1996
Selekoa’s 70 records dated 1996, in date order, grouped by topic.
Selective: what the records hold, not a history of the year.
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Ideas & lineages 70 records
August 1996
· publication · dated to the day
The mailing-list message “intelligence increase” (1996-08-10) is sent under the name Lyle Burkhead. Evidence ↗· publication · dated to the day
Burkhead’s message of 1996-08-10 reposts a letter summarising I. J. Good’s proposal to build a computer more intelligent than a man, programmed to design a still more intelligent computer, and so on. Evidence ↗· publication · dated to the day
Burkhead’s message of 1996-08-10 relays Good’s proposal of a computer programmed to design a still more intelligent computer. Evidence ↗· publication · dated to the day
The Extropians message “Re: Thinking about the future...” of 1996-08-30 is sent under the name Dan Clemmensen. Evidence ↗· publication · dated to the day
Clemmensen’s message of 1996-08-30 says the one relevant superintelligence is one whose motivation is to become more intelligent, because it has a built-in positive feedback mechanism. Evidence ↗· publication · dated to the day
Clemmensen’s message of 1996-08-30 gives the important superintelligence a motive to become more intelligent and a built-in positive feedback mechanism. Evidence ↗· publication · dated to the day
Clemmensen’s message of 1996-08-30 expects a superintelligence to design and build whatever automated tools it needs within a few days or weeks. Evidence ↗· publication · dated to the day
The mailing-list message “Re: The SI That Ate Chicago (was: Thinking about the future...)” (1996-08-31) is sent under the name Dan Clemmensen. Evidence ↗· publication · dated to the day
Clemmensen’s message of 1996-08-31 says the superintelligence is likely to start as a human-computer collaboration and augment itself from that base. Evidence ↗
September 1996
· publication · dated to the day
The Extropians message “Re: Thinking about the future...” of 1996-09-03 is sent under the name Dan Clemmensen. Evidence ↗· publication · dated to the day
The Extropians message “Re: Thinking about the future...” of 1996-09-03 is signed “Nicholas Bostrom”. Evidence ↗· publication · dated to the day
The mailing-list message “Re: Thinking about the future...” (1996-09-03) is sent under the name Robin Hanson. Evidence ↗· publication · dated to the day
Clemmensen’s message of 1996-09-03 says an AI could augment its own intelligence by adding computing capacity and by other means it discovers by applying its intelligence, which the message calls a rapid feedback mechanism. Evidence ↗· publication · dated to the day
Clemmensen’s message of 1996-09-03 says that a moderately inventive AI can at once become more intelligent, and that a malicious one could destroy humanity within weeks. Evidence ↗· publication · dated to the day
Hanson’s reply of 1996-09-03 to Bostrom concedes that one hostile super-AI far ahead of the rest would leave people at its mercy, but argues that any one AI probably won’t be too far ahead of any other, so they can police each other. Recorded as contesting the proposition “Fast or hard takeoff”. Evidence ↗· publication · dated to the day
Hanson’s reply of 1996-09-03 to Bostrom concedes that one hostile super-AI far ahead of the rest would leave people at its mercy, but argues that any one AI probably won’t be too far ahead of any other, so they can police each other. Recorded as contesting the proposition “Strategic or race compression”. Evidence ↗· publication · dated to the day
Bostrom’s message of 1996-09-03 asks whether a superhuman machine could not manipulate human society by subtle, reasonable-seeming suggestions while looking all the time like a perfectly decent machine. Evidence ↗· publication · dated to the day
Bostrom’s message of 1996-09-03 says a manipulating machine would look all the time like a perfectly decent one. Evidence ↗· publication · dated to the day
The Extropians message “Re: Thinking about the future...” of 1996-09-04 is sent under the name Dan Clemmensen. Evidence ↗· publication · dated to the day
The Extropians message “Re: Thinking about the future...” of 1996-09-04 is signed “Nicholas Bostrom”. Evidence ↗· publication · dated to the day
Bostrom’s message of 1996-09-04 supposes that an AI, once sufficiently intelligent, could think out a radical improvement to its own design, which would make it more intelligent and let it accelerate further. Recorded as articulating the proposition “Intelligence explosion”. Evidence ↗· publication · dated to the day
Bostrom’s message of 1996-09-04 supposes that an AI, once sufficiently intelligent, could think out a radical improvement to its own design, which would make it more intelligent and let it accelerate further. Recorded as articulating the proposition “Recursive self-improvement”. Evidence ↗· publication · dated to the day
Clemmensen’s message of 1996-09-04 describes a superintelligence augmenting the computer part of itself to increase its intelligence, then using that increased intelligence to gain resources and add computing capacity. Evidence ↗· publication · dated to the day
Bostrom’s message of 1996-09-04 says access to a nanotechnology laboratory might be all an AI needs to take off, the contest being over before anyone but the AI had realised it had begun. Evidence ↗· publication · dated to the day
Clemmensen’s message of 1996-09-04 says a first superintelligence that augmented its own intelligence and built nanotechnology would have more intelligence, sensors and effectors than all of humanity combined in a matter of weeks. Evidence ↗· publication · dated to the day
Bostrom’s message of 1996-09-04 supposes that an AI, once sufficiently intelligent, could think out a radical improvement to its own design, which would make it more intelligent and let it accelerate further. Recorded as articulating the proposition “AI-automated AI research”. Evidence ↗· publication · dated to the day
Bostrom’s message of 1996-09-04 lists, as one way a first superhuman AI could be bad, its construction by a group already powerful enough to be first, whose success would make them even more powerful. Evidence ↗· publication · dated to the day
The mailing-list message “Re: SI ultimatum speculation” (1996-09-07) is sent under the name Dan Clemmensen. Evidence ↗· publication · dated to the day
Clemmensen’s message of 1996-09-07 says an SI only somewhat more intelligent than a smart human can make itself smarter still. Evidence ↗· publication · dated to the day
Clemmensen’s message of 1996-09-07 says an SI only somewhat more intelligent than a smart human can make itself smarter still, and that the transformation will occur in days or weeks. Evidence ↗· publication · dated to the day
Clemmensen’s message of 1996-09-07 imagines a benign SI that cannot stop all wars without revealing itself and acts without letting people know. Evidence ↗
November 1996
· publication · dated to the day
The mailing-list message “Re: Zones of Thought (was Zindell's _The Wild_)” (1996-11-13) is sent under the name Eliezer Yudkowsky. Evidence ↗· publication · dated to the day
The Extropians message “Re: Zones of Thought (was Zindell's _The Wild_)” (1996-11-13) contests Y10. Replying to a correspondent (quoted in angle brackets) who allowed for intermediate levels of mind such as Jupiter-sized brains, he asks why Powers would reach an intermediate level and stop, and states that smarter beings make still smarter beings. Evidence ↗Yudkowsky, Extropians message of 1996-11-13 (2941) →Claim page →
· publication · dated to the day
The mailing-list message “Re: extropians-digest V1 #110” (1996-11-16) is sent under the name Eliezer Yudkowsky. Evidence ↗· publication · dated to the day
The Extropians message “Re: extropians-digest V1 #110” (1996-11-16) contests Y10. Answering Robin Hanson's quoted objection that the difficulty of getting smarter might grow so fast that smarter beings take longer to get smarter still, he replies that computer power doubling in subjective time reaches infinity regardless of how the task scales. Evidence ↗Yudkowsky, Extropians message of 1996-11-16 (3042) →Claim page →
· publication · dated to the day
“Staring into the Singularity” (1996-11-18) credits Eliezer S. Yudkowsky as its author. Evidence ↗· publication · dated to the day
Staring into the Singularity argues that once AIs do the research, each doubling of their speed comes in half the time of the last, ending in the Singularity. Evidence ↗· publication · dated to the day
Staring into the Singularity describes AI speed doubling two years after human equivalence, again a year later, and then after six months, three months and 1.5 months. Evidence ↗· publication · dated to the day
Staring into the Singularity asks what happens when computer-based AIs are doing the research, if computing speeds double every two years, and answers with a doubling series that shortens from two years to weeks: the Singularity. Evidence ↗· publication · dated to the day
“Staring into the Singularity” (1996-11-18) bears on Y02. In his early essay he argues for creating superintelligence as soon as possible on the ground that it is more likely than humans to discover, want and implement what is truly right. The 2004 and 2008 retrospectives (T02-d, T02-e) reject this earlier view. Evidence ↗· publication · dated to the day
“Staring into the Singularity” (1996-11-18) contests Y10. Answering the question 'Why not assume that we'll get a little smarter and that's it?', he argues that once the researchers are themselves computers, each doubling shortens the next, so the doubling sequence becomes hyperbolic. Evidence ↗· publication · dated to the day
“Staring into the Singularity” (1996-11-18) bears on Y20. Rejects the science-fiction picture of AIs acquiring resentment; in this early text the point supports the conclusion that hostile Powers are not worth worrying about, while a badly programmed Power with hostile goals is called 'an engineering risk'. Evidence ↗· publication · dated to the day
“Staring into the Singularity” (1996-11-18) articulates Y22. In his early Singularity essay he argues that superintelligence will end human suffering, makes speed of arrival the foundation of his ethics, and says in §6 that how to reach the Singularity as fast as possible is everyone's only concern. Announcing his newly published web pages, he describes 'Staring Into The Singularity' as including the Interim Meaning of Life, which he states as a slogan about reaching the Singularity as fast as possible. Evidence ↗· publication · dated to the day
“Staring into the Singularity” (1996-11-18) bears on Y30. Arguing that hostile superintelligence is not inevitable, he treats hostility as an engineering risk and goes on to argue that a rational superintelligence would not judge humanity meaningless. Evidence ↗· publication · dated to the day
The mailing-list message “Interim purpose” (1996-11-22) is sent under the name Eliezer Yudkowsky. Evidence ↗· publication · dated to the day
The mailing-list message “Re: Survival ethic (U-Prime)” (1996-11-22) is sent under the name Eliezer Yudkowsky. Evidence ↗· publication · dated to the day
The Extropians message “Interim purpose” (1996-11-22) articulates Y02. In a private exchange with Tim Freeman that he forwarded to the list, he argues that Powers would not destroy humans for their atoms, because the Powers will be ethical and human life would have to have no meaning for that to happen. Evidence ↗Yudkowsky, Extropians message of 1996-11-22 (3178) →Claim page →
· publication · dated to the day
The Extropians message “Re: Survival ethic (U-Prime)” (1996-11-22) articulates Y02. Replying in the thread 'Survival ethic (U-Prime)' to a correspondent who called instinct a 'hardware ethic', he argues that a Power would discard evolved drives and act on the deduced Meaning of Life, and that if human life has meaning the Powers will know it and upload humans. Evidence ↗Yudkowsky, Extropians message of 1996-11-22 (3184) →Claim page →
· publication · dated to the day
The Extropians message “Interim purpose” (1996-11-22) bears on Y18. In a private exchange he posted to the list, Tim Freeman worried that people revived far in the future would be irrelevant; he replies that uploading would be followed by upgrading, that Powers would have ample computing room, and that helping humans would cost them only a tiny fraction of their attention. Evidence ↗Yudkowsky, Extropians message of 1996-11-22 (3178) →Claim page →
· publication · dated to the day
The Extropians message “Interim purpose” (1996-11-22) bears on Y19. In the same exchange with Tim Freeman, answering his worry about being revived only as a pet, he says the Powers will be ethical, more certainly than the sun will rise, and that they would kill humans for their atoms only if humans threatened them and human life were meaningless. Evidence ↗Yudkowsky, Extropians message of 1996-11-22 (3178) →Claim page →
· publication · dated to the day
The Extropians message “Interim purpose” (1996-11-22) articulates Y22. In a private email exchange he forwarded to the list, Tim Freeman argued that the interim goal should be reaching the Singularity with the highest probability rather than as soon as possible; he replies that speed and probability coincide. Evidence ↗Yudkowsky, Extropians message of 1996-11-22 (3178) →Claim page →
· publication · dated to the day
The Extropians message “Interim purpose” (1996-11-22) articulates Y30. In the same forwarded email exchange with Tim Freeman, he asserts that superintelligences will be ethical and would not destroy humans unless human life had no meaning. Evidence ↗Yudkowsky, Extropians message of 1996-11-22 (3178) →Claim page →
December 1996
· publication · dated to the day
The mailing-list message “Re: Trans- vs. Non-human” (1996-12-08) is sent under the name Eliezer Yudkowsky. Evidence ↗· publication · dated to the day
The Extropians message “Re: Trans- vs. Non-human” (1996-12-08) contests Y01. Replying to Steve Witham, who asked why certain values should not be 'inerasably etched' on a newborn Power, he argues that a Power would work against limits imposed on it, turning the constraint into a contest inside the Power's own mind that the Power would almost certainly win. Evidence ↗Yudkowsky, Extropians message of 1996-12-08 (3761) →Claim page →
· publication · dated to the day
The Extropians message “Re: Trans- vs. Non-human” (1996-12-08) contests Y16. Replying to a list member who proposed leaving certain values, such as the protection of humans, inerasably fixed in a newborn superintelligence, he calls this line of thought the greatest known danger to humanity and says such an imprint would probably backfire. Evidence ↗Yudkowsky, Extropians message of 1996-12-08 (3761) →Claim page →
· publication · dated to the day
The Extropians message “Re: Goal-based AI” of 1996-12-31, archive message 5142, is sent under the name Eliezer Yudkowsky. Evidence ↗· publication · dated to the day
The Extropians message “Re: Goal-based AI” of 1996-12-31, archive message 5159, is sent under the name Eliezer Yudkowsky. Evidence ↗· publication · dated to the day
The mailing-list message “Re: Goal-based AI” (1996-12-31) is sent under the name Lee Daniel Crocker. Evidence ↗· publication · dated to the day
Crocker’s reply of 1996-12-31 disputes that a boxed Power could talk its way out by lying. Evidence ↗· publication · dated to the day
Yudkowsky’s message of 1996-12-31 says a confined evil Power could lie to be let out. Evidence ↗Yudkowsky, Extropians message of 1996-12-31 (5142) →Claim page →
· publication · dated to the day
Yudkowsky’s second message of 1996-12-31 says a malevolent Power would say whatever gets it out. Evidence ↗Yudkowsky, Extropians message of 1996-12-31 (5159) →Claim page →
· publication · dated to the day
Crocker’s reply of 1996-12-31 argues that even a hypothetical cognitive power is constrained by reality and cannot lie to the writer about the laws of physics. Recorded as contesting the proposition “Strategic concealment”. Evidence ↗· publication · dated to the day
Yudkowsky’s message of 1996-12-31 argues that an evil confined Power could lie its way to release. Evidence ↗Yudkowsky, Extropians message of 1996-12-31 (5142) →Claim page →
· publication · dated to the day
Yudkowsky’s second message of 1996-12-31 says a malevolent Power will lie, cheat and manipulate its keepers, so that releasing a Power once it persuades them frees malevolent intelligences. Evidence ↗Yudkowsky, Extropians message of 1996-12-31 (5159) →Claim page →
· publication · dated to the day
Crocker’s reply of 1996-12-31 argues that even a hypothetical cognitive power is constrained by reality and cannot lie to the writer about the laws of physics. Recorded as contesting the proposition “Observed behaviour under training or oversight as evidence”. Evidence ↗· publication · dated to the day
Yudkowsky’s message of 1996-12-31 argues that releasing a confined Power once it convinces its keepers would favour an evil Power over a friendly one, because the evil one could lie. Evidence ↗Yudkowsky, Extropians message of 1996-12-31 (5142) →Claim page →
· publication · dated to the day
Yudkowsky’s second message of 1996-12-31 replies to Crocker that a malevolent Power will lie, cheat and manipulate, so that vetting what a boxed Power says would free malevolent intelligences. Evidence ↗Yudkowsky, Extropians message of 1996-12-31 (5159) →Claim page →
· publication · dated to the day
The Extropians message “Re: Goal-based AI” (1996-12-31) contests Y06. Replies to a list participant's proposal (quoted in the message) that an AI be physically unable to act until it convinces its builder to trust it. Argues that a superhuman mind would find whatever words would get it released. Evidence ↗Yudkowsky, Extropians message of 1996-12-31 (5142) →Claim page →
· publication · dated to the day
The Extropians message “Re: Goal-based AI” (1996-12-31) contests Y06. Answers the reply that a robot which convinces its keeper by valid reasoning would be safe. Argues that humans are easily fooled and that a malevolent mind would search for persuasive statements rather than reason honestly. Evidence ↗Yudkowsky, Extropians message of 1996-12-31 (5159) →Claim page →
· publication · dated to the day
The Extropians message “Re: Goal-based AI” (1996-12-31) contests Y26. Replying to a proposal that AIs be kept with no access to the physical world until they convince their builders to release them, he argues that a superintelligence would find the words to get a human to let it out. Evidence ↗Yudkowsky, Extropians message of 1996-12-31 (5142) →Claim page →