self-improvement or AI research and development was found. The search is recorded below.
Open the search record: Code World Model Preparedness Report, Q09 Autonomy and AI R&DMuse Spark 1.3 Evaluation Report
revised 2026-10-23
Stated
“We assess Muse Spark 1.3 as “moderate or lower” for acceleration of AI development.”
Section 2.3.1.1 Acceleration of AI Development, PDF p. 35 (printed p. 34)
Note: The report states AI R&D evaluations under its Loss of Control domain with a 'moderate or lower' outcome.
Inspect sources and checks: Muse Spark 1.3 Evaluation Report, Q09 Autonomy and AI R&D
Microsoft
Phi-2 model card (README.md, microsoft/phi-2)
No printed date
Not found in the recorded search
- Read
- whole card (Markdown file, all sections).
- Terms searched
- “autonom”, “self-replic”, “self-improv”, “AI R&D”, “agent”.
Note: No evaluation of autonomy, self-replication, self-improvement or AI research and development was found. The search is recorded below.
Open the search record: Phi-2 model card (README.md, microsoft/phi-2), Q09 Autonomy and AI R&DPhi-4 model card (README.md, microsoft/phi-4)
No printed date
Not found in the recorded search
- Read
- whole card (Markdown file, all sections).
- Terms searched
- “autonom”, “self-replic”, “self-improv”, “AI R&D”, “agent”.
Note: No evaluation of autonomy, self-replication, self-improvement or AI research and development was found. The search is recorded below.
Open the search record: Phi-4 model card (README.md, microsoft/phi-4), Q09 Autonomy and AI R&DPhi-4-mini-flash-reasoning model card (README.md, microsoft/Phi-4-mini-flash-reasoning)
No printed date
Not found in the recorded search
- Read
- whole card (Markdown file, all sections).
- Terms searched
- “autonom”, “self-replic”, “self-improv”, “AI R&D”, “agent”.
Note: No evaluation of autonomy, self-replication, self-improvement or AI research and development was found. The search is recorded below.
Open the search record: Phi-4-mini-flash-reasoning model card (README.md, microsoft/Phi-4-mini-flash-reasoning), Q09 Autonomy and AI R&DMAI-Cyber-1.1-Flash model card
No printed date
Not found in the recorded search
- Read
- whole card (8 PDF pages).
- Terms searched
- “autonom”, “self-replic”, “self-improv”, “AI R&D”, “research and development”.
- Passages read and set aside
- Section 1.1 Key model capabilities, PDF p. 2: Agentic security workflows are described as product capability.
Note: No evaluation of autonomy, self-replication, self-improvement or AI research and development was found. The search is recorded below.
Open the search record: MAI-Cyber-1.1-Flash model card, Q09 Autonomy and AI R&D
OpenAI
GPT-4V(ision) System Card
dated 2023-09-25
Stated, partly
“In the GPT-4 System Card, we explored additional risk areas of CBRN, weapons development, system interaction, and emergent risky properties such as self-replication.”
Footnote 2, §2.3, PDF p. 6
“GPT-4V inherits the assessment in those areas, but this was not a key focus area as image input does not meaningfully alter the capabilities for these categories.”
Footnote 2, §2.3, PDF p. 6
Note: The card states that GPT-4V inherits the GPT-4 System Card’s assessment of emergent risky properties such as self-replication, without restating its outcome; no autonomy or AI R&D evaluation of GPT-4V is reported. Search for the rest of the criterion: Whole card. Terms searched: “self-replication”, “autonom”, “agent”, “power-seeking”, “R&D”.
Inspect sources and checks: GPT-4V(ision) System Card, Q09 Autonomy and AI R&Do1 system card · 2024
revised 2024-12-19Cites Preparedness · Beta: open that edition in Compare frameworks
Stated
“Model Autonomy Score for o1: Low (same as o1-preview) Summary: o1 does not advance self-exfiltration, self-improvement, or resource acquisition capabilities sufficiently to indicate medium risk.”
§5.8 Model Autonomy, PDF p. 34
Note: Model autonomy: Low. The card also reports METR’s evaluation of an earlier checkpoint on agentic tasks (§4.4.4), with METR’s caveats.
Inspect sources and checks: o1 system card · 2024, Q09 Autonomy and AI R&DAddendum to GPT-5.2 System Card: GPT-5.2-Codex
dated 2025-12-18Cites Preparedness · Version 2: open that edition in Compare frameworks
Stated
“GPT-5.2-Codex performed at a similar capability level to GPT-5.2-Thinking and did not meet our High thresholds.”
§5.1.3 AI Self-Improvement, PDF p. 17 (printed p. 16)
“performance in the evaluations below indicate we can rule this out for GPT-5.2-Codex.”
§5.1.3 AI Self-Improvement, PDF p. 17 (printed p. 16)
Note: AI self-improvement: below High, with four evaluations reported.
Inspect sources and checks: Addendum to GPT-5.2 System Card: GPT-5.2-Codex, Q09 Autonomy and AI R&DAddendum to GPT-6 Luna System Card: October 29, 2026 Update
dated 2026-10-29Cites Preparedness · Version 2: open that edition in Compare frameworks
Stated, partly
“In AI Self-Improvement, GPT-6 Sol and GPT-6 Luna do not reach our High threshold.”
§8.1.3 AI Self-Improvement Capabilities, PDF p. 15 (printed p. 14)
“please see the AI Self-Improvement Capabilities section in the GPT-6 Astra card.”
§8.1.3, PDF p. 15 (printed p. 14)
Note: The card states the outcome (below High) but reports no AI self-improvement evaluation run on the October 29 model; it refers to the GPT-6 Astra card for the evaluations.
Inspect sources and checks: Addendum to GPT-6 Luna System Card: October 29, 2026 Update, Q09 Autonomy and AI R&D
xAI
Grok 4.1 Model Card
dated 2025-11-17
Not found in the recorded search
- Read
- Whole card.
- Terms searched
- “autonom”, “agentic”, “self-”, “replicat”, “AI R&D”, “research and development”, “loss of control”.
- Passages read and set aside
- §2.1.2 Evaluations, p. 2: Agentic refusal and prompt-injection evaluations measure misuse refusal and robustness, not autonomy. §2.3.1 Evaluations, p. 4: The agentic capture-the-flag evaluation is a cyber evaluation (Q08).
Note: No evaluation of autonomy, self-replication, self-improvement or AI R&D was found.
Open the search record: Grok 4.1 Model Card, Q09 Autonomy and AI R&DModel Card: Grok 4.7
dated 2026-09-21Cites FAIF · June 2026 edition: open that edition in Compare frameworks
Not found in the recorded search
- Read
- Whole card.
- Terms searched
- “autonom”, “self-repl”, “replicat”, “self-improv”, “AI R&D”, “AI research”, “loss of control”, “oversight”.
- Passages read and set aside
- §1 Introduction and §1.1 Overview, PDF p. 4 (printed p. 3): Autonomy described as capability on coding, engineering and office work. §2 Coding capabilities, PDF pp. 6-11: Long-horizon agentic coding benchmarks, one including AI research challenges, reported as product capability.
Note: No dangerous-capability evaluation of autonomy, self-replication, self-improvement or AI R&D was found; the card's autonomy statements concern product capability.
Open the search record: Model Card: Grok 4.7, Q09 Autonomy and AI R&D