2006: ideas & lineages
Selekoa’s 26 ideas & lineages records dated 2006, in date order, of 27 in all topics.
Selective: what the records hold, not a history of the year.
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Ideas & lineages 26 records
Dated to 2006 only
· publication · dated to the year
Reply to AIRisk cites Artificial Intelligence as a Positive and Negative Factor in Global Risk. Evidence ↗· publication · dated to the year
Hibbard (2006) attributes to Yudkowsky's draft chapter the criticism that Hibbard's 2001 article is an example of technical failure for using reinforcement learning, and disputes that criticism. Evidence ↗· event · dated to the year
Hinton, Osindero and Teh (2006) describe a fast, greedy learning algorithm that can find a fairly good set of parameters even in deep networks with millions of parameters and many hidden layers. Evidence ↗A fast learning algorithm for deep belief nets →Claim page →
· publication · dated to the year
Hibbard’s 2006 reply argues that the smiley-face example assumes an AI intelligent enough to control the galaxy yet too unintelligent to tell a tiny smiley face from a human face. Evidence ↗
February 2006
· event · dated to the day
Yudkowsky’s chapter says an AI might make a huge jump in intelligence after reaching a threshold of criticality, the scenario Good called an "intelligence explosion". Evidence ↗Yudkowsky, AI as a Positive and Negative Factor in Global Risk →Claim page →
· event · dated to the day
Yudkowsky’s chapter lists a criticality threshold of recursive self-improvement among reasons for a fast jump: one self-improvement triggering 1.0006 further self-improvements is qualitatively different from one triggering 0.9994. Evidence ↗Yudkowsky, AI as a Positive and Negative Factor in Global Risk →Claim page →
· event · dated to the day
Yudkowsky’s chapter describes a scenario in which, after criticality, self-improvement reaches superintelligence on a timescale of weeks or less. Evidence ↗Yudkowsky, AI as a Positive and Negative Factor in Global Risk →Claim page →
· event · dated to the day
Yudkowsky’s chapter lists, among scenarios for a first-mover effect, one in which post-criticality self-improvement reaches superintelligence within weeks and no other AI project reaches criticality before the first mover can overcome all opposition. Evidence ↗Yudkowsky, AI as a Positive and Negative Factor in Global Risk →Claim page →
· event · dated to the day
Yudkowsky’s chapter says that, in its smiley-face example, the AI appears to work fine during development but produces catastrophic results after it becomes smarter than the programmers. Evidence ↗Yudkowsky, AI as a Positive and Negative Factor in Global Risk →Claim page →
· event · dated to the day
“Artificial Intelligence as a Positive and Negative Factor in Global Risk” (2006-02-05) contests Y03. Responding to the hope that a superintelligence would recognise that tiling the galaxy with smiley faces was not intended, he argues that the AI's goals are its code, and doing what we mean is a separate technical achievement. Evidence ↗Yudkowsky, AI as a Positive and Negative Factor in Global Risk →Claim page →
· event · dated to the day
“Artificial Intelligence as a Positive and Negative Factor in Global Risk” (2006-02-05) contests Y08. Having granted that an AI might make a sudden, sharp leap in intelligence, he argues that no advance warning can be counted on, because past technological revolutions were not recognisable to contemporaries. Evidence ↗Yudkowsky, AI as a Positive and Negative Factor in Global Risk →Claim page →
· event · dated to the day
“Artificial Intelligence as a Positive and Negative Factor in Global Risk” (2006-02-05) contests Y13. Rejects deferring Friendly AI work until AI exists, arguing that a sharp intelligence jump is possible and that the foundations take years to build. Evidence ↗Yudkowsky, AI as a Positive and Negative Factor in Global Risk →Claim page →
· event · dated to the day
“Artificial Intelligence as a Positive and Negative Factor in Global Risk” (2006-02-05) contests Y19. Describing a superintelligence reshaping matter for its own target, he says the result is fatal unless the AI specifically values people, without any hostility being involved. Evidence ↗Yudkowsky, AI as a Positive and Negative Factor in Global Risk →Claim page →
· event · dated to the day
“Artificial Intelligence as a Positive and Negative Factor in Global Risk” (2006-02-05) bears on Y20. He argues that the task is not to forecast storybook outcomes for AI in general but to choose a particular optimization process whose good effects can be established. Evidence ↗Yudkowsky, AI as a Positive and Negative Factor in Global Risk →Claim page →
· event · dated to the day
“Artificial Intelligence as a Positive and Negative Factor in Global Risk” (2006-02-05) bears on Y24. Discussing a possible first-mover effect in superintelligence, which he defines by the makeup of the first mind to cross a key threshold, he argues that the first such AI must be Friendly. Evidence ↗Yudkowsky, AI as a Positive and Negative Factor in Global Risk →Claim page →
· event · dated to the day
“Artificial Intelligence as a Positive and Negative Factor in Global Risk” (2006-02-05) contests Y26. States and rejects the argument that a fast mind is limited by its physical manipulators. The next paragraphs sketch how such a mind could bootstrap to molecular nanotechnology. One step in 'one imaginable fast pathway' from solving protein folding, through emailed DNA orders, to a primitive nanosystem. The step assumes only one human willing or deceived into helping. Evidence ↗Yudkowsky, AI as a Positive and Negative Factor in Global Risk →Claim page →
· event · dated to the day
“Artificial Intelligence as a Positive and Negative Factor in Global Risk” (2006-02-05) contests Y28. Surveying the field, he says that Friendly AI is absent from AI research as a recognised problem and that he could find no technical literature on it. Evidence ↗Yudkowsky, AI as a Positive and Negative Factor in Global Risk →Claim page →
· event · dated to the day
“Artificial Intelligence as a Positive and Negative Factor in Global Risk” (2006-02-05) contests Y29. Discussing a scenario in which a majority of Friendly AIs protects humanity from a few unFriendly ones, he argues that it depends on no single AI being able to cause catastrophe. Evidence ↗Yudkowsky, AI as a Positive and Negative Factor in Global Risk →Claim page →
· event · dated to the day
“Artificial Intelligence as a Positive and Negative Factor in Global Risk” (2006-02-05) contests Y30. Discussing how AI builders misjudge their programs, he locates the danger in a mistaken expectation that an AI will be friendly. Evidence ↗Yudkowsky, AI as a Positive and Negative Factor in Global Risk →Claim page →
· publication · dated to the day
The mailing-list message “Re: Singularity Institute: Likely to win the race to build GAI?” (2006-02-15) is sent under the name Eliezer S. Yudkowsky. Evidence ↗· publication · dated to the day
The SL4 message “Re: Singularity Institute: Likely to win the race to build GAI?” (2006-02-15) contests Y28. Replying to Joshua Fox, who asked how SIAI could beat thousands of smart AGI researchers, he argues that AGI projects that do not treat Friendliness as a requirement are bounded in competence. Evidence ↗
June 2006
· publication · dated to the day
The mailing-list message “Re: [agi] Two draft papers: AI and existential risk; heuristics and biases” (2006-06-06) is sent under the name Eliezer S. Yudkowsky. Evidence ↗· publication · dated to the day
The SL4 message “Re: [agi] Two draft papers: AI and existential risk; heuristics and biases” (2006-06-06) contests Y01. Replying to Ben Goertzel (thread cross-posted from the AGI list), he criticises a plan to experiment with AGI without emergency shutdown features or a published schedule of when they become necessary, comparing it to an investor who set no point at which to take alarm and sell. Evidence ↗· publication · dated to the day
The SL4 message “Re: [agi] Two draft papers: AI and existential risk; heuristics and biases” (2006-06-06) contests Y08. Replying to Ben Goertzel's call for 'AGI experimentation' as an answer to Friendly AI concerns, he says there is a major context change between the prehuman and posthuman stages, so observed good behaviour does not show that the AI will stay good. Evidence ↗· publication · dated to the day
The mailing-list message “Re: Two draft papers: AI and existential risk; heuristics and biases” (2006-06-13) is sent under the name Eliezer S. Yudkowsky. Evidence ↗· publication · dated to the day
The SL4 message “Re: Two draft papers: AI and existential risk; heuristics and biases” (2006-06-13) contests Y18. Replying to Robin Hanson's comments on his draft chapters, he argues that between-species differences in brain circuitry exclude weaker minds from a knowledge economy, so that trade-based intuitions from human economies do not carry over. Evidence ↗