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Propositions · 7 propositions · 25 records · 2023–2025

Arguments about AI and biological risk

Which located texts, from 2023 to 2026, state, contest or bear on the published arguments about AI and biological risk: whether current systems already help an actor seeking biological harm, where the binding barrier lies, what published evaluations establish, whether design tools are a distinct case, whether synthesis screening is the control point, whether open weights raise the risk, and whom assessment must cover? For each proposition, which text is the earliest located?

Each argument is recorded as a proposition with one criterion. It is phrased generically and attributed to no one. A text that meets the criterion articulates the proposition. A text that disputes it contests it. A text that comes close bears on it, and its record names what is missing. Every record stays at the policy and evaluation level: it says what a text argues, not how anything could be done. Texts are listed in date order. The page records what texts say and when; it does not assess whether an argument is right, and it is not evidence about any risk.

A machine selected and arranged these records. No human review of the selection or framing is recorded.

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The original sources first, in date order, then every proposition on this page with its criterion, earliest located text and records. Each record gives its original source and the place in it, its role, register and dates, the qualification and the missing element of a context record, then the Selekoa identifiers. Stored paraphrases and permitted short quotes are included. Original documents are not.

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How to read a record
Articulates
A passage meets the proposition’s criterion.
Contests
A passage disputes the proposition or a premise it depends on.
Bears on
A passage comes close without meeting the criterion; the record names what is missing.
Earliest located
The earliest articulation the searches found, dated by its wording. It is not a claim that no earlier text exists. The earliest located text that contests a proposition is chosen by the same rule.
Earliest located use of the name
The earliest located text that uses the proposition’s usual name. A title can carry the name without stating the proposition.
Engages a premise, states the contrary
A contesting passage engages a premise when its paragraph, message or dialogue turn gives a reason against it. Otherwise it states the contrary conclusion only.
Dates
The first date is the one the work is dated by. “Wording attested” gives the date from which the quoted wording is known, when it survives only in a later copy. “Claimed” gives an earlier talk, draft or presentation that does not date the wording.
Register: the kind of text
Fiction, satire, a dream frame or a relay of another author is labelled. A passage in fiction records what the work says, not its author’s view. Unlabelled records are nonfiction.
Limits of this page
  • “Earliest located” means the earliest text found by the searches described under “How we searched”. It is not a claim of first use or first statement.
  • A record documents what a text says. It is not evidence that the proposition is true, that any system can do what a text says, or that any measure works.
  • A proposition is phrased generically and attributed to no one. Texts grouped under one proposition disagree with each other about much else.
  • Every record stays at the policy and evaluation level. No record carries a method, a protocol, an agent or a screening criterion, and where a source holds such content the record cites only its policy-level passages.
  • The codes D1 to D7 correspond to B1 to B7 in the research pack the records come from, which clashed with the dataset’s own B codes.
  • A machine selected and classified these records, and machine checks from two model families re-examined them. No person has reviewed them.

R · What current systems and evaluations show

Whether systems already available increase an actor’s ability, where the binding barrier lies, and what published evaluations of biological capability establish.

D1 Currently available AI systems increase an actor's biological-misuse capability

Criterion. The text states that AI systems already deployed or publicly available at the time of writing increase the ability of an actor seeking to cause biological harm, relative to the resources otherwise available to that actor.

Filled dots articulate, open dots contest, small dots bear on the proposition; a large dot is an earliest located text. A line below a dot runs to the date from which its wording is attested.

Texts that articulate or contest it (6)

  1. Articulates · Earliest locatedarXiv (preprint, Emily H. Soice, Rafael Rocha, Kimberlee Cordova, Michael Specter, Kevin M. Esvelt) · Can large language models democratize access to dual-use biotechnology?The preprint “Can large language models democratize access to dual-use biotechnology?” (arXiv v1, 6 June 2023) states that its results suggest that large language models will make pandemic-class agents widely accessible as soon as they are credibly identified, even to people with little or no laboratory training.2023-06-06 Inspect claim & evidence ↗Document page →
  2. ArticulatesarXiv (preprint, Jonas B. Sandbrink, Nuffield Department of Medicine, University of Oxford) · Artificial intelligence and biological misuse: Differentiating risks of language models and biological design toolsSandbrink's preprint on AI and biological misuse (arXiv v1, 24 June 2023) states that large language models such as GPT-4 are already able to provide dual-use information that could have enabled historical biological weapons efforts to succeed.2023-06-24 Inspect claim & evidence ↗Document page →
  3. Contests · Earliest located · Engages a premiseRAND Corporation · The Operational Risks of AI in Large-Scale Biological Attacks: Results of a Red-Team StudyRAND's report on the operational risks of AI in large-scale biological attacks (RR-A2977-2, 25 January 2024) states that it found no statistically significant difference in the overall viability of biological weapon attack plans generated with or without the aid of the large language models it tested, and that such planning is beyond the capability frontier of the models available in summer 2023.2024-01-25 Inspect claim & evidence ↗Document page →
  4. Contests · States the contraryInformation Technology and Innovation Foundation (blog; Martin Makaryan) · The Shift in Rhetoric on AI and Biothreats Is a Lesson on the Risks of Premature RegulationAn ITIF commentary of 30 April 2024 states that experts, having studied the issue more closely, have concluded that large language models do not introduce a new set of capabilities or significantly enhance existing ones that could lead to a biological attack.2024-04-30 Inspect claim & evidence ↗Document page →
  5. Contests · Engages a premisearXiv (preprint, Aidan Peppin, Anka Reuel, Stephen Casper and others) · The Reality of AI and BioriskThe preprint "The Reality of AI and Biorisk" (arXiv v1, 2 December 2024) states that the available literature does not support the notion that access to biological information and planning through current, publicly available large language models can significantly increase biorisk.2024-12-02 Inspect claim & evidence ↗Document page →
  6. ArticulatesRAND Corporation (working paper WR-A3853-1), posted to arXiv · Contemporary AI foundation models increase biological weapons riskThe RAND working paper "Contemporary AI foundation models increase biological weapons risk" (WR-A3853-1, arXiv v1 of 12 June 2025) states that contemporary AI models can meaningfully contribute to biological weapons development, against published safety assessments that assert minimal risk.2025-06-12 Inspect claim & evidence ↗Document page →

D2 The binding barrier is physical execution rather than information

Criterion. The text states that access to information is not the barrier that limits biological misuse, because what remains required is physical: acquiring materials and succeeding at hands-on laboratory work.

Earliest located
No located text meets the criterion.
Filled dots articulate, open dots contest, small dots bear on the proposition; a large dot is an earliest located text. A line below a dot runs to the date from which its wording is attested.

Texts that articulate or contest it (3)

  1. Contests · Earliest located · Engages a premisearXiv (preprint, Emily H. Soice, Rafael Rocha, Kimberlee Cordova, Michael Specter, Kevin M. Esvelt) · Can large language models democratize access to dual-use biotechnology?The preprint "Can large language models democratize access to dual-use biotechnology?" (arXiv v1, 6 June 2023) states that the agents it discusses would become widely accessible as soon as they are credibly identified, even to people with little or no laboratory training, against the premise that laboratory execution is the binding barrier.2023-06-06 Inspect claim & evidence ↗Document page →
  2. Contests · Engages a premiseRAND Corporation (working paper WR-A3853-1), posted to arXiv · Contemporary AI foundation models increase biological weapons riskThe RAND working paper of 12 June 2025 states that safety assessments mistakenly assume that biological weapons development requires tacit knowledge, that is, expertise gained through experience that cannot be conveyed in words.2025-06-12 Inspect claim & evidence ↗Document page →
  3. Contests · Engages a premiseAnthropic (Frontier Red Team) · LLMs and bioriskAnthropic's Frontier Red Team post "LLMs and biorisk" (5 September 2025) states that its 2024 pilot study, while not providing strong evidence either way about AI uplift, suggested that tacit knowledge may not be as significant a bottleneck as many have suggested.2025-09-05 Inspect claim & evidence ↗Document page →
Texts that bear on it without meeting the criterion (1)
  1. Bears onCenter for Security and Emerging Technology, Georgetown University · AI and Biorisk: An ExplainerCSET's explainer "AI and Biorisk" (December 2023) states that the barrier to scientific information is not high even for beginners, and that feasibility depends on both information and hands-on production success, without stating which of the two limits biological misuse.Missing: The explainer states that information and hands-on production success are both required; it does not state that access to information is not the barrier that limits biological misuse.2023-12 Inspect claim & evidence ↗Document page →

D3 Published evaluations do not establish real-world biological risk

Criterion. The text states that published evaluations or benchmarks of AI systems' biological capability do not, as conducted, establish the level of real-world biological misuse risk.

Filled dots articulate, open dots contest, small dots bear on the proposition; a large dot is an earliest located text. A line below a dot runs to the date from which its wording is attested.

Texts that articulate or contest it (3)

  1. Articulates · Earliest locatedarXiv (preprint, Aidan Peppin, Anka Reuel, Stephen Casper and others) · The Reality of AI and BioriskThe preprint "The Reality of AI and Biorisk" (arXiv v1, 2 December 2024) states that existing studies of AI-related biorisk are nascent, often speculative, or limited in methodological maturity and transparency.2024-12-02 Inspect claim & evidence ↗Document page →
  2. ArticulatesRAND Corporation (working paper WR-A3853-1), posted to arXiv · Contemporary AI foundation models increase biological weapons riskThe RAND working paper of 12 June 2025 states that flawed safety assessments resting on tacit knowledge and inadequate benchmarks may create a false sense of security, leading to weak safeguards and regulatory gaps.2025-06-12 Inspect claim & evidence ↗Document page →
  3. ArticulatesAnthropic (Frontier Red Team) · LLMs and bioriskAnthropic's Frontier Red Team post of 5 September 2025 states that text-based uplift trials of the kind it reports are imperfect proxies for real-world scenarios, which involve further factors it names.2025-09-05 Inspect claim & evidence ↗Document page →

G · What follows for governance

Whether biological design tools are a distinct case, whether screening orders for synthesised nucleic acids is the control point, whether publishing model weights raises the risk, and whether assessment must cover actors who already hold relevant skills.

D4 Biological design tools pose risks distinct from those of language models

Criterion. The text states that AI tools built to design or predict biological molecules or systems create misuse risks that differ in kind, in the actors they affect or in the governance they require, from those of general-purpose language models.

Filled dots articulate, open dots contest, small dots bear on the proposition; a large dot is an earliest located text. A line below a dot runs to the date from which its wording is attested.

Texts that articulate or contest it (3)

  1. Articulates · Earliest locatedarXiv (preprint, Jonas B. Sandbrink, Nuffield Department of Medicine, University of Oxford) · Artificial intelligence and biological misuse: Differentiating risks of language models and biological design toolsSandbrink's preprint (arXiv v1, 24 June 2023) differentiates large language models from biological design tools, stating that language models in particular lower barriers to biological misuse while design tools expand the capabilities of sophisticated actors.2023-06-24 Inspect claim & evidence ↗Document page →
  2. ArticulatesarXiv (preprint; workshop paper, Regulatable Machine Learning at NeurIPS 2023) · Towards Responsible Governance of Biological Design ToolsThe preprint "Towards Responsible Governance of Biological Design Tools" (arXiv v1, 27 November 2023) states that biological design tools pose distinct regulatory challenges and that regulatory proposals tailored to large language models may be less effective for them.2023-11-27 Inspect claim & evidence ↗Document page →
  3. ArticulatesCenter for Security and Emerging Technology, Georgetown University · AI and Biorisk: An ExplainerCSET's explainer of December 2023 treats biological design tools as a separate class from chatbots, stating that their use in its current state requires both scientific and programming expertise.2023-12 Inspect claim & evidence ↗Document page →

D5 Synthesis-order screening is a control point for AI-related biological risk

Criterion. The text states that screening orders for synthesised nucleic acids is a control point on which mitigation of AI-related biological risk depends.

Filled dots articulate, open dots contest, small dots bear on the proposition; a large dot is an earliest located text. A line below a dot runs to the date from which its wording is attested.

Texts that articulate or contest it (1)

  1. Articulates · Earliest locatedarXiv (preprint, Jonas B. Sandbrink, Nuffield Department of Medicine, University of Oxford) · Artificial intelligence and biological misuse: Differentiating risks of language models and biological design toolsSandbrink's preprint (arXiv v1, 24 June 2023) states that enhanced screening of gene synthesis is among the measures key to reducing the risks it describes.2023-06-24 Inspect claim & evidence ↗Document page →
Texts that bear on it without meeting the criterion (2)
  1. Bears onarXiv (preprint, Emily H. Soice, Rafael Rocha, Kimberlee Cordova, Michael Specter, Kevin M. Esvelt) · Can large language models democratize access to dual-use biotechnology?The preprint of 6 June 2023 states that promising nonproliferation measures include pre-release evaluations of language models by third parties, curation of training datasets, and verifiable screening of all DNA generated by synthesis providers.Missing: The passage proposes screening among three promising measures; it does not state that mitigation of AI-related biological risk depends on screening, which is the proposition’s criterion.2023-06-06 Inspect claim & evidence ↗Document page →
  2. Bears onarXiv (preprint; workshop paper, Regulatable Machine Learning at NeurIPS 2023) · Towards Responsible Governance of Biological Design ToolsThe preprint of 27 November 2023 states that the design capabilities of biological design tools could be used to evade DNA screening techniques, against the premise that screening at synthesis is a dependable control point.Missing: The passage states that the design capabilities could be used to evade screening; it does not contest screening’s role as a control point on which mitigation depends, which the contesting relation would require.2023-11-27 Inspect claim & evidence ↗Document page →

Headlines replaced

  • The preprint of 6 June 2023 on large language models and dual-use biotechnology, headlined as earliest located by the research pack of 2026-10-28. The cross-family check found that proposing screening among three promising measures does not state the dependence the criterion asks for. Sandbrink’s preprint of 24 June 2023, which states that reducing the risks depends on enhanced screening of gene synthesis, holds the role. Recorded 2026-10-30.
  • The workshop paper of 27 November 2023, headlined as the earliest located contesting text by the research pack of 2026-10-28. The cross-family check found that stating that design capabilities could be used to evade screening does not contest screening’s role as a control point. No contesting text holds the role. Recorded 2026-10-30.

D6 Public release of model weights increases biological misuse risk

Criterion. The text states that making model weights publicly available increases the risk of biological misuse, or that some models should for that reason not be released openly.

Filled dots articulate, open dots contest, small dots bear on the proposition; a large dot is an earliest located text. A line below a dot runs to the date from which its wording is attested.

Texts that articulate or contest it (3)

  1. Articulates · Earliest locatedarXiv (preprint, Elizabeth Seger and 21 other authors; Centre for the Governance of AI and others) · Open-Sourcing Highly Capable Foundation Models: An evaluation of risks, benefits, and alternative methods for pursuing open-source objectives"Open-Sourcing Highly Capable Foundation Models" (arXiv v1, submitted 29 September 2023) states that for some highly capable foundation models likely to be developed in the near future, open-sourcing may pose sufficiently extreme risks to outweigh the benefits, and names access to biological weapons knowledge among the dangerous capabilities at issue.2023-09-29 Inspect claim & evidence ↗Document page →
  2. ArticulatesarXiv (preprint; workshop paper, Regulatable Machine Learning at NeurIPS 2023) · Towards Responsible Governance of Biological Design ToolsThe preprint of 27 November 2023 identifies, among the challenges of regulating biological design tools, the potential for safeguards to be circumvented by open-sourcing model weights.2023-11-27 Inspect claim & evidence ↗Document page →
  3. Contests · Earliest located · Engages a premisearXiv (preprint, Sayash Kapoor, Rishi Bommasani and others) · On the Societal Impact of Open Foundation Models"On the Societal Impact of Open Foundation Models" (arXiv v1, 27 February 2024) states that across several misuse vectors, biological weapons among them, current research is insufficient to characterise the marginal risk of open foundation models relative to pre-existing technologies.2024-02-27 Inspect claim & evidence ↗Document page →

D7 Assessment must cover actors who already hold relevant skills

Criterion. The text states that assessment of AI-related biological risk must cover actors who already hold relevant scientific skills, and not only actors without them.

Filled dots articulate, open dots contest, small dots bear on the proposition; a large dot is an earliest located text. A line below a dot runs to the date from which its wording is attested.

Texts that articulate or contest it (1)

  1. Articulates · Earliest locatedRAND Corporation (working paper WR-A3853-1), posted to arXiv · Contemporary AI foundation models increase biological weapons riskThe RAND working paper of 12 June 2025 states that safety assessments rely on benchmarks that overlook the full range of potential threat actors and fail to account for how AI could enhance the capabilities of skilled individuals as well as enabling non-experts.2025-06-12 Inspect claim & evidence ↗Document page →
Texts that bear on it without meeting the criterion (2)
  1. Bears onarXiv (preprint, Jonas B. Sandbrink, Nuffield Department of Medicine, University of Oxford) · Artificial intelligence and biological misuse: Differentiating risks of language models and biological design toolsSandbrink's preprint (arXiv v1, 24 June 2023) states that biological design tools will expand the capabilities of sophisticated actors, and proposes interventions to deter biological misuse by such actors.Missing: The passage states that design tools expand the capabilities of sophisticated actors and proposes interventions aimed at them; it does not state that assessment must cover actors who already hold relevant skills, which is the proposition’s criterion.2023-06-24 Inspect claim & evidence ↗Document page →
  2. Bears onCenter for Security and Emerging Technology, Georgetown University · AI and Biorisk: An ExplainerCSET's explainer of December 2023 states that the biorisk landscape is not uniform and that specific scenarios and actors should be assessed individually, without stating that assessment must cover actors who already hold relevant skills.Missing: The explainer asks for scenario- and actor-specific assessment in general, but does not state that actors who already hold relevant scientific skills must be within the scope of assessment.2023-12 Inspect claim & evidence ↗Document page →

Headlines replaced

  • Sandbrink’s preprint of 24 June 2023, headlined as earliest located by the research pack of 2026-10-28. The cross-family check found that stating that design tools expand the capabilities of sophisticated actors does not state that assessment must cover them. RAND’s working paper of 12 June 2025, which states that safety assessments fail to account for skilled actors, holds the role. Recorded 2026-10-30.